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some activity which taken together exhibit properties not to be
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purposes or goals
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Preface 
Change and increasing complexity in all aspects of our lives seem
to be the only certainties in the modern world. The established
order is challenged almost every day by developments in
technology, political systems, social behaviour and in all types of
organisations. These developments generate a need for response
by managers who are faced with a bewildering variety of new
problems or "messes" (a mutiplicity of ill-defined problems and
anxieties), and, are charged with responsibility for solving them.
The problems range from the management of relationships
between all nations, between racial, religious and other groups
within and across nations, and to the management of our
"selves" within our societies.
Managers and consultants such as myself use organisational
models, abstractions from "reality," to assist in the
understanding of situations and the development of "appropriate
solutions." Unfortunately the dominant management models such
as Scientific Management, Bureaucracy Theory, Human Relations
and, less prominently, the Systems approaches, can all be
demonstrated to be inadequate for managers needs.
This three part thesis proposes that, whilst not perfect, Stafford
Beer's Diable System Model is a more adequate representation of
organisation for contemporary Managers than its predecessors.
The aim of the thesis is to explore the inadequacies of the
dominant models as compared with the cybernetic approach,
and, to report experiences of using the Viable System Model both
as a tool for organisational problem solving and as a way of
HUI
thinking about organisation. Finally the experiences will be
critically reviewed to highlight the benefits of this approach in
attaining organisational survival in an increasingly turbulent
environment.
The first part of the thesis consists of six chapters. It aims to
highlight the need for a more adequate model of organisation
that will enable the complex problems faced by contemporary
managers to be addressed, perhaps in some cases to be
anticipated and averted and in others to be "dissolved" rather
than solved. Chapter One reflects upon the increasing complexity
and the rate of change of the world. It is a principally practical
chapter showing some absurd results arising from the use of the
dominant approaches to organisation and illustrating the
inadequacy of those approaches for dealing with problems
arising in the contemporary organisational context. Chapter Two
introduces each of the principal organisational models, and, with
a cautionary note on the nature of models, reviews their
strengths and weaknesses. The final part of the chapter
introduces the Viable System Model and outlines its apparent
strength as a more adequate model for contemporary managers.
Chapter Three introduces the science of Cybernetics and reviews
the initiation and development of the subject, focusing on
"management cybernetics." The major models in organisation
theory are then related to the cybernetic model. The Viable
System Model is briefly introduced as the principal model of
"Organisational Cybernetics." The Viable System Model is fully
revealed in Chapter Four which will demonstrate how the model
has been derived from and develops the cybernetic principles
discussed in Chapter Three. The chapter concludes with a
HUH
discussion on the principles of the established methodology for
using the model. Chapter Five continues the exploration of the
Viable System Model with a literature review that covers the
major prior applications of the model and the developments and
principal criticisms of the entire approach. This enables the
lessons already learnt to be extracted. The philosophical position
of Stafford Beer in relation to his model and his concern with
human emancipation is explored. Chapter Six, which concludes
the first part of the thesis summarises the arguments for and
against the Diable System Model and highlights those elements
that will be pursued through the case studies and the critical
reflections.
The second part of the thesis contains four chapters. Chapter
Seven acts as an introduction to this part giving the background,
nature and extent of the principal case study, emphasising the
major issues and specifying the writer's role. Chapter Eight gives
a detailed account of the application in a franchised car
dealership, revealing both the successes and failures of the
application, as well as aspects with which the Viable System
Model was of no help. Chapter Nine moues on from that major
application to review uses of the model as a pedagogical device
and as a consulting tool in two other organisations. Application
of the Viable System Model to the writers' "self" is included as a
means of exploring the utility and generality of the model and
displaying its competence for small organisations. The need to
understand the different roles played by any one individual
within an organisation is emphasised. Chapter Ten acts as a
conclusion to Part Two, consolidating the work done, reviewing
the theory and practice of the Viable System Model and
reflecting on the experience. Critical reflection is used to draw
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out the lessons learned, which are synthesised and expanded
upon in Part Three.
Part Three of the thesis contains two chapters. Chapter Eleven
adopts a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats)
analysis to provide a critical framework through which to review
the lessons learnt, to make comparisons with the mainstream
models and to demonstrate the greater utility of the Viable
System Model. This section is followed by critical reflection on
the "new knowledge" gained from the thesis, showing how and
where the model may be considered useful, proposing changes to
the currently used methodology, and considering ways in which
the model can be made accessible as a "mainstream" model for
contemporary managers. Chapter Twelve contains final
conclusions and closes with proposals for further research into
the Viable System Model.
This thesis focuses on the Viable System Model with regard to its
ability to enable managers to deal with complexity in
organisations. That a second debate could be pursued, about its
contribution to dealing with conflict is acknowledged but that
debate falls outside the scope of this enquiry. Each of these
aspects deserves separate and comprehensive study. Further to
this the main aim of this thesis is to evaluate the Viable System
Model as it stands up in practice. This leads the thesis away from
debate on conflict which has tended to be a very theoretical
area, the main interest is in matters relating to the method and
theory of the Viable System Model in practise.
XIX
Chapter One 
A Problem of Organisation 
This chapter reflects on the increasing complexity and rate of
change of the world. Flaws and sometimes absurd results arising
from application of the dominant approaches to management are
presented as an indication of their limitations as problem solving
devices in the contemporary organisational context.
1.1 Introduction 
I started this research in 1989 after six years of professional
practice as an internal consultant with a major financial
institution. Experience during that period suggested to me that
the traditional tools and techniques used for thinking about
organisation and problem solving were inadequate for
contemporary management. Situations often appeared
intractable when the methods were applied, the complexity
absorbing capacity of the tools used not matching the complexity
generating capability of the organisational situation. This chapter
reveals flaws and sometimes absurd results arising from the
application of these dominant organisational models and
attempts to establish the need for a more adequate and rigorous
model.
1
1.2 Complexitq and the rate of chance 
"Today, the stuff of management includes the
Four Ms, (men, materials, machinery, money),
but is best denoted as: COMPLEXITY." (1 , PG 31)
The above quotation from Beer is abstracted from a chapter
concerning the measurement of variety in organisations, variety
being the measure of complexity; that is, the number of possible
states of a system.
1.2.1
The current century has seen substantial development, both in
technology, and, in the awareness of human needs and interests.
Each step in this development has seemed to increase the rate of
change leading to further development, and generating a
maelstrom of both new ideas and problems. Every advance
seems to have increased variety, (and so complexity), and
provided new options and choices, whilst the dominant
techniques and philosophies of management do not seem to have
kept pace with these changes.
1.2.2
The progress of technology has affected all aspects of our lives
from the fundamentals of how and what we eat, drink and
breathe to the ways and locations in which we work and play
and to the wider "security" of our nations and selves. The
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development of the aeroplane and jet engine now makes it
comfortably possible to conduct business and personal
relationships wherever in the world we choose. The maintenance
of contact with colleagues and family is facilitated by satellite
communications whilst the preparation of a piece of academic
work does not necessarily require full time residence at a
University, but perhaps a hotel bedroom, a portable computer
and a telephone for "on-line" discussion with a supervisor.
1.2.3
One outcome of these developments is the increase in the
number of possible interactions between people, organisations
and nation states. This increase in complexity may be expressed
as a function of the number of options available, i.e. variety.
'Mother outcome is that every step seems to follow its
predecessor more rapidly. Earlier technologies lasted the lifetime
of an individual, major steps forward in technology being
witnessed once in a lifetime or even over a period of centuries.
In the contemporary world what happens today becomes history
today, the life cycles of products, and of the organisations that
make them, seeming to become ever shorter.
1.2.4
The flood of development seen during the late 1980's has abated
in the early 1990's and the Japanese consumer products
companies in particular are reviewing their marketing, product
development and product life cycle strategies(2). However, this
3
should be seen as a temporary abatement driven by relatively
short-term changes in the global economy rather than a
slowdown in fundamental development. The pace of
technological change may reasonably be expected to continue to
increase even if, for short periods, consumers are unwilling or
unable to take advantage of it. Nevertheless, the possibility of a
high pace of reversionary technological change to a fundamental
survival economy cannot be entirely discounted for developed
economies in the wake of recent developments in Eastern Europe
and Russia and the development of industrialised economies
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
1.3 Problems with problem soluinq 
1.3.1
The increasing complexity and consequent uncertainty of the
contemporary world need to be reflected in the conduct of the
tasks of management. However, it seems to be the case that
most managers still adhere to the models of organisation
developed in and for a simpler time. Dominant management
models and decision making tools or disciplines largely focus on a
"reductionist" view of the world, fragmenting problems and
organisations and concentrating on improving the
"epiphenomena"( 3, PG HI ) of the system rather than the system
itself. The continued use of these tools and models and the
reliance on the assumptions that underlie them often appears to
generate absurd and unhelpful responses to contemporary
organisational problems. These tools often enable some
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incremental development but do little to address more
fundamental issues. It seems that installing mechanisms to
ensure ongoing adaptation of organisations should be considered
desirable in a continually changing world, yet the search is
normally for "the one best way", or, "the one best tool", for
dealing with a situation, and, once it has been discovered,
adhering to it at all costs.
1.3.2
One example is the 1991-93 UK recession. This may be viewed as
a function of the inadequacy of current management practice at
corporate, national and international government level. The
speed of the boom and bust cycle, which appears to have
increased throughout the twentieth century, seems to be
accelerating as economies are alternatively stimulated and
repressed according to the outputs of inadequate econometric
models using outdated information. Each response to a further
change in "economic indicators" appears to be more out of phase
with the situation than its predecessor, and is made in apparent
ignorance of the behaviour of other economies and governments.
Each government seems to be attempting to manage its economy
independently of others despite those economies being almost
inextricably linked through global companies and markets, such
linkages perhaps tending towards the development of the
phenomenon which Robb(4 ) has called Suprahuman flutopoietic
Systems, i.e. systems which are self-producing, and in principle,
beyond human control.
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1.3.3
Beer (1 P6 375) , whilst surely not the first to raise the issue,
says, in a discussion on measurement, that "If our information is
six months' out of date, then (since information is what changes
us) we are ready to deal with a world that is past and gone".
Since that work was published in 1979 there appears to have
been little progress, information used for decision making is still
out of date, i.e. by the time it is received the situation has
changed. It may now perhaps be three months old rather than
six, but decisions are still being made based on what has already
happened rather than what may be expected to happen now and
in the future.
Government decisions about interest rates may demonstrate this
point. Following the relaxation in the UK of exchange and credit
controls, the 1980's saw a massive expansion in credit for
personal purchases such as consumer durables and property.
Individuals and businesses borrowed against an expectation of
economic growth and low interest rates, assuming a continuation
of the, then present and recent past, into the future. Demand for
many products exceeded supply which led to an increased level
of imports, price rises and "inflation" in the economy. The
government answer to this was to raise interest rates perhaps
with the intention of reducing demand through more expensive
credit and thereby suppressing inflationary effects.
This raising of rates affected both new and existing borrowers
equally so that even those who had borrowed "wisely" were
penalised by the change. The change was further compounded by
the determination to maintain a fixed position within the
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European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that required the
government to retain high interest rates, and thus the
investment value of the pound, beyond the apparent
requirements of the UK economy. The effect of all this has been a
substantial fall in house prices, which were seen as having
reached unrealistically high levels in relation to incomes, a 30%
fall in the new car market, and the failure due to interest costs
of a large number of businesses. This has been accompanied by a
substantial rise in unemployment. Each of these aspects
interacting with every other reinforced the effects.
1.3.4
Failures can perhaps be seen here in more than one area. Firstly
action was taken too late and with too broad an effect. Secondly,
subsequent actions, such as the joining of the ERM, reinforced
the damping effect at the time when it should perhaps have been
easing. To the first failure an alternative could be considered,
that increases in base lending rates should only be applied to
new borrowing. This could be anticipated as having the effect of
slowing down rather than reversing growth trends. While
technology exists which would make this feasible, significant
change would be required in the financial relationship between
the central and commercial banks.
The second failure is more straightforward for, regardless of the
rules and regulations surrounding the European exchange rate
mechanism (ERM), it is difficult to see how it can ever be made to
work. World-wide, currency markets exist to facilitate
international trade. Most major currencies are floated
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independently and market forces largely determine their relative
values. If a currency, or group of currencies, is isolated and
relative exchange rates fixed by a mechanism that requires
other members of the group to intervene and support the
weakest ones, then a market is created for speculative trading
in those currencies. This is an invitation to money brokers to
increase their profits at the expense of the countries involved
through relatively small transactions. It is not necessarily the
individual amount of funds traded which is important but the
number of transactions and the nature of the activity in the
market, that is its dynamics. Traders in currency make their
profits in the same way as any other trader, that is they define
an opportunity or flaw in the market and "work it" to their
advantage.
The removal of the pound and other currencies from the ERM to
allow them to find their market value was followed by
speculative trading in the next most vulnerable, i.e. that which
was considered by currency dealers to have a price different to
its value in terms of the analysts view of the health of the
economy of the nation concerned. This process eventually
culminated in a relaxation of ERM rules which widened the
fluctuation bands for most currencies remaining within the
system to 15%. R banker engaged in foreign currency
transactions will normally regard 10% as an adequate
contingency allowance against currency fluctuations and hence
the implementation of 15% movement bands may be regarded as
an effective suspension of the mechanism, since currencies
would not normally be expected to vary in value to that extent.
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1.3.5
These examples, whilst simplified and excluding many factors of
fiscal policy, commercial duplicity and political and ideological
engineering, both show a "reductionist" approach to managing
situations. The first shows the attempt to use a single tool to
manage one economy in isolation from others. The second the
belief that an international trading currency can be "isolated"
from the influence of its environment.
1.3.6
R further problem of the traditional approach is that if "right"
answers are provided at all, it is instantaneously. They are
derived at a particular time in a particular environment, or set of
circumstances. However "right" they may be for that particular
time, any change in the organisation or its environment will
render them inappropriate.
Organisations tend to deal with this problem in one of two ways.
First they try to ignore the need for change, a particular feature
of bureaucracies. Second, they may spend large sums of money
on "management services" departments such as Organisation D
Methods or Work Study and Systems Analysis and Development
issues, to study and review systems, procedures, work methods
and management structures and make recommendations for
change.
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1.3.7
Taking the first of these options, unless it is subsidised or in
some way protected, the organisation is likely to eventually
undergo some major trauma such as insolvency, or alternatively
be ignored or substituted by its potential users. Examples of this
latter alternative are the Education and Health Services in the UK
that are funded by taxpayers. They are perceived by many not to
provide an acceptable standard of service and a significant
proportion of the population, who have the financial ability, are
willing to pay again to private institutions to obtain the level of
service that they require. Examples of insolvency through failure
to adapt to changes and customer requirements may be seen in
any of the so called "sunset" industries throughout the world,
e.g. Coal mining and shipbuilding in the UK. Complexifying factors
which are not accounted for in these simple examples include,
political and commercial duplicity, funding and taxation
arrangements and ideological influences.
1.3.8
The second option, whilst perhaps better in terms of
organisational survival, suffers from the problem that in the
time taken to review a situation, recommend changes and
implement them the circumstances have frequently changed
again. This renders the "solution" obsolete before it has been
implemented. Thus many organisations could be paying for
problem solving departments whose long term existence is
guaranteed by the inadequacy of their techniques and tools.
Rather than reducing costs for the organisation these may be
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R "problem situation" is identified at Ti and subjected to a
review, a key assumption of which is that the present problem
needs to be and can be cured. During the period that elapses
whilst the review is undertaken, proposals formulated and
agreed and changes implemented, the situation has moved from
T1 to 12. The results of the investigation of Ti are compared with
the new situation, either after a failed implementation or at a
follow up review. R mismatch between the "solutions" proposed
and the current situation, 12, is discovered and so a further
review is undertaken to "correct the mistakes". Whilst
"solutions" are being formulated to the situation existing at T2
further changes are taking place leading to a new situation, 13,
which will again generate a mismatch between solution and
problem. The cycle continues with a continual gap between the
perceived situation and the "reality".
The scale of the gap will vary with the extent of the review
undertaken. Elapsed time between the start of the review and
the acceptance of recommendations, the extent of the changes
being proposed and the rate of change of the situation will all
affect this aspect. There are cases, such as in short run
production environments, where every new order will require a
"review" of staffing, procedures etc. Such situations accentuate
the need for managers to be equipped with adequate problem
solving tools and for the organisation to be structured to deal
with the requirements of its operating environment.
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1.3.9
Fl small example of the problem-solution gap may be a work
study analyst. R clerical procedure will be studied in fine detail,
its elements reviewed, and a revised procedure devised to make
it more efficient. Using a database of established task times a
"standard time" for the job will be synthesised and a workload
monitoring system developed and installed based upon the
results. Rs a professional, the analyst will compare a number of
clerks undertaking the revised procedure and, after "rating" the
"standard time" will use an average result as the basis of
monitoring. There are a number of flaws in this:-
The clerks will often utilise a different procedure
to that which has been timed.
Over time the team of clerks will change and the
replacements will either not be trained to work
in the same way or will have a different average
rate of work.
The procedure becomes "institutionalised" and
will resist further adaptation. (Hence the
expression, "We've always done it like that!")
The procedure is based on the analyst's view of
"how the situation is". That is it is dependent on
the perception and acuity of the observer.
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The database used by the analyst may not
provide an accurate time for the tasks being
measured and another time may be "adapted".
The extent of the mismatch between the "measured workload"
and apparent workload undertaken is often quite significant.
1 .3.1 0
R larger scale example would be a review of the management
structure of an office of, say, 100 people. This situation is vastly
more complex than that outlined above. Whilst an organisation
chart may be in place that shows who reports to who, and, who
is responsible when things go wrong, it tells nothing of "how the
organisation works." Nonetheless, a review is undertaken in an
attempt to develop a revised organisation structure, which is
intended to make the office more effective in achieving some
more or less well defined objective. This process will take some
considerable time, and, using traditional approaches will
concentrate upon aspects such as unity of reporting lines, span
of control and, inevitably, the traditions of the particular
organisation.
R new chart will be derived, negotiated with the manager and,
normally after some modification, implemented with consequent
impacts on individuals, numbers employed, etc. This may or may
not lead to an "improvement" in the situation. Very often a
number of staff change seats, some will change job titles and
job descriptions, but nothing else changes. The way in which the
organisation works has been unaffected by the process because
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the organisation does not work according to the lines on the
organisation chart but upon the interactions of the people, their
needs and desires. The whole exercise has been futile.
The flaws in this situation are:-
The way in which the organisation actually
works was not, and probably could not be, fully
understood.
Any observations made by the "problem solver"
will have been made from his or her "expert"
perspective, often without any consultation with
the job-holders.
The "actual" situation has developed throughout
the review period, through staff changes,
differing requirements and procedures, such that
a solution is being proposed to a problem which
no longer exists in the form studied.
The difficulty seems to be that the approach to solving problems
adopted by most organisations is almost certain to fail because
the underlying assumptions are flawed. These assumptions are:-
The organisation can be understood through
reductionist analysis of the component parts.
Improvement to the parts will necessarily
improve the whole.
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The situation under examination is static and a
"solution" can be developed which will apply to
that situation even after time has elapsed.
1.4 Conclusion 
It is the contention of this chapter that the models of
organisation on which current management practices are based
and which are exemplified above are themselves now problems.
The management of complexity means creating processes for
dealing with the actions and interactions of whole organisations
within the context of a perceived purpose and a defined
environment whilst recognising the need for ongoing adaptation
to changes in all their aspects.
This thesis will follow two main themes, firstly that it will be
both more effective and less costly to develop organisations of
which mechanisms of learning and adaptation are an integral
part instead of an optional extra. Secondly that an "expert"
should seek to work with and develop the "problem owners"
view of a situation to enable a problem to be dissolved rather
than seek to impose his own view, and solution, upon it.
The final argument is that a systems perspective needs to be
taken and that one essential problem of organisations is
organisation.
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Chapter Two 
The Dominant Models for Orqanisation 
This chapter opens with a cautionary note on the nature of
models. R critical review of the dominant management models is
then undertaken which seeks to demonstrate their strengths and
weaknesses and highlights their underlying assumptions about
the nature of organisations. Finally the Viable System Model is
introduced as a more adequate model for contemporary
managers.
2.1 Models of orqanisation
The four principal models in organisation theory are the
Traditional or Rational, Human Relations, Systems and Cybernetic.
These approaches each have their own particular strengths and
weaknesses and these will be explored in this chapter. The
metaphors employed by Flood 6, Jackson( 5) will be used and they
make the point that "management theories offer only partial
visions of what organisations are like" (S PG 2 ). It is essential to
maintain this awareness that any organisational model is only an
explicit projection of a particular viewpoint, that is, a
representation of one view of "reality". It is "neither true nor
false: it is more or less useful," Beer ( 3 PG 2).
The first part of this chapter addresses that point, which may be
simply exemplified; the chapter proceeds by reviewing the
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dominant models for organisation and is, necessarily, my model
of what has been written about them. I trust it is "useful".
2.2 Problems with models of organisation 
That particular models of organisation have survived and proved
"more or less useful" for lengthy periods may be seen as a
reflection of their perceived utility during that time. For
example, many organisations have applied, and continue to
apply, the principles of Taylor's Scientific Management with
direct benefit to productivity or output although not, apparently,
to human emancipation. A problem with all organisational models
is, that if their apparent utility is sufficient for them to gain a
general acceptance, and, a close enough match occurs between
the personal desires, beliefs and expectations of the observer or
user and the outcomes of utilising the model, then the model
may come to be seen as the "reality". That is, the model is seen
as "How it (the organisation) is". The attempt is then made to
make the organisation a reflection of the model rather than the
model an interpretation of the organisation.
The danger arising from this attitude is that any flaw or
weakness in the model may be replicated in the organisation. fin
organisational model cannot be perfect unless it contains all the
complexity that may be generated and absorbed by people, by
their interactions with each other and by the technical and
environmental aspects of that which is modelled. None of the
existing models can claim to do this, each representing a low
variety perception of "reality" from an explicit or implicit
philosophical, social or technical viewpoint.
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The subsequent parts of this chapter will attempt to reveal these
viewpoints in the critical review of the dominant models. The
major issue when the Viable System Model is introduced is that it
is proposed as being "a more adequate model for contemporary
managers" than the others. It is not and cannot be perfect, it is
an abstraction from "reality" and as such holds different value
and meaning for every observer.
2.3 The Rational (Machine) Model ("Closed Sustem") 
2.3.1
The "machine" model of organisation reflects the scientific
management approach developed by Frederick Taylor, the
classical theory of Henri Fayol and the bureaucracy theory of
Max Weber. These collectively still dominate mainstream
management thinking. Each of these approaches regards the
organisation as a "technical apparatus"( 5 PG 8 ), and depends
upon fragmenting or dissecting an organisation into its
component parts for analysis and operation.
The "machine" approaches to organisation each arose in the late
19th and early 20th centuries and may be considered as logical
extensions of the advances then being made in machine
technology. Machines are, in general, designed to perform
specified tasks at known input/output rates and within specified
tolerances; these approaches assume that organisations can be
similarly designed.
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2.3.2
Taylor's Scientific Management is based on the four principles,
that management should( 6 PP 36-37);_
"....develop a science for each element of a mans
work, which replaces the old rule of thumb
method."
"....scientifically select and then train, teach and
deuelop the workman, whereas in the past he
chose his own work and trained himself as best
he could."
".... heartily co-operate with the men so as to
insure all of the work being done in accordance
with the principles of the science which has been
developed."
ensure that "....There is an almost equal division
of the work and the responsibility between the
management and the workmen. The management
take over all the work for which they are better
fitted than the workmen, while in the past
almost all of the work and the greater part of
the responsibility were thrown upon the men."
Huczynski and Buchanan( 7 PG 282) see Taylor's objectives as
being first, to improve efficiency by increasing output and
reducing "underworking", what Taylor( 6
 PG 19) described as
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"natural soldiering" and "systematic soldiering". Second, to
achieve "standardisation of job performance, by dividing tasks
up into small and closely specified subtasks." Finally, to instil
discipline, "by establishing hierarchical authority and introducing
a system whereby all management's policy decisions could be
implemented."
Whilst Taylor recognised that the worker in a given situation had
a( 6 PG 32) "mass of rule of thumb or traditional knowledge,"
which constituted his "principal asset or possession," he had a
poor view of the capabilities and intelligence of the worker. For
example, he believed( 6 PG 40 ) that "the science of handling pig
iron is so great and amounts to so much that it is impossible for
the man who is best suited to this type of work to understand
the principles of this science, or even to work in accordance with
these principles without the aid of a man better educated than
he is."
Taylor, saw the organisation as a machine, capable of being
specified, designed and controlled by management to achieve a
given purpose. The workmen were viewed as standardised
machine parts, interchangeable with every other of like design
and to be used at the discretion of management. His approach
was later followed by Gilbreth and Gantt who both attempted to
"humanise" Scientific Management, recognising the need for rest
(Gilbreth) and human needs and dignity (Gantt), albeit the
assumption remained that the worker was principally motivated
by money.
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2.3.3
Henri Fayol used the "machine" metaphor in writing that(8 PG
57):
"The body corporate of a concern is often
compared with a machine or plant or animal. The
expressions, "administratiue machine,"
"administrative gearing," suggest an organism
obeying the drive of its head and having all of its
effectively interrelated parts moue in unison
towards the same end, and that is excellent."
His perception of the excellence of the "machine" view is evident
in his proposals for organising and managing. He proposed( 8 PG
53 ) that "to organise a business is to provide it with everything
useful to its functioning: raw materials, tools, capital, personnel"
and saw six sets of activities as producing the organisation,
Technical, Commercial, Financial, Security, Accounting and
Managerial.
Fa Yol's proposed duties of managers reinforce this view, these
are(8 PP 5):-
To ensure that the plan is judiciously prepared
and strictly carried out.
See that the human and material organisation is
consistent with the objectives, resources and
requirements of the concern.
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Set up a single, competent, energetic guiding
authority.
Harmonise activities and co-ordinate efforts.
Formulate clear, distinct, precise decisions.
Arrange for efficient selection - each
department must be headed by a competent,
energetic man, each employee must be in that
place where he can render greatest service.
Define duties clearly.
Encourage a liking for initiative and
responsibility.
Have fair and suitable recompense for services
rendered.
Make use of sanctions against faults and errors.
See to the maintenance of discipline.
Ensure that individual interests are subordinated
to the general interest.
Pay special attention to unity of command.
Supervise both human and material order.
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Have everything under control.
Fight against excess of regulation, red tape and
paper control.
The managerial duties reflect Fayol's fourteen principles of
Management: Division of work (specialisation), Authority,
Discipline, Unity of Command, Unity of Direction, Subordination
(the interest of the organisation is more important than that of
the individual), Remuneration, Centralisation (a question of
continuously varying proportion), Scalar chain, Order, Equity,
Stability of tenure, Initiative and Esprit de corps.
Some of these "managerial duties" and Principles of Management
appear to conflict with the machine view and with each other,
e.g. "Define duties clearly" and "Encourage a liking for initiative
and responsibility", or "specialisation" and "initiative," the first
of which would in each case appear to preclude or at least make
difficult the second. The admonition to managers to "fight
against excess of regulation, red tape and paper control" stands
in sharp contrast to his view that the work should be "clearly
divided", "judiciously planned and strictly carried out," aspects
which carry with them an implication of machine like precision
and heavy reliance on record keeping.
The overall impression remains that Fayol, like Taylor, viewed the
organisation as a machine. The management were responsible for
forecasting, planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating and
controlling whilst the "workers", distinguished by "technical
ability characteristic of the business,"(8 PG 8) were component
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parts to be fitted into the machine at the most appropriate place
with "a place for everyone and everyone in his place." (8 PG 36)
2.3.4
Max Weber's "Bureaucracy Theory" is developed from his views
of three types of legitimate authority in organisations, Rational,
Traditional and Charismatic. The first of these was seen by
Weber(9 P G 3 ) as representing legal authority, with "obedience
owed to the legally established impersonal order." He considered
that( 9 P G 8) the "purest type of exercise of legal authority is
that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff," and
that bureaucracy was not simply desirable but indispensable to
cope with the, then, complexities of organisations. He considered
that the increasing general technical knowledge had as a
consequence, a need for an increase in the particular technical
knowledge of individuals, in order for them to effectively
administer an organisation.
R bureaucracy was seen by Weber as being composed of a
hierarchical organisation of "offices", each acting according to
the rules and norms of the organisation within a specified area
of competence. Individuals within this structure were appointed
on rational grounds to perform a specified function, without
gaining rights to that appointment or having ownership of the
organisation. fill decisions, rules and acts were to be recorded in
writing, in order, together with the "continuous organisation of
official functions," to "constitute the office." Weber saw a clear
choice in organisations between "bureaucracy and
.000"
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dilettantism"(9 PG 12), and proposed that bureaucracy was an
inevitable requirement to support large organisations.
The "machine" view is evident again in this case, Weber
proposing that every function, and every act of every office is
capable of being specified to an exact degree. People were
clearly viewed as functionaries within the bureaucracy, bringing
no human element to the conduct of the affairs of the
organisation.
2.3.5
There are a number of assumptions underlying these three
rational views of organisation which need to be stated before
summarising their strengths and weaknesses. These assumptions
are:-
that an organisation can be treated as isolated
from environmental influence;
that an improvement in the performance of a
part will necessarily improve the performance of
the whole;
that the organisation must be studied from the
perspective of the goals of management;
that an organisation can be understood and
designed in machine terms to perform a
particular function and once so designed it need
not be adapted.
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Each of these assumptions has been challenged through
developments in thinking about organisations and human well-
being during the current century. Practical experience of using
the model in organisations has also shown that the assumptions
are flawed. Flood E, Jackson( 5 PG 9 ) consider that the machine
view is useful in practice when the organisation operates in a
stable environment, performing a straightforward task, such as
repetitive production of a single product and when the "human
parts" are prepared to follow "machine-like" commands. They
consider that its usefulness is limited since it reduces the
adaptability of organisations and the "mindless contribution" is
difficult to maintain with "mindful parts", leading to
dehumanisation or conflict.
The strengths of the model are:-
that it enables systematic, methodical analysis
of specific tasks;
it assists in "ordering" organisations (deriving
order from chaos);
it provides a useful guide to creating
organisations where demands on individuals
need to be precise or exact, e.g. the Armed
Forces or the Nuclear industry.
Its weaknesses are:-
that no account is taken of influence by or on
the environment of the organisation;
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there is little acknowledgement of the
interdependence of parts and no means of
dealing with it;
there is no recognition of the possible need for
adaptation and how to address that need,
the model is static not dynamic;
people are "dehumanised";
no help is provided with determining the
"purpose" of an organisation;
the emphasis on "command" and "control"
through the use of hierarchy may give succour to
the 'inevitable growth of bureaucracy";
the focus of attention is principally
"commercial" organisations;
it is only applicable to organisations which are
"real", that is those which have some legal or
formal existence, it cannot help with informal
organisations;
whilst the tools may be used in a diagnostic way
to compare an actual situation with a proposed
ideal, no prescription for "curing" ineffective
organisations is offered.
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It can be seen then that whilst the "machine" view offers some
assistance, its weaknesses are such that it must be seen as an
inadequate approach for managers today.
2.4 The Human Relations and Sustems (Oruanic) Model 
("Open Sustem") 
Whilst benefits could and can still be obtained from the rational
approaches, their lack of humanity is demonstrated by the
difficulties which emerge during their application with the
people involved. The human relations model of organisation
emerged as a means of addressing these difficulties, and was
the first significant challenge to the "machine view".
The "organic"( 5 PG 9 ) or "organism" analogy stems from the
origins of modern systems thinking in the biological sciences and
attempts to deal with attainment of survival of the system
rather than achievement of particular goals. While survival may
be seen as a legitimate goal it may not sufficiently represent the
purpose of the organisation. This "organic" view first found
expression in organisations through what has become known as
the Human Relations Model. This considers that attention must be
paid to the human aspects of organisation and gives primacy to
the roles, needs and expectations of the human participants.
Particular emphasis is given to issues of motivation,
management style, and participation as critical success factors.
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2.4.1
While the "Hawthorne" studies of Roethlisberger and Dickson
with Mayo indicated an early systems approach to management
(10 PG 74) ,
 attempting to capture and understand the
relatedness of all the parts involved, later work in this field by
Maslow, Herzberg etc., did not use a systems model. The later
developments still adopt a reductionist and "closed system"
view of the organisation, concentrating on improving the
performance of parts not wholes.
Mayo argued that, "In modern large-scale industry the three
persistent problems of management are (11 PG 61):_
The application of science and technical skill to
some material good or product.
The systematic ordering of operations.
The organisation of teamwork - that is, of
sustained co-operation."
Following Chester Barnard, he saw that the first two of these
would operate to make an industry effective, the third to make
it efficient. He considered that the application of science and
technical skill and the systematic ordering of operations were
attended to, the first by continuous experiment, the second
being already well developed in practice. He saw the third
element as neglected but necessary if the organisation as a
whole were to be successful.
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Mayo became involved in the "Hawthorne" studies after they had
examined the effects on workers of changes in the physical
environment. Experiments had shown that social and
psychological factors were present and the studies became
focused on these human issues, whilst records were kept of
every aspect of changes made and their impact, to establish a
"systemic" view. Further experiments were conducted and
followed by formal interviews which revealed that many of the
particular organisations' difficulties related to emotional rather
than rational conditions. R further experiment showed that
informal group pressures had more influence on output and
performance than the economic pressures of the formal
organisation.
The "Hawthorne" studies are credited with having discovered the
importance of groups in organisations, the influence of the
observer on the observed, and the need to ensure that the goals
and objectives of staff are not in conflict with those of the
organisation. Notwithstanding subsequent criticisms of the
research methodology and interpretation of the findings, the
studies are generally seen as the foundations of the human
relations approach.
2.4.2
Maslow( 12 ), whilst seeing that the "individual is an integrated,
organised whole"( 12 PG 19) ,
 proposed a hierarchy of human
needs. These needs were; physiological (food and health), safety
(security), belongingness and love (the need to belong to a
group), esteem (the need to be valued by oneself and others),
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and, self-actualisation (the need to be all that one can be). He
considered that the needs were all contained within each other
such that "if one need is satisfied then another emerges"( 12 PG
53) although the satisfied need remains present, that is to say
that each need is ever present even when not "prepotent."
2.4.3
Frederick Herzberg, in his studies of motivation in the industrial
and commercial context, built upon the foundation laid by
Maslow. Through a series of observations and interviews with
samples of people at work, he found that two sets of factors
influenced the level of motivation; these he called "hygiene" and
"motivators." (13 ) "Hygiene" factors concerned the maintenance
of conditions that were conducive to satisfaction. If satisfactory
conditions did not pertain then the worker would be dissatisfied
with his job position; conversely, achievement of a satisfactory
standard would not positively motivate. Positive motivation
would be derived from "motivators" which were seen as actively
encouraging an increased contribution. These factors are
summarised as follows( ? PG 74):-
Motivators - Rchieuement, Recognition,
Responsibility, Rdvancement, Growth, The work
itself.
Hygiene - Salary, Company Policy, Supervision,
Status, Security, Working conditions.
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Summarising, Herzberg concludes that in order for organisations
to achieve improved levels of performance they must address
both types of factor. He considered that "good hygiene will
prevent many of the negative results of low morale"( 13 PG 131),
but this on its own was not enough, writing, "our emphasis
should be on the strengthening of motivators." (13 PG 132 ) This he
saw as being achieved by restructuring jobs; providing workers
with some degree of control over their achievement; meaningful
job rotation; selection of staff to match the needs of the task;
effective supervision through planning, organising and support (a
link with Taylor's work); and, appropriate participation.
Finally, Herzberg et al, recognised that "there are large
segments of our society to which these prescriptions cannot
possibly appiw(13 PG 138). They considered that these people
could obtain a good life from "fruitful hobbies and improved lives
outside the job," and that "the greatest fulfilment of man is to
be found in activities related to his own needs as well as those
of society"(13 PG 139)
2.4.4
The principal strength of the Human Relations model is the
emphasis that it places on the human element of organisations,
recognising that people are not "machine" parts but individuals
who have needs and desires.
There are a number of weaknesses in this approach that make it
inadequate for the needs of contemporary managers. Firstly,
notwithstanding the warning from Herzberg et al, that human
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needs could be, and for some people, need to be met outside the
workplace, the assumption underlying many applications of
Human Relations Theory is that these needs must be met at work.
Secondly, the human relations model does not allow for the
supremacy of the organisational goals and objectives, its needs
driven by technology, or the operating environment, over human
goals and needs; a supremacy which, in terms of the
organisation's survival, may be necessary. Finally, and, in terms
of this debate perhaps most importantly, the model does not
assist with the specifics of designing and structuring
organisations to cope with the complex tasks faced by
contemporary managers nor with the interface of the
organisation with its environment.
2.4.5
Systems Thinking emerged as a further challenge to the
traditional and human relations models and falls within the
"organic" view. This approach is "holistic", attempting to deal
with organisations as "wholes" rather than parts, considering
the organisation as a complex network of elements and
relationships, and recognising the interaction with the
environment in which the organisation is contained. Thinking
about organisations as "systems" has built upon the early work
of Barnard, Selznick and von Bertalanffy to become a major, if
not dominant, approach for managers.
Parsons and Smelser are seen by Jackson( 14 ) as having made the
best known attempt to "elaborate four functional imperatives to
be fulfilled for a system, by its sub-systems, if that system is to
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continue to exist." These imperatives are adaptation, goal-
attainment, integration and latency (pattern maintenance) and
make up the RGIL mnemonic. These terms are taken to mean(14
PG 57):-
R = Rdaptation; the system has to establish
relationships between itself and its external
environment.
G = Goal-attainment; goals have to be defined
and resources mobilised and managed in pursuit
of those goals.
I = Integration; the system has to have a means
of co-ordinating its efforts.
L = Latency (or pattern maintenance); the first
three requisites for organisational survival have
to be solved with the minimum of strain and
tension by ensuring that organisational "actors"
are motivated to act in the appropriate manner.
Jackson( 14 PG 57 ) interprets this differently, seeing four primary
sub-systems, goal, human, technical and managerial, as essential
prerequisites. He considers that effectiveness and efficiency are
attained through the interaction of the sub-systems in pursuit of
the purpose of the system in its environment.
The goal sub-system is concerned with the purpose of the
system and the means of achieving that purpose; the human sub-
system deals with the people and their management and
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motivation; the technical sub-system handles the operations (i.e.
input - transformation - output); and the managerial sub-system
co-ordinates and manages each of the others, balancing their
relationships and attending to the environmental relationships.
While the "systems" model provides a broader view than the
machine and human relations models, in particular in its
recognition of the environment, it still retains some particular
weaknesses. Firstly it takes survival as the primary aim of the
system, overriding achievement of goals and effectively ignoring
the high volume of achievement oriented activity undertaken in
contemporary organisations of all types. Secondly, the systems
model seems to "reify"( 15 PG 4 ) organisations, to grant them a
"mind," that is to say, to allow them power of thought and deed.
This is to ignore the rational human activity which drives the
apparently mystical adaptations. Thirdly, no adequate method of
measuring achievement of goals has been developed. Fourthly,
interdependence of the parts is stressed but, again no
measurements are available for determining "how much
interdependence" does or should exist. Finally, the "solutions"
proposed in the theory are vague and untested, emphasising
system maintenance perhaps to the detriment of survival
through the inhibition of radical change.
To summarise the "organic" view, while the Human Relations
model gave primacy to the role of the people in the organisation
and suggested ways of increasing their satisfaction, it did
nothing for the achievement of the objectives of the
organisation and said little about how the complex tasks of the
organisation could be structured. The Systems model, whilst
taking account of the environment for the first time, focuses on
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survival rather than objectives. It does not attempt to quantify
the success of an organisation, and says little about "how"
organisations adapt. The potential for relative autonomy is not
explored and little specific advice is offered in terms of "tested"
remedies for ineffective organisations.
2.4.6
Flood 6, Jackson( 5 P G 10) consider that the "organic" view is of
practical value when, there is an open relationship with the
environment, when survival or adaptation needs are
predominant and when the environment is complex. They believe
that it fails because it does not recognise that organisations are
socially constructed phenomena which, it can be argued, need to
be understood from the perspective of the participants;
emphasis is on harmony, whereas conflict and coercion are often
present, and, change is environmentally driven, rather than
driven by the organisation itself.
This "organic" view, whilst offering some significant advantages
over the "machine" view still appears inadequate for
contemporary needs.
2.5 The Neurocubernetic ("Viable Sustem") Model 
Stafford Beer's Diable System Model (USM) emerged from his
work on cybernetics in the 60's and 70's. It is an observer
dependent and general model of any organisation, developed in
"The Heart of Enterprise"(1) from cybernetic first principles. It
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takes a holistic view of organisation, and draws on cybernetic
principles to deal with the underlying structure of organisation
itself rather than with the "epiphenomena"( 3 PG HI) of the
system.
2.5.1
Beer proposes that a viable system must have five sub-systems
dealing with implementation, co-ordination, control, planning and
policy. These five sub-systems are connected via a network of
communication channels and transducers, which carry
information on a real time basis. This structure is considered to
enable the organisation to learn and adapt so that it can survive
in a changing environment. It is Beer's argument that
organisations must answer to the laws of viability and that use
of the model in a diagnostic process will enable the identification
and rectification of faults that threaten survival.
Beer believes that use of his model will enable organisations to
deal more adequately with the increasing complexity of the
world than the more traditional approaches. The best known
application to date was in Allende's Chile in the early 70's, an
application cut short by the revolution in that country. This was
an attempt to model a national economy, something which could
not even be considered with the models of organisation
described earlier in this chapter.
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2.5.2
The Viable System Model, as with any other, is not immune to
criticism. It is seen to be difficult to apply in practice, both
because of the lack of an adequately refined methodology,
recently addressed by Flood D Jackson( 5 ), and because its
effective use threatens the power and influence of the
"establishment". It is claimed to be open to autocratic abuse
because it emphasises control. Beer himself is obviously
concerned with human interests and notes that human beings
are at the heart of any enterprise and that overriding human
interest will threaten viability, a part of the philosophy of the
Viable System Model that is often forgotten.
The model is seen by many to be relying on mechanical and
biological analogies although Beer( 1 ) again states that these are
explanatory devices, the model being developed from first
principles of cybernetics. Variety, the measure of the number of
possible states of the organisation is criticised for being an
inadequate measure for scientific work, and is seen as
uninformative in relation to the management of social
organisations.
While Beer emphasises the ability to learn and adapt as being
key abilities of a Diable System, the model is accused of
emphasising stability at the expense of change. This accusation
is carried through to the concern with the achievement of goals
which are considered to be pre-ordained in the definition of the
system, and to disregard environmental relationships necessary
for survival. The model is further held to give an impoverished
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account of the organisation, missing out much of importance, and
to understate the purposeful behaviour of individuals.
2.5.3
Following Flood & Jackson's first principle of Total Systems
Interuention( 5 PG 59 ) that, "organisations are too complicated to
understand using one management "model" and their problems
too complex to tackle with the "quick fix";" it is not proposed
that the Uiable System Model is the only useful model of
organisation. It is proposed that it is the most useful to
contemporary managers. This is because it attempts to deal with
the invariant nature of organisation itself and with the systems
of communication and control which determine the "nature" of
the system and its emergent characteristics. These in turn
determine the "metaphor" through which the participants in the
organisation will view it, that is whether they consider that they
work in a "machine", "organic" or other type of organisation.
2.6 Summar
This chapter, after warning of the limitations of models and the
dangers of over-reliance on them, has, through a critical review,
attempted to show the inadequacy of the dominant models used
by managers to deal with the complexity of contemporary
organisations. The [liable System Model has been briefly
introduced and some criticisms stated: notwithstanding these,
the model is proposed as the most adequate representation of
organisation currently available to managers.
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The next chapter will introduce the science of cybernetics and its
deuelopment to date. The cybernetic models will then be related
to the major models already described and the distinction
between "management cybernetics" and "organisational
cybernetics" will be explored.
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Chapter Three 
The Cubernetic Insioht 
This chapter introduces the science of cybernetics and the
principal models in "management cybernetics". The first section
reviews the development, history and multi-disciplinary nature
of the science, and considers the principles and tools of the
cybernetic approach. The next part relates the cybernetic model
to the dominant models explored in Chapter Two. The distinction
between "management cybernetics" and "organisational
cybernetics" is then drawn and the Viable System Model revealed
as the principal tool of the latter.
Terms used throughout this chapter are explained in the glossary of cybernetic terms.
3.1 Development and History of Cybernetics 
"As to sociology and anthropology, it is manifest
that the importance of information and
communication as mechanisms of organisation
proceeds beyond the individual into the
community",(16 PG 27)
Cybernetics was defined by Wiener( 16 ) as "the science of control
and communication in the animal and the machine". The word
cybernetics is drawn from the Greek "kybernetes" meaning
"steersman," which was the word used by Plato to describe,
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literally, a ships helmsman, and, metaphorically, the art of
government, i.e. steering the ship of state.
Wiener, a mathematician, and Rosenblueth, a physician together
with other mathematicians, anthropologists, engineers and so
on, were concerned in the 1940's with the study of control and
communication in a range of scientific areas. These studies
ranged from medicine and weapons systems to computing
devices. They recognised "the unity of the set of problems
centering about communication, control and statistical
mechanics, whether in the machine or living tissue" (16 PG 19).
They saw their work as sufficiently different from their original
areas of expertise, and sufficiently general in its application, to
warrant a title of its own. Through structured research they
sought to explore the validity of their ideas and develop new
knowledge in the science of cybernetics.
Wiener recognised at an early stage that he and his group had
"contributed to the initiation of a new science
which, 	 , embraces technical developments
with great possibilities for good and for evil".
(16 PG 38).
This chapter will reveal the principles of cybernetics and the
possibilities with which Wiener was concerned, but, as with all
human knowledge, the principles cannot be denied existence
simply because they can, in terms of one person's set of values
or ethics, be misapplied. Cyberneticians and their opponents
continue to share Wiener's concern that the cybernetic insights
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may be abused and this is one of the principal criticisms of this
approach to management.
3.2 Meaning and role 
This thesis is concerned with the application of the science of
cybernetics to social systems; that is to say, the management of
organisations which are societies, composed of people and
existing as the product of their actions, interactions, and of the
technical artefacts which link and support them. Early work,
from which the cybernetic principles were developed, addressed
such diverse fields as automation, computing and radar and built
upon earlier discoveries such as Watt's steam engine governor,
which are used to illustrate what Jackson( 17 P g 102 ) has called
"Management cybernetics".
Organisational cybernetics builds upon and draws ideas from that
fundamental work, but "breaks somewhat with the mechanistic
and organismic thinking that typifies management
cybernetics"( 17 PG 103). The distinction is drawn by Jackson on
the basis of two differences between the work of Stafford Beer
and that of others in this field. Firstly, in "The Heart of
Enterprise"( 1 ) Beer builds a model of "any organisation" from
first principles of cybernetics, and, secondly he pays significant
attention to the role of the observer whose presence influences
the situation observed. Rccepting the intellectual insights of
Stafford Beer, it is possible to utilise the principles of
cybernetics without entirely relying on analogies between the
system observed and other natural phenomena. It can be
recognised that the existence and behaviour of the organisation
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studied is, to some degree, a function of the perceptions of the
observer.
Beer defines cybernetics as "the science of effective
organisation" and that definition will serve throughout this text
as the meaning of organisational cybernetics. That definition and
the application of cybernetic principles are intended to help with
the problems of organisation discussed in Chapter One. The role
of cybernetics is to help the manager (defined as any person
legitimately attempting to command and control an organisation)
to understand:-
How the system (organisation) works (or doesn't
work).
Why it works that way.
What to do about the organisation to influence
the outcome in a way which is beneficial to the
perceived purposes being served.
This is because "Cybernetics 	  treats, not things but ways of
behauing "(18 pg 1).
3.3 Characteristics, Tools and Principles of cubernetics 
"The truths of cybernetics are not conditional on
their being derived from some other branch of
science“( 18 PG 1).
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This section will first introduce the major characteristics of
systems suitable for the cybernetic approach. Key tools of
cybernetics and the principles which they follow will then be
introduced. Notwithstanding the above quote from Ross Ashby, a
number of the principles have been derived from "some other
branch of science" but it is in taking account of the role of the
observer that they reflect the essentially cybernetic operation
of those natural systems which have been studied. That is to say,
that the principles of cybernetics can be seen to operate in
nature and to be concerned with "general laws that govern
control processes, whatever the nature of the system under
governance"( 17 PG 92).
3.3.1 Systems: a starting point
Cybernetics is a strand of systems thinking. This way of thinking
recognises that a "whole" system exhibits emergent properties
that are not to be found in its parts. For example, a ship is a
system which will float, while any of its parts or "sub-systems,"
taken in isolation, will sink. The ability to float is the ship's
"emergent property". Similarly, each of the ship's sub-systems
has properties which the ship as the containing system does not.
The engine can convert potential energy (fuel) into heat, which
can be used to generate steam. The action of the steam on a
turbine converts the heat energy to rotary motion which,
through an output shaft and propeller, causes the horizontal
motion of the ship. The ability of the engine and output shaft to
convert potential energy to horizontal motion is not a property
to be found in any of its parts or sub-assemblies, or in the ship
itself, it is a property of the "engine system" as a whole.
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Cybernetics, as with the whole of the systems tradition, takes as
its starting point the "Input - Transformation - Output" model.
This reflects the idea that a system carries out some activity, the
transformation, and is open, i.e. it imports "instructions" (in the
form of energy, information, materials etc.) and acts upon those
instructions to produce an output. The theoretical basis of
cybernetics is that this model allows management, i.e. regulation
of the selected inputs-transformation-outputs, to be studied in
its own right, the task of management in any particular case
being determined by the nature of the system being controlled
and the environment in which the system is embedded.
3.3.2 Characteristics of cybernetic systems
While the early studies of Wiener et al. dealt with problems of
communication and control in "machines and living tissue",
subsequent developments have taken cybernetics into the wider
field of management. Beer( 19 ) considers that, in order to be a
worthwhile subject for the application of the cybernetic
approach, the system will be likely to demonstrate extreme
complexity, a degree of self-regulation and probabilistic
behaviour. He views organisations as exhibiting these
characteristics.
Beer(19 PG 12) designates as "exceedingly complex" a system
which is so complicated that it cannot be described in a precise
and detailed fashion. To explain this point, the wiring loom of a
car is, in Beer's terms, "complex but describable", its design and
connectivity can be, and, in fact, are recorded. fin example of an
exceedingly complex system would be an interaction between
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two people in a meeting. This, apparently simple to observe and
record, would, in fact, not be describable, because the nuances,
inflections of speech and bodily postures adopted all form a part
of the transaction. The meeting would, following Clemson( 20 PG
19) , "have more relevant detail than the given observer can
possibly cope with", although increasing the number of
observers would, perhaps, counter this.
Self-regulation describes the ability of a system to "manage"
itself towards its purposes or goals despite environmental
disturbance e.g. maintenance of body temperature. The system
behaves in an autonomous manner.
Probabilism exists where there are elements of the system
whose behaviour is at least partly random. Returning to the
example of the car wiring loom, it is not only "complex but
describable," it is also "deterministic." Its behaviour can be
known in advance as any given input to the system, e.g.
operating a switch, will generate a precisely predictable
outcome. This argument assumes that the wiring loom is in
working order. The outcome of the meeting between two people
would be "probabilistic." This is because, while the agenda for
discussion may be known in advance, and a "most likely"
outcome predicted the variables in the meeting, such as mood,
posture and experience, of the parties, separately and together,
make the outcome uncertain.
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3.3.3 Cybernetic Tools
The cybernetic tools for dealing with these exceedingly complex,
self-regulating, probabilistic systems are:-
0 the black box technique - to address extreme
complexity.
0 feedback - to manage self regulation.
0 variety engineering - to handle probabilism.
These will be dealt with in turn.
3.3.3.1 The Black Box Technique
Complexity is the property of the system that the black box
technique enables the cybernetician to address. Clemson's
definition of complex is (op.cit.), having "more relevant detail
than the given observer can possibly cope with". Schoderbek et
al . (21 PG 94) consider that complexity is a property of a system,
which, when examined from a non-quantitative viewpoint, is the
product of the interaction of four main aspects, the number of
elements, their interactions, their attributes, and, their degree
of organisation. The number of elements refers to the number of
sub-systems contained in the system being examined. The
interactions describes the richness of the connectivity between
those elements. Rttributes refers to the individual properties of
the elements, that is their particular nature and features. The
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degree of organisation is the extent to which the interactions
and attributes are guided by predetermined rules.
It should be apparent that the interaction of these four
"determinants" can generate what would be seen as an
exceedingly complex system. Rs such it would not lend itself to
reductionist analysis, such an approach would "destroy" the
system and cause the emergent properties to "disappear". The
system then examined would be different from that which was
initially identified.
The need to study the system while interfering minimally with its
internal operation, leads to the use of the black box technique.
This is a way of gaining knowledge about the operations carried
out by a system without the need to reduce it to its component
parts, this leads to Beer's "First Regulatory Aphorism":-
"It is not necessary to enter the black box to
understand the nature of the function it
41 PG 40) .performs
Essentially the black box technique inuolues manipulating the
inputs to a system and recording the effect on its outputs in
order to establish patterns or regularities in its behauiour. As
knowledge or understanding of the system is acquired the
manipulations can become more structured. The black box
technique is shown diagramatically in Figure 3.1.
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The Black BOX Technique
(after Schoderbek et. al. as
adapted by Jackson)
Figure 3.1
Jackson(15) gives the following example, 'even though we do
not understand the process involved, the following black box is
carrying out the transformation 'multiply by 3'."
	 I	 BB 
BB	 I	
BB
Multiply by 3
From Jackson (15)
Figure 3.2
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Fill people deal with much more complex black boxes than this in
their daily lives without ever needing to know or understand
how they work. Indeed, the black box technique will never
reveal how the transformation process works or how efficient it
is. Examples of everyday black boxes are that:-
Drivers need not know how an engine works in
order to drive a vehicle.
I need no understanding of electronics in order
to use the computer on which this thesis is being
written.
Children need know nothing of the internal
workings of a video recorder in order to record
and view their favourite programmes.
Finally, parents learn to manage their children
(and children their parents) long before they
have a common spoken language with which to
communicate and explain their actions. Nobody,
conventionally classified as sane, would propose
a reductionist analysis of a baby to "find out
how it works" in order to control it, it is simply
managed as a black box.
Managers in organisations perform their tasks in much the same
way. If it is not possible for them to grasp the full complexity of
the systems which they manage, they must do so by
manipulating the inputs to the system, recording the outputs,
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and deducing patterns of response. These patterns can then be
used to inform future actions.
R cautionary note is necessary on the topic of black boxes.
Firstly, since it is often not understood how the black box is
composed, it is possible that manipulation of the inputs may
change it to such an extent that it will not, or cannot be,
returned to its original state for further experiments. R system
which is largely composed of people will, to some extent, always
change in this way simply because all of those people have
memories which will influence (or condition) their response to
further changes of input. (See the "Hawthorne" studies).
Secondly, it is vital that enough experiments are conducted on
the black box to be sufficiently sure of its behaviour for the
purpose being considered. Essentially the greater the number of
trials that are conducted the greater the accuracy of prediction.
Thirdly, ill-considered random experimentation with a black box
may have disastrous consequences, for example, a child inserting
a screwdriver in the back of a radio to "find out how it works"
and receiving an electric shock, or, a teenager joyriding in a
powerful car to "explore its behaviour."
Notwithstanding these dangers, the black box technique is
important to Managers. Knowingly or unknowingly, they have to
use it all of the time, if they are not to become immersed in a
flood of detail that they have neither time nor inclination to
assimilate.
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3.3.3.2 Feedback
Feedback is viewed as the mechanism of self-regulation and
describes "circular causal processes..(20  PG 22). Self-regulation
occurs in both the organisation and its environment and is
consequently of major importance. If it is not understood that an
exceedingly complex probabilistic system, to some extent,
regulates itself, and how this occurs, then the predictability of
the outcomes of managerial actions, in relation to that system, is
reduced. Self-regulation generates a degree of stability, but, if
an intervention is undertaken, either in an organisation or by an
organisation in its environment, this stability may be disturbed.
If the "circular causal chains" have not been adequately
understood then the intervention may produce unmanageable
instability.
The simplest form of feedback occurs when two elements
continuously interact with each other such that the output of
one determines the next action of the other. There are two types
of this "first order" feedback behaviour. In the first, negative
feedback or goal seeking behaviour, the system will resist
disturbances that take it away from its goal. That is to say that
the reaction of the one element is to inhibit the change in the
other and vice versa.
Fin early example of this is the governor on Watt's steam engine.
This is described by Beer( 19 PG 29 ) as follows:-
"Fin engine turns at an increasing speed; with it
turn weighted arms, also at an increasing speed;
the arms are mounted on pivots so that they are
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free to rise by centrifugal force as they revolve;
the arms operate a valve which admits power to
the engine, so that the valve is closed in
proportion as the arms rise and the speed grows.
Hence we have a homeostat: the more the
machine tends to exceed a given speed, the less
it is supplied with energy to do so; while should
it fail to reach this given speed its energy
supplies will be increased until it does. Thus the
desired output is attained by self-regulation; the
input to the machine is adjusted by the output
itself and both settle down to steady operation".
This example displays the four elements necessary to an
effective, if simple, closed-loop feedback system:-
R desired goal - the speed of the engine.
R sensor - the weighted arms.
R comparator - centrifugal force.
An activator - the valve.
II most common example today is the thermostatic control of a
heating or air conditioning system, the thermostat switching the
system on and off in order to maintain a given temperature. These
cases have two things in common, firstly, they are examples of
negative feedback, that is, the operation of the system is
designed to ensure stability. Secondly, they are first order
feedback systems, that is, the goal of the system is determined
externally to it.
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The opposite of negative feedback is positive feedback. In this
case, deviation by one element will be amplified rather than
reduced by the action of another. These systems whilst potentially
highly unstable are also useful. Beer( 19 PG 31 ) refers to the action
of power assisted brakes where the small action of moving the
pedal is amplified by the braking system "until the force applied is
capable of stopping a vehicle in motion".
II second order feedback system is capable of choosing between a
variety of responses to environmental changes in order to achieve
its goal. Fl third order system, is still more sophisticated in that it
is capable of changing the goal state itself in response to
feedback processes, determining the goal internally as opposed to
externally in the first and second order systems. Figure 3.3 shows
an example of a closed-loop feedback system.
Input
lg
il.ilProcess
	 SensorActivator
Desired Goal
A Closed-Loop First Order Feedback System
Figure 3.3
This description of feedback has so far dealt with simple
situations. In organisations the feedback systems may be highly
complex containing large numbers of elements, connected in a
Current
Output
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number of ways and consisting of both positive and negative
loops. It may also be the case that at any time the "sum" of the
loops may operate in a positive or negative manner. Clemson(20
PG 23) refers to the effect of success or failure on the action of
athletics teams:-
"Given two teams that are roughly evenly
matched, if one team plays very well and begins
to pull slightly ahead, the other team is
stimulated to greater effort and tends to catch
up, i.e. the two function as a negative loop in
minimising the score difference between them.
However, suppose one team is having a horrible
night and gets completely demoralised in the
first ten minutes. Hs the game goes on and they
get more and more hopelessly behind they will
tend to play less and less well and the better
team will relax and everything will go right for
them. In this case, the two teams are
functioning so that the overall feedback loop is
positive in maximising the score difference."
Clemson then draws the point from this that:-
"... there is nothing structural or in the
"essence" of the system, about whether the loop
is positive or negative.."
Ultimately, systems that include feedback loops are capable of
demonstrating exceedingly complex behaviour, and large changes
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in that behaviour may be brought about by small changes in the
internal relationships.
Beer( 19 PG 29 ) considers that two aspects of vital importance
emerge from the concept of negative feedback. The first is that,
provided the mechanism does not break, the system cannot go out
of control since in the process of so doing it will correct itself. The
second is that the system is guaranteed to be effective, not only
against a particular kind of disturbance, but against any
disturbance. Thus, in the engine governor example, the system will
operate to control engine speed regardless of whether the system
state has altered because of an increase in boiler pressure, the
approach to an incline, a reduction in the energy level supplied to
the boiler or any other disturbance. The simple system will keep in
order a large number of possible sources of variation, some of
which could be regarded as being outside the simple governor
system, a part of its environment.
There are a number of design criteria for effective feedback
systems, these are:-
fill the elements of the system must be working
properly and the communication channels
between them must be adequate.
In an organisation, responsibility for action,
(which carries with it accountability), must be
clearly allocated.
Controls must be selective.
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The control should highlight the necessary
action.
These points will be further elaborated in the section on principles
and in the exposition of the [liable System Model in Chapter Four.
3.3.3.3 Uariety Engineering
Variety engineering is the process of matching the variety of the
controller to that which is to be controlled, and is used to deal
with probabilistic behaviour. Variety is the measure of complexity,
that is, the number of possible states of the system; probabilistic
behaviour exists when the behaviour of some of the elements of
the system is considered to be at least partly random. It was
shown in Chapter One that the variety (complexity) of the world is
increasing as the possible number of actions and interactions
increases. fl principal argument of cybernetics is that the
mechanisms that are used to manage this complexity must
answer to Rshby's "Law of Requisite Variety." This law states that
"only variety can destroy variety." This means that, in order to
effectively manage a situation, the "management unit" must
command as much variety as the "operation(s)" it seeks to
control.
Variety engineering consists of the two prime methods of
achieving this, either, reducing the variety of the system to be
controlled (variety reduction), or, increasing the variety of the
management unit (variety amplification). This process must be
undertaken in a manner which is suitable for the particular
organisation being managed and should contribute to the
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achievement of its goals. There are a number of management
techniques which are in common use and may be seen as the tools
of variety engineering if employed appropriately. They need to be
used thoughtfully and with full awareness of their possible
consequences, rather than randomly, or politically, as often seems
to happen in organisations.
The tools for reducing the variety faced by managers are:-
Structural - e.g. delegation (autonomy or
decentralisation), functionalisation or
diuisionalisation.
Planning - e.g. establishing objectives and
priorities.
Operational - e.g. budgeting, management by
exception.
Rules and policies - e.g. instructions and "norms"
of behaviour.
Managers may amplify their variety through the following
approaches:-
Structural - e.g. team work, groups, etc.
Augmentation - e.g. recruit/train experts,
employ independent experts.
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Information Management - e.g. management or
executive information systems (which may also
act as attenuators).
fictions or processes that work to reduce the variety faced by
managers are known as filters or attenuators, whilst those which
act to increase the variety of the manager are amplifiers.
3.3.4 Principles of Cybernetics
The principles of management cybernetics may now be stated as
general abstractions from the characteristics and tools of
cybernetic systems.
The Systems principle.
Any system has emergent properties that are possessed by none
of its parts, each part has properties not possessed by the whole.
The manager should seek to deal with the whole system of
interest and not the parts.
The Black Box principle.
No exceedingly complex system can be known completely, yet the
manager may learn to control it through a systematic process of
manipulating its inputs and classifying its outputs. It is not
necessary to enter the black box in order to do this.
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The principle of Self-regulation.
R complex system may be expected to exhibit a degree of self-
regulation arising through feedback loops within itself and
between it and its environment. The sum of the feedback loops
may be either positive or negative and there is nothing in the
structure or the "essence" of the system that determines this.
The Law of Requisite Variety.
"Only variety can destroy variety". This law, elucidated by Ross
Ashby, states that the variety of the "controller" must be equal to
that which is to be controlled in order to be an effective
regulator.
This section has reviewed the characteristics, tools and principles
of management cybernetics. The next section will relate these to
the dominant models for management.
3.4 Dominant models and cybernetics. 
Each of the dominant models for organisation can be seen to
exhibit some cybernetic characteristics. Robb(22 ) considers that
what he saw as the three schools, Classical theory, Management
Science and Organisational Management Theory, "lead towards
the adoption of a cybernetic view of the large, though probably
not the small, organisation." Classical theory and Management
Science are considered to represent the "machine" model and
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Organisational Management Theory the Human Relations, "organic"
model.
3.4.1
The "machine" model, as with cybernetics, recognises the need for
authority, communication and control, but sees the organisation
as totally definable with responsibility clearly allocated to
managers. Communication and control in this model descend from
management to workers and the information network is simple
and deterministic. Formal communication channels follow the
hierarchy, and cross hierarchy transactions are subject to tightly
prescribed rules that render such transactions meaningless, e.g.
Fayol's acceptance that staff could "treat directly" provided that
they had their superior's permission, kept them informed and
provided that they were in agreement. For simple operational
matters this may be adequate but meaningful debate under these
rules is impossible.
Cybernetics suggests that the information network is vastly more
complex than the rigid hierarchy indicates and emphasises the
need to understand the nature of the relationships between
managers. These relationships and the dialogues on which they
are based are seen by cybernetics as "complex conversations at a
number of levels between just two or more individuals."(22)
Authority (command and control) is seen in the "machine" model
as vested in the managers by right of appointment to that
position. Cybernetics questions this, suggesting that authority and
responsibility are products of the structure of the system and can
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be distributed according to the will of the people within the
system, albeit, the "natural leader" may distort the intentions of
the people to his/her view.
Goedel's incompleteness theorem further challenges the
"machine" model, which treats humans as deterministic machine
parts. The theorem is that, "All consistent axiomatic foundations
of number theory include undecidable propositions."(20 PG 207)
This is seen by Beer( 19 PG 71 ) as indicating that some propositions
can "in principle be neither proved nor refuted within the limits of
its own language." Robb( 22 ) sees the inference of this as being
that the theory of the "machine" model is unprovable because of
its assumption about the nature of people "not because humans
are more than this but because it is impossible to prove the
consistency of a formal system from within the system itself."
Robb proposes that the most obvious link between the "machine"
model and cybernetics is the reliance on feedback, a concept with
which all managers are likely to be familiar. He indicates that
cybernetics adds to the established view a recognition that there
should be feedback of a "significant kind about the effects which
every management decision produces." He sees this as the key to
adaptation and learning by the metasystem. He states that:-
"In large organisations this closure is very
difficult to obtain because at lower levels in the
organisation there is a convergent tendency,
that is one determined to feed back supportive
information."
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This attenuation and filtering will be familiar to most Managers,
being a cybernetic restatement of the tendency to "tell the boss
what he wants to hear." The "machine" model demands that the
organisation runs like this, allowing no scope for unpredicted or
undesirable outcomes. This tendency hides the apparent truth
about the organisation from those who need it most and is a
product of the way the organisation is perceived.
3.4.2
Cybernetics also has a close link with Human Relations theory or
the "organic" view. Cybernetics accepts that humans are
"exceedingly complex, self-regulating and probabilistic," that is,
they exhibit the three characteristics of systems, which according
to Beer, are suitable for cybernetic enquiry. Cybernetics also
recognises that the human being interacts with other systems,
both human and social, in different ways and at different logical
levels, playing a variety of roles and parts dependent upon
systemic and environmental circumstances. It is proposed that
cybernetics can help to explore and understand the interactions of
people and organisations, viewing the organisation as "the
meeting point of a number of interacting social, managerial,
economic and political systems."(22)
3.4.3
This section has attempted to show the clear links between the
structure and purposes of the dominant models and how the tools
and principles of cybernetics can add to and develop those
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approaches. The next section will draw the distinction between
Management and Organisational cybernetics.
3.5 "Management" and "Organisational" Cgbernetics 
Management cybernetics is considered by some, e.g. Clemson and
Jackson, as not being a significant advance on the "machine"
model. Early work in this field relied heavily on analogies for
illustration and for some Cyberneticians the organisation came to
be seen as a "machine" or "organism". This "Management
cybernetics" still saw the goals and purposes of the system as
imposed from outside and regulated according to the feedback
principle by management. The tools, such as "the black box
technique" and "self-regulation" were used to gain knowledge of
system behaviour. The concept of "variety" was largely ignored,
as was the impact of the observer on the observed.
Organisational cybernetics was developed from this, principally by
Stafford Beer and two of his followers, Espejo and Clemson.
Organisational cybernetics rests upon two differences in approach
between Beer and others. Firstly, Beer has built his Viable System
Model from cybernetic first principles in "The Heart of
Enterprise" (1) dispensing with the use of analogy. Secondly Beer
pays great attention to the role of the observer in defining the
system, its purpose and its design, although this is understated in
the current methodologies for its use.
Beer's approach is seen by Jackson (15) as enabling the cybernetic
laws to be understood in their own right instead of only in the
context of an analogy, and, as enabling the study of "relativistic
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organised complexity" because it studies the observing system as
well. This approach is seen by Clemson( 20 ) as representing second
order cybernetics as opposed to the first order cybernetics of the
early approach.
3.6 Summar
This chapter has introduced the science of cybernetics and
reviewed its origins and development. The key tools and
characteristics of the approach have been revealed and briefly
related to the dominant models. Finally a distinction has been
drawn between management and organisational cybernetics.
The next chapter will introduce Beer's Viable System Model and
show how this draws from and develops the ideas and tools of
cybernetics.
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Chapter Four
The Viable Sustem Model:
Conception, Construction and Methodoloqu 
This chapter will introduce the Viable System Model and show
how this utilises and develops the cybernetic principles
discussed in Chapter Three. The second part of the chapter will
review the established methodology for the use of the model.
Terms used throughout this chapter are explained in the glossary of cybernetic terms.
4.1 The Nature of the Model 
Beer considers that the conventional organisation chart and the
dominant structures and processes of organisation are
unsatisfactory approaches for management. Chapter Two
reviewed the dominant models and demonstrated faults on
which some of Beer's criticisms could rest; other criticisms
concerned the nature of information, communication and the
distribution of power and authority. Chapter Three introduced
the science of Cybernetics upon the principles of which the
Diable System Model is founded, this chapter fully reveals that
model.
Beer contends that if organisations are to adapt and survive in
the contemporary environment then they must answer to those
cybernetic criteria that have been detailed and which may be
considered to be effective in nature. Through more than twenty
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years as a practising manager, operational researcher and
cybernetician, he developed his approach to these "faults",
aiming to construct a more useful and practical alternative. This
work reached maturity in the development of the [liable System
Model (LAM).
The USM is an observer dependent, general model of any
organisation. It consists of a set of five sub-systems, each of
equal importance to the viability of the organisation. These sub-
systems are richly interconnected by a network of information
loops in continuous operation. The whole system is designed to
be capable of learning and adaptation. The five sub-systems are
Implementation, Co-ordination, Control, Planning and Policy.
The model attempts to deal with the underlying nature and
identity of a system, and concerns itself with the mechanisms of
adaptation, communication and control in that system. Whilst Co-
ordination and Control mechanisms ensure cohesion of the
whole, the model encourages the grant of the maximum
autonomy commensurate with systemic cohesion at the level of
Implementation. This maximises use of the self-regulating
tendencies of complex systems and enables problems to be
resolved as closely as possible to where they arise. This is seen
as generating two outcomes, firstly, greater motivation at lower
levels and, secondly, enabling higher management to concentrate
on their most relevant functions. The model perceives the
organisation as open to its environment through its Planning
function, both influencing it and being influenced by it. The Policy
function is responsible for the whole system, creating and
representing its identity and arbitrating between the potentially
conflicting demands within the system for stability and change.
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The Diable System Model is useful for systems exhibiting
purposeful behaviour. The purpose is considered to be observer
dependent, thus the purpose of the organisation, even its very
existence, is seen as a function of the perception of the observer
rather than being an objective statement about the system. For
example, a rainbow is an observer dependent system. It exists
as a result of the action of light through water droplets, but, it
can only be observed from the outside, and when approached, it
disappears; it is a mirage. While we cannot grasp or physically
handle a rainbow, we can describe it and understand how it is
structured; and yet, if we look at the same area of the sky from
a different angle, the rainbow isn't there. Another example is to
consider a physical entity such as the City of Kowloon (Nine
Dragons) in Hong Kong. There is only one Kowloon, yet,
consideration of it from a vantage point on each of its
surrounding eight hills would generate different descriptions of
its "objective reality." Each of these descriptions would be
"right" for the particular observer and viewpoint, but each would
describe an apparently different "reality." The ninth dragon is
the set of eight hills taken together - a containing system!
For Beer, "the nature and the purpose of a System are recognised
by an observer within his perception of WHAT THE SYSTEM
DOES"(sic). (1 PG 9 ) The observer's perception is informed by how
he sees the system and, this is, in turn, prejudiced by his past
experience, personal desires and expectations. This means that,
even if the System is studied by different people from precisely
the same place, different aspects of the system will be
highlighted. For example, examining Kowloon through a set of
binoculars from a hilltop will reveal different sights to different
10
people; an firchitect may see buildings, a Town Planner the roads
and an Rnthropologist the people.
The USN1 is an artificial intellectual construct; it provides, not a
set of facts about a particular organisation, but a way of
thinking about organisation itself. Through this it offers ways of
making any particular perceived organisation more effective. In
reading the following description then it is important to
remember that:
"you are not determining absolute facts:
you are establishing a set of conventions"(3 PG 2).
These conventions cover both the diagrams and the language
used to describe the organisation.
4.2 The Droanisation in its Environment 
The starting point for the USN1 is that any organisation exists in
an environment with which it interacts. That is, it is both
influenced by, and seeks to influence, its environment. Its
operations are contained within the environment and those
operations contain a management function. This is shown
diagramatically in Figure 4.1, the cloud shape representing the
environment, the circle the operations, and the square, the
management function.
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Operations
..-------,	 Environment
Management Unit
The Organisation in its Environment
adapted from Beer (1 PG 94)
Figure 4.1
Environment is the term used to describe all of the external
factors interacting with the organisation. The aspects of the
environment that are of relevance depend upon the particular
organisation being studied and the purposes to be served, but
would be expected to include legal and government issues,
market forces, customers, suppliers, demographic and other
external influences. The operations are the things which the
organisation does, i.e. its purposes. Management is what enables
the operations.
Interaction is through communication channels which link the
environment to the operations and the operations to the
management. While diagramatically these links are shown as
discrete communication channels, the process is seen by Beer(1
P6 95 ) as more like diffusion, the discretely drawn boundaries
being "porous membranes" rather than walls. Beer proposes that
the channels are "variety exchangers" and that the variety of
the environment is greater than that of the operations which in
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turn eHceeds that of the management unit. The channels
represent the diffusion process of these differing varieties. The
Law of Requisite Variety, "only variety can destroy variety",
demands that variety will tend to equate throughout the system
and this leads Beer to enunciate his "First Principle of
Organisation":-
"Managerial, operational and environmental
varieties, diffusing through an institutional
system, tend to equate; they should be designed
to do so with minimal damage to people and to
cost."
This means that, rather than allowing variety amplifiers and
attenuators to grow in a random fashion on the communication
channels, they need to be designed so that only relevant and
necessary information is carried across the boundaries/Beer
sees the limiting case of unconstrained growth in attenuators as
"that attenuating filter called Sheer Ignorance"( 1 PG 96) , in that
case he considers that management will be a farce. He proposes
that rather than allowing this to happen, filters and amplifiers
need to be built into each of the channels to increase the
performance level of each element to enable it to cope with the
variety generating capability of the system in which it is
contained. Figure 4.2 shows the communication channels with
the amplifiers and attenuators represented by standard
electrical symbols.
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Key:--1).-0. Communication Channel with Amplifier
	 lin Communication Channel with Attenuator
E: Environment 0: Operations M: Management Unit
The Environment, Operations and Management
unit separated to reveal the communication channels.
Figure 4.2
Beer elaborates two further Principles of Organisation in
connection with these communication channels. The "Second
Principle of Organisation" is:-
"The four directional channels carrying
information between the management unit, the
operation and the environment must each have a
higher capacity to transmit a given amount of
information relevant to variety selection in a
given time than the originating sub-system has
to generate it in that time."
Beer(' P6 99) explains this principle as follows:
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"Clearly, in a dynamic system, there is a minimal
time in which all possible states could be
exhibited, and therefore there is a rate (sic) of
variety generation possible per unit time."
The reminder is then given that channel capacity refers to the
ability of the channel to discriminate between states rather than
its capacity to transmit "content ". He continues:
"H channel carrying a message in the morse code
has to distinguish a variety of five states: the
dot and the dash; and the pause that separates
them within a letter, from the pause between
letters, from the pause between words. It
makes no difference whether the information
conveyed is a declaration of war or a grocery
order".
The point of the Second Principle in a management system is to
consider whether "the channel has sufficient variety to register
the number of states it is supposed to transmit at a given
rate"( 1 PG 99).
The "Third Principle of Organisation," concerning information
"crossing boundaries" between the units, is:
"Wherever the information carried on a channel
capable of distinguishing a given variety crosses
a boundary, it undergoes transduction; and the
variety of the transducer must be at least
equivalent to the variety of the channel."
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Communication between the environment, the operation and the
management unit requires information to cross the boundaries
between them. The "language" of each sub-system is considered
to be unique to it and it is therefore necessary for the message
to be translated on crossing the boundary from the language of
the sender to that of the receiving sub-system. The mechanism
that does this is called a transducer. It should be apparent that
the transducer must be able to distinguish at least as many
states as the communication channel can convey. R transducer
that cannot do this will act as a variety attenuator, any message
becoming denatured or distorted and the transducer failing in its
purpose. Similarly, it must be remembered that since some
information will always be lost in translation it is essential to
minimise the number of translations.
This section has established the Viable System view that an
organisation, consisting in essence, of operations and an
enabling contained management unit, exists in dynamic
interaction with an environment. To be effectively organised,
adequate communication channels using variety amplifiers and
attenuators must convey information between the three sub-
systems. This process relys on competent transducers at the
boundaries to translate information into a language which can be
understood by the receiving sub-system.
The section has shown the application of cybernetic tools; the
use of feedback loops, i.e. the communication channels, to
create "homeostats" between the embedded sub-systems which
should lead to a degree of self regulation. Nothing has been
said about the specific contents of the sub-systems, they are
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The amplifiers and attenuators on the communication channels
are the tools of variety engineering, always bearing in mind
the information losses incurred in translation. The basic view can
now be developed to elaborate the full model.
4.3 Sustem One 
"The purpose of a system is what it does."
This "key aphorism"( 3 PG 99 ) describes "Implementation," the
purposeful actions of the system. System One consists of the set
of operational sub-systems of the organisation. Each of these
sub-systems is composed of an operations unit and a
management unit in interaction with a local, or operation
specific, environment. That is, each System One element at any
particular level of resolution may be represented as Figure 4.2.
For an organisation these elements will be the "productive"
parts, e.g. the branches of a Bank, the factories of a
manufacturing company, the sales territories of a direct sales
operation. lit a higher organisational level they may be
subsidiaries or divisions. lit the lowest practical level of
organisation they are people.
The model recognises that these elements will necessarily
interact with each other, exchanging information about relevant
issues. If, for example, the elements are different stages in a
production process they will need to exchange information in
order to enable the process to flow from one element to the
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next. Similarly, an element may need to advise a predecessor in
the sequence of a problem or an opportunity. These interactions
are represented in the model by the "squiggly" lines shown in
figure 4.3 linking the operational units. While in figure 4.3 the
elements are shown in a column, this is merely a diagrammatic
convention, not an indication that any System One element is
either superior to or necessarily precedes another.
The elements of System One, depend from a Senior Management
unit, known as the metasystem. That unit is logically, rather than
hierarchically, senior to the System One elements. That is to say
that the Senior Management unit has an overview of the whole
of System One which is not available to any of the elements
individually. It transacts its business in a metalanguage to
decide propositions which are undecidable at the operations
level. These features enable the metasystem to deal with
conflicts arising between the operational elements. The
management units of the System One elements are each directly
connected to the metasystem through three communication
channels.
The first channel is for Legal and Corporate requirements. This
deals with those aspects which constrain System One to belong
to the overall system. For a Company the legal constraints will
be the Memorandum and Articles of Association and provisions of
various Companies Acts or other current legislation relating to
companies. The Corporate Requirements are Company Rules and
Procedures which are intended to control the behaviour of the
division or subsidiary.
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The second channel, carrying the information that constitutes the
Resource Bargain, is considered to represent the agreement or
"deal" between the individual System One element managements
and the Senior Management. The Resource Bargain determines
the degree of autonomy which the element is permitted within
the constraints of the wider system to which it belongs. Typically
it will constrain the System One element, through a process of
negotiation, to only engage in particular activities and will
determine the level of resources which the metasystem will
provide to enable those activities to be carried out. This
negotiation is seen as a dynamic process and is depicted in
Figure 4.3 by the homeostatic loop joining the transducers at the
boundaries of the boxes. Dynamic means that the negotiation is
not a once and forever agreement but a continuing dialogue
between the units in which the activities and resources are
continuously under review.
While described as a negotiation process, a Resource Bargain by
unilateral dictat is still a Resource Bargain, even though this may
threaten the longer term viability of the organisation.
Individuals, in most organisations, retain the freedom to leave if
they are, or feel oppressed and "the heart of enterprise is the
human being" (1 PG 42),
 It is after all people not organisations
that make decisions.
The third, or Accountability, channel carries to the Metasystem
reports of how System One has utilised its resources to fulfil its
purposes. Beer( 3 PG 40 ) considers that "accountability is an
attenuation of high variety happenings." He perceives that the
metasys tern will not have requisite variety to deal with all of the
data provided to it, in the form of "totals, averages, key
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indicators" and consequently, in the usual case, "System One ....
simply is not accountable." This lack of accountability is handled
in the L1SM through the "Regulatory Centre" which exists as a
service to System One.
Each System One element has its own Regulatory Centre which
amplifies managerial variety to the operations and attenuates
operational variety to management. This is achieved by
elaborating the basic framework of the resource bargain
between management and operations and ensuring that
operational potential is harnessed to the achievement of agreed
objectives. This is depicted in Figure 4.3 by the triangles and
their communication channels.
Beer(3 PG 42 ) contends that the regulatory activities should have
physical embodiment in the organisation and provides as an
example, a production schedule in a manufacturing organisation.
This amplifies the Resource Bargain which " 'knows' we can make
1000 units this month" into a production schedule, this occurring
on the loop between operations and management.
This completes the exposition of System One which is the set of
operational elements and management units, each with its own
regulatory centre and which taken together fulfil the purpose of
the organisation.
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4.4 Sustem Two 
Conflicts and oscillations arise between the elements of System
One because the management of any one element must
inevitably act in at least partial ignorance of the activities of the
other elements and may therefore take actions which interfere
with them. 1111 elements may be interfering with each other in
this way, and each will be continuously attempting to adjust to
each of the others, this is "oscillation" or "hunting." R
mechanism is necessary to inhibit this.
System Two is the overall sub-system which links all regulatory
activity of the individual elements to each other and to the
Senior Management. This, a service to System One, ensures that
the conflicts and oscillations occurring between System One
elements are damped to inhibit oscillation which could lead to
resonation and fragmentation. Beer (3 PG 69) gives as "the most
accessible example of a System Two, a school timetable." He
gives as the main considerations these thoughts (italics,
parentheses and capitals are Beer's) :-
"However you describe the System One of a
school or a university, its departments or its
faculties or its courses or its classes are each
pursuing (correctly so) selfish ends which
engage them in competition for scarce resources
- notably staff but also other facilities.
If each System One element were to determine
its own programme unilaterally, then the whole
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plan for the future would be rife with 'double-
booking.' The TIMETABLE takes care of this.
The timetable reflects managerial policies and
decisions, but does not make them.
It is accepted as authoritative throughout
System One, because it does not seize authority,
but is gratefully accepted as a seruice.
The timetable is rigid in routine circumstances
and is therefore a most convenient variety
attenuator.
(Were it not for this, teachers would have
no time to do anything except negotiate with
each other).
The timetable is flexible whenever an element of
System One is under duress
(if not, a teacher could not go for
emergency dental treatment, say)
and its adaptations are not then regarded as
autocratic.
Beer regards this as a "remarkable fact."
System Two and its organisational embodiment does not have
higher status than System One. It performs a different function
and has a wider view of all of the activities of System One, which
gives it power through knowledge. However, if it is to act in a
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System Two (co-ordination) capacity preserving System One
autonomy, and not as a part of the Senior Management on the
command channels, its activities must be limited to those which
are anti-oscillatory. Beer gives as further examples, the
"attitude" to health and safety, the personnel ethos, house style,
salary and company car policies.
Commonly, the need for System Two activity is recognised, but is
made explicit through the command channels of the organisation
rather than through anti-oscillatory behaviour. For example,
salary policies become enshrined in manuals and tables stating
at what age an individual with a given set of qualifications and
experience can receive a certain salary or a particular "perk" of
employment. This has been seen by the author to generate
absurd results, high potential staff of an organisation being told
that, "Now that you have received this promotion you cannot
expect further promotion for a number of years, regardless of
performance at the task, because you are far too young for your
grade." The System Two activity of absorbing salary oscillations
between operational elements has been denatured to become a
rigid command of the organisation, issued by a party without the
"right" to give such a command and limiting the autonomy of the
System One Manager to manage his unit.
In summary, System Two is any anti-oscillatory activity within
the System being studied. Accountability and command authority
do not reside in System Two. It is a system operating outside the
Resource and Accountability loops to minimise conflicts between
System One elements as a service solely to them.
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4.5 Sustem Three* 
Before commencing the full exposition of the Metasystem, one
final vertical link between it and System One needs to be
elaborated. This is System Three*, an audit function amplifying
variety from the operations level to the Metasystem.
Beer( 3 PG 82) , states that the five vertical communication
channels so far reviewed operate on a routine basis. He asks,
"what happens if what the management most needs to know is
FILTERED OUT (by the use of totals, averages, and so on)?" Beer
contends that poor managements will attempt to restore, or
achieve, a variety balance on the command channels by
invigilating "the horizontal activities with all the zeal of an
Inquisition" and suggests that rather than doing this there exist
a "whole set of acceptable management practices that do not
involve this centralisation of manifest power".
These practices are various forms of audit, e.g. financial,
personnel, consultant review, which operate "sporadically" by
intervening directly in the Operations, with the agreement of
System One, and amplify Operational variety directly to the
Metasystem.
Great emphasis is placed on the sporadic nature of an effective
audit, a "routine" audit being likely to reveal nothing of value.
Beer(3 PG 85) gives the following example:
	  routine and regular audits surrender a large
part of the variety they generate to no purpose
whatsoever. Think of the way in which WW2
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Prisoners-of-war escaped from Germany, by
doing their digging in the gaps between rigorous
patrolling 	 ..
Figure 4.4 shows the Viable System Model including Systems Two
and Three*.
4.6 Senior Management: The Metasustem 
Chapter Three introduced Goedel's incompleteness theorem, seen
by Beer as indicating that a particular proposition may be neither
proved nor disproved within the language in which it is
expressed. Goedel, cited by Beer (12 PG 71 ), uses the following
example: " 'What this sentence says cannot be proved.' If this
proposition can be proved, then it is impossible to prove it; but if
the proposition can be disproved, then it follows that it can after
all be proved."
The elements of System One conduct their transactions with the
environment and each other in a language which is specific to
them. From Goedel, it follows that propositions will arise which
they are unable to resolve. Within the limits of the System One
language they will be undecidable. This suggests the need for a
metasystem, conducting its transactions in a metalanguage, i.e.
a system and language of a higher logical order, and able to
decide that which is undecidable at the System One level. This,
logically necessary, system is the Senior Management and is
composed of System Three (Control), System Four (Planning) and
System Five (Policy).
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4.7 Sustem Three 
System Three is that aspect of the Senior Management which
manages all the internal aspects of the system so far elaborated.
Unlike the individual System One element managements, System
Three deals with the whole of System One, negotiating Resource
Bargains and Accountabilities, and being responsible for the anti-
oscillatory activity of System Two and the sporadic interventions
of System Three*. It is described by Beer( 3 PG G O as being
"responsible for the internal and immediate functions of the
enterprise: its 'here and now', day-to-day management."
Beer also refers to System Three as an "Operations Directorate",
composed of those parts of the organisation which enable and
control the purposeful behaviour of System One. It is important
to recall at this point that while System Three must intervene in
the autonomy of System One this should be at a minimum level
"consistent with cohesiveness within the purposes of the viable
system. -(1 PG 202)
The particular organisational aspects which create System Three
cannot necessarily be found as features of an organisation chart.
It will be remembered that System Three, negotiates a Resource
Bargain with System One, passes down legal and corporate
requirements and monitors behaviour (accountability). It is the
processes and features which enable these things to be done
which create System Three. These may include, for example, a
sales management function, a production or manufacturing
management function, management accounting, and a personnel
function together with their necessary supporting services and
procedures, most of which should operate substantially through
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Systems Two C,
 Three* rather than through the command
channels in order to maximise the "sense" of autonomy at the
operational level. Before proceeding from this stage it is
worthwhile to remember that no one of the five sub-systems
within the model is more important than any other, they are
each necessary and the absence or ineffectiveness of one
threatens the viability of the whole system being studied.
While System One produces the viable system, ("What the system
does is done by System One")( 3 PG 128) and System Two is
necessary to damp oscillations between System One elements,
System Three occupies a position of "intrasystemic
omniscience4 3 PG 92) .
 It has a synoptic view of System One and
is logically necessary to manage the System One activities from
that privileged position. Beer(3 PG 92) stresses this issue:
"System Three is not constructed as a box to
house people with better suits and bigger cars
than anyone else. That they do have these things
is simply the result of a general acquiescence in
the hierarchical concept." 	
	  "Go and look into a monastery if you doubt
this. System Three still works without the perks.
But in real (?)(sic) life it suits the greedy to
acquiesce in greed: their turn (they hope) will
come."
The argument for autonomy at System One is an endeavour to
maximise the use of the tendency to self-regulation of complex
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systems. This is seen as enhancing efficiency within the system.
The argument for System Three is that it is not itself purposeful
but rather it is supportive to, or enabling of, the achievement of
the System's purpose. In consequence it should not consume
more of the organisation's resources than are necessary to
enable it to fulfil that supporting role.
It is frequently the case that the Departments and people which
constitute the System Three of an organisation do not recognise
their role as supportive. They do consider themselves to be
"more important" than those whose activities fulfil the purpose
of the whole system. Evidence of this can be seen both in the
attitudes and actions of those people, e.g. cost reduction
programmes are most often aimed at branch or factory since,
"that is where the problem is," rather than "Head Office."
Relatively junior "experts" from Head Office are, and expect to
be, treated as "little tin gods" when visiting distributed parts of
an organisation. System Three can for many organisations be
seen as attracting those who would rather talk about work than
do any!
R particular example of this spurious importance and abuse of
position might be a junior Work Study analyst, who, as part of
the Resource Bargaining process may be armed with a low
variety "Work Measurement" model of an operational unit's
staffing needs. Using this model he will dictate to a Manager how
many staff and of what grades he may have to fulfil his System
One purposeful role. Factors which, in the Manager's opinion,
affect the "pure" result obtained from the model will be ignored
by the Analyst if they are not capable of straightforward
inclusion in the model, or, if they mean treating the particular
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unit differently to others which appear similar. The impact of this
will depend to a significant degree on the accuracy of the
standard model in relation to the particular unit. Problems arise
when the analyst has neither the discretionary power nor the
imagination to adapt the model and its outcomes to the
particular case.
System Three is logically necessary to manage the "inside and
now" of the organisation. However, it needs to be recognised by
the actors in this System that, without System One, there is no
role for System Three since the organisation no longer exists. The
focus of design for System Three and its subsequent activities
should be on how it can enable System One to function most
effectively and efficiently whilst minimising its own cost to the
organisation. Figure 4.5 is a general example of System Three
components, the arrows between Sales Management and
Production Management represent the ongoing dialogue which
should exist between these two functions.
4.8 Sustem Four
The system so far described is "autonomic", it will continue
indefinitely doing what it has been designed and structured to
do. System Four is the sub-system that enables the learning and
adaptation which are considered essential to viability.
Referred to by Beer as a "Development Directorate," System Four
is comprised of those functions which deal with the future, or,
"outside and then," of the organisation such as, Research and
Development, Market Research, Strategic Planning, Personnel
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Development and Manpower Planning. For the LISM these units
continuously and systematically scan the total environment of
the organisation to identify relevant patterns of change. Then,
using a model of the organisation, they consider whether and
how it should adapt to cope with those changes. The "internal"
model of the organisation is informed by System Three, a model
of the organisation's environment focuses on aspects where the
different issues identified by the research units intersect. RII of
this activity may be undertaken on a part-time basis in a small
organisation, or by properly constituted committees and
advisory groups in others. This satisfies the Conant-Ashby
Theorem, quoted by Clemson( 20
 PG 201) that 'Every good
regulator must contain a model of that which is regulated." It
enables the use of feedforward or strategic control, predicting
disturbances before they affect the organisation and
encouraging timely adaptation, avoiding problems rather than
confronting them.
Beer is critical of the lack of an effective System Four in most
contemporary organisations. He argues that a fully effective
System Four needs to be realised in the form of an "Operations
Room." He proposes that all of the different factors affecting the
future of the organisation can be displayed and the different
units can engage in dialectical debate, in a "club-house"
atmosphere, and agree how the organisation should respond.
Beer(' PG 265 ) considers that "System Four is often, indeed
usually, virtually empty." This is because the components of
adaptation are not brought together in a coherent manner, "It is
quite normal, in a large enterprise, for the elements of System
Four to have virtually no knowledge of each other's activity"(1
PG 232).
93
The System Four activities suggested above are most usually
carried out by discrete departments which often jealously guard
the information which they have gathered. This may be done
either to preserve their own power and position within the
organisation, or the information may be rejected (e.g. shelved
reports) because it challenges what Waddington( 23 ) has called
"COWDUNG" (the conventional wisdom of the dominant group).
Beer (1 PG 233 ) gives an example of this type of behaviour, "I
recall a firm in which the market research department did indeed
make itself aware of every report issued by the operational
research department; but it did so only to mount immediate
studies seeking to disprove any OR finding that affected
Marketing!" R less sinister consideration is that the possessors
of information, holding to a reductionist view, simply do not
realise that their failure to share it with others may threaten the
future of the organisation.
For Beer then, the integration which is sought in the "Operations
Room" simply does not exist in most organisations. He argues for
-232)such integration on two grounds( 1 P6 2312 :
The "change in the rate of change" of the world
has rendered the traditional "discrete" approach
inadequate and inappropriate.
The responsibility for adaptive behaviour has
shifted, from the "Boss" supported by staff
advisors, a situation which became prevalent
after the Second World War, to the advisors
themselves. The techniques and tools used by
the advisors are likely to be outside the
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competence of the "Boss" who must place his
trust in the competence of their operators. The
power has then shifted to the advisors, they
must be responsible for the decisions made.
The 1.1SM requires that System Four people be "in line" in order to
be accountable. They should not be seen as hierarchically
superior to System Three. They have a different view of the
organisation, and unlike System Three, a particular knowledge of
its total environment. Figure 4.6 shows a generalised view of a
System Four with its environmental and System Three
connections.
Key: E=Enuironment
ME=Model of Environment
MS=Model of Total Viable System
3= System Three
--I- =Communication Channels
Generalised View of System Four
Figure 4.6
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4.9 Sustem Flue 
Systems Three and Four are envisaged as engaging in a
continuous conversation to negotiate the need for investment in
both stability and adaptation of the (liable System, this is
represented by the Three-Four homeostat in Figure 4.6. Systems
Three and Four are "accountable to each other"(1 PG 252) for the
disposal of their respective varieties. In the terms of the model,
one cannot be permitted to dominate the other, although this
often happens in practice, e.g. when System Four is weak or
poorly articulated. A system is necessary to maintain balance
between the demands of these two Systems, this is System Five.
The essence of viability is that System One must continually
produce itself, remembering that "the purpose of a system is
what it does and what the viable system does is done by System
One" (3 PG 128). This means for Beer( 1 PG 254) that,
"the existing enterprise has to go on being
itself. Therefore, it follows, the investment
required to enable System One to produce itself
is mandatory".
"To go on being itself" does not mean that the component parts
of System One cannot be changed, but that System One as a
whole is guaranteed survival. System Three must then
appropriate to itself those resources, of all types and both
internal and external, which are necessary to ensure this
survival, and, "What is left is, grudgingly, available to System
Four."( 1 PG 254)
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System Five, the final sub-system of the Viable System Model
"monitors" the ongoing conversation between Systems Three and
Four and, when necessary, arbitrates between their conflicting
demands for resources. This arbitration is not seen as being
made evident by the imposition of sets of rules but, preferably,
by the establishment of a "Corporate Ethos - an atmosphere"(3
PG 124)• System Five is seen as a "variety sponge of gigantic
capacity1 3 PG 125) ,
 dealing with all the residual matters which
could not be addressed by other parts of the system, or
"mopping up variety that the homeostasis of One-Three and
Three-Four will not have accounted for." (3 PG 130)
Beer(3 PG 125) proposes the following test of a System Five
ethos:
"Try to think of a really way out idea in your
organisation - so way out that certainly no one
has ever considered it, although it is not
manifestly daft.
HOW WOULD THE BOARD REACT TO THAT?
The betting is that you know the answer exactly.
No-one has put the idea forward just because
the answer is self-evident".
Although System Five is "the Boss", it is not in cybernetic terms
more important than the other sub-systems, it does not
"produce the system", it "is only thinking about it." (3 PG 128)
System Five is the ultimate authority in the system and as such
has two functions:
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It supplies logical closure to the viable system.
It monitors the Three-Four homeostat.
System Five is comprised in most organisations of "the Board". It
must be remembered however that, in a Company, the Board is
appointed by the shareholders, on whose behalf the Chairman
and Directors claim to speak. Ultimate authority rests then, in
principle, not in the hands of the Board but of the shareholders.
The same comment applies to the Government and electorate of
a democratic state. System Five is expected to represent the
essential qualities of System One to the wider System of which
the system studied is a part. Figure 4.7, on the following page,
shows the 3-4-5 metasystem.
4.18 illoedonic mechanism 
System Five should, if all is properly designed within the viable
system, be able to "fall asleep", it should be receiving a constant
drone of satisfaction from below. The algedonic (pain/pleasure)
mechanism is to enable System One to directly alert System Five
of danger or threat to the System without having to pass
through Systems Three and Four. This is shown as a dotted line in
Figure 4.7. The algedonic mechanism divides the message being
passed up to System Three from System One and decides whether
System Five should be directly alerted. Beer( 3 PG 1 3 3 ) gives the
following examples:
"Informal extreme: the roof has collapsed -
phone the boss."
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The 3-4-5 Metasgstem
(Adapted from Beer (3 PG 129))
Figure 4.7
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"Formal extreme: the four-minute missile
warning."
4.11 Enuironment 
Figure 4.8, on the next page, shows the complete Diable System
Model which has now been built. One point which should be noted
from this diagram is that the total environment of the viable
system is greater than the sum of the individual environments of
the System One operational elements. This is because System
Four, Planning, is concerned not simply with those things which
the system already does but also with all the things which it
doesn't do but which are relevant to the "Ethos" established by
System Five.
4.12 Recursion 
The Recursive System Theorem( 1 PG 118) states that:
"In a recursive organisational structure, any
viable system contains, and is contained in, a
viable system."
Viable systems are considered to be nested one within the other,
like Chinese Boxes, in an infinite chain of viable systems. The
structure and connections of each system are identical to that
which has been elaborated in this chapter, hence the use of the
word recursion.
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The Complete Viable System Model showing three levels of
recursion. (Beer (3 PG 136))
Figure 4.8
181
It will be recalled that each Operational element of System One
was comprised of Management and Operations units. These were
not examined in the first elaboration of the model but were
treated as "Black Boxes." If they were now to be opened up by
the study descending a level of recursion they would be found to
be identical in structure to the System already specified.
Similarly if the study were to step up a level of recursion it
would be found that the 3-4-5 of the system just elaborated
would become the "Black Bole System One management of that
higher level and the System One elements would be contained in
the Operations Circle. This triple recursion is shown in Figure 4.8.
The recursive nature of the Viable System Model tends to great
economy in the examination of a system, since all systems are
considered to be identical in terms of their underlying structures
and processes.
As the Viable System Model is observer dependent, i.e. the
existence and purpose of the System being potentially matters
of opinion rather than fact, another factor emerges with the
Recursive System Theorem. In addition to being perceived as
contained in a chain of Diable Systems that one observer has
defined, the observed system may also be at the centre of any
other chain of systems that another observer has defined. This is
shown diagramatically in figure 4.9.
4.13 Rutopoiesis 
Any viable system is autopoietic, that is it continuously inuests
resources in producing itself, preserving its identity. Beer(1 PG
405) credits Maturana and Varela with having revealed the
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"principle of life itself. Life is not characterised, as most people
would say, by the process of self-reproduction, but by the
process of self production. Life is devoted to the preservation of
its own organisation." He continues the discussion with
reference to the human body, the cells of which are continuously
replaced whilst the identity of the individual is preserved. He
also remarks on well known institutions such as hospitals,
universities and large commercial organisations which, while
continually changing their component parts, branches, divisions,
wards and staff, may retain their identity as organisations. The
University of Hull, for example, is always the University of Hull
despite the fact that around one-third of its students and a
number of staff are replaced every year. This investment in self-
production, e.g. the resource appropriation by System Three, is
mandatory. It must be undertaken to preserve the organisation
and is a "healthy" sign.
Systems Two to Five are not viable systems; they exist as
services to System One. Investment must be made in their self-
production in order for them to continue to fulfil their function.
However, this should be only to the extent that they are part of
System One at the next lower level of recursion. lit any given
level of recursion of the viable system, Systems Two to Five
should exhibit no internal autopoietic behaviour. If they do they
have become "pathologically autopoietic," absorbing more
resources than are necessary for self-production of the viable
system and they threaten its viability.
Pathological autopoiesis is represented for Beer by "The
Establishment." He proposes(1 PG 410) ,
 using the example of a
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hospital staff, a simple test to discover whether the autopoietic
function of the organisation is healthy or pathological:-
"What proportion of everybody's time is spent on
healing, and what proportion on the autopoiesis
of the medical profession?"
"The hospital is ritualistic; and it is not difficult
to examine these rituals to determine the effort
that goes into keeping all concerned in their
appropriate places, a process whereby the
hospital produces its own organisation."
When the proportion of time devoted to self-production exceeds
the minimum necessary then the autopoietic function has
become unhealthy.
Fl definition of "The Establishment" is then prouided(1 PG 412) :
" 'The Establishment' in any social system comes
into being at the point when the vital principal of
autopoiesis consumes energy greater than that
needed to maintain cohesiveness through the
appropriate number of viable recursions that
marks its claim to organisational identity as a
set of embedments of System One.
'The Establishment' presents autopoietic actiuity
on the part of Systems Two, Three, Fours or Flue;
and this constitutes a pathological symptom of
the viable system."
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The admonition with autopoiesis is that to ensure viability, and
with it efficiency and economy of operation, participants in an
organisational situation should be conscious of the resources not
devoted to achieving the purposes of the system.
4.14 Rmplifiers and Rttenuators 
The amplifiers and attenuators of variety referred to throughout
this chapter have already been specified in Chapter Three. They
are the tools of variety engineering, viz.:
For variety attenuation: Structural, Planning,
Operational and Rules/Policies.
For variety amplification: Structural,
Rugmentation, Information Management (which
can also be an attenuator.)
4.15 Measurement 
Traditional forms of performance measurement, such as cost
accounting, profit and loss statements etc. are regarded by Beer
as inadequate and insufficient measures for a viable system.
While, in the contemporary framework of Western society,
organisations must at least break-even in order to survive, this
is regarded by Beer as being a constraint upon their viability
rather than an objective of their existence. He proposes that to
measure the productivity of a viable system we should be
concerned with three aspects(24 PG 163):
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"Rctuality: This is simply what we are managing
to do now, with existing resources, under
existing constraints.
Capability: This is what we could be doing (still
right now) with existing resources, under
existing constraints, if we really worked at it.
Potentiality: This is what we ought to be doing
by developing our resources and removing
constraints, although still operating within the
bounds of what is already known to be feasible.
He proposes that these productivity measures, expressed in pure
numbers, should be combined to provide measures of
achievement expressed as ratios. These measures of
achievement are:
Productivity: the ratio of actuality and
capability.
Latency: the ratio of capability and potentiality.
Performance: the ratio of both actuality and
potentiality, and also the product of latency and
productivity.
Figure 4.10 on the next page represents these diagramatically.
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Potentiality
Latency
Capability
Procluctiuity
Performance
lictuality
Performance Measurement System (Beer 24 PG 164)
Figure 4.10
These forms of measurement are seen as being applicable to all
critical aspects of the performance of the viable system, and to
be capable of containing, in a simple way, all the information
normally expressed in more conventional ways.
4.16 Method°loou 
The Diable System Model, as elaborated in the previous pages,
specifies the underlying structure of a viable organisation in
cybernetic terms. It is a general model applicable to any
particular case and this is a major source of its utility. The 1JSM
can be used to "diagnose" faults in existing organisations, by
comparison of the "reality" of the organisation with the
"expectations" of the model, and to suggest "remedies" for the
perceived ills.
To ensure that the Model is usable in this way Beer has provided
a "handbook for Managers"; Diagnosing the System for
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Organisations(3). This provides both a systematic description of
the model and "instructions" for its use. The established
methodology has been crystallised by Flood C) Jackson( 5 ) and
their briefer version has been the foundation for this section. The
methodology consists of two parts, system identification and
system diagnosis. At each stage of the identification and
diagnosis process, the USM diagrams are used to record findings
of "how the organisation is", in other words, the diagnostic
diagrams should reveal any weaknesses identified during the
process.
4.16.1 System Identification
The Lliable System Model assumes a unitary view, that is that the
goals or purposes of an organisation are either agreed between
the participants in the system or are readily susceptible to such
agreement. It is firstly necessary to identify the purpose to be
pursued. This may be "given" by the owners of the organisation
to be studied, or may be imputed by the observer of the system.
The next step is to identify the appropriate system for achieving
that purpose. This may exist as a physical or legal entity, e.g. a
Company or a University, or may be a conceptual system, e.g.
"Western Society" or "the man on the Clapham omnibus", both of
which are accepted as existing but have no "physical" presence.
Beer(3 PG 4) proposes that "in practice, the best plan is to
consider a trio of viable systems at any one time: the
organisation we wish to study, that within which it is contained,
and the set of organisations contained by it - one leuel of
recursion down." This helps to ensure that the study focuses
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solely on issues which are relevant to the system under study by
providing full awareness of the adjacent levels.
It is often found in practice that managers devote time and
energy to matters which fall outside their sphere of interest,
either delving into more junior matters, because they are more
comfortable, or addressing more senior matters. These are not
necessarily bad things and will often be useful to the running of
an organisation. The allocation of interests to different recursive
levels ensures that managers are aware at what level they are
operating, when, and perhaps most importantly, why.
The system identified at the centre of the triple recursion is
known as, the "System-in-focus." Once this is established it is
necessary to specify the viable parts of that System, i.e. the
operational elements. These, taken together, comprise and
produce the System One of the system-in-focus. The next step is
to specify the viable system of which that is part, i.e. its
containing system and wider environment. Figure 4.11 on the
following page gives an example of this identification of three
recursions of the Viable System.
It is vital at this stage to recall that the "viable" parts of the
system are those elements which produce it, the "purposeful"
parts, as errors are commonly made with this aspect. For
example, if the system-in-focus is a hospital, and the imputed
purpose of the hospital is to heal the sick through medical
treatment, then only those activities concerned with healing in
this way are purposeful. This could be the wards or the operating
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theatres, or any one of the myriad medical specialities. Any part
which exists to enable this purpose to be carried out is not, in
itself and within the conventions defined, "purposeful." Thus the
pathology lab, the kitchens and the "administration" are
supportive, they do not form part of System One. (If the purpose
of a Hospital were defined as being "a system for employing
people" then the different conventions would demand a different
interpretation of the composition of System One).
The parts specified as operational elements of System One, must,
in principle, be capable of independent existence. R ward, for
example, could in theory be separated from a hospital and
continue in existence, an operating theatre could be established
independently etc. The "administration" should have no existence
outside the context of the hospital although it frequently does.
4.16.2 System Diagnosis
The trio of embedded systems having been identified, emphasis
moues to an examination of the system-in-focus through the
cybernetic principles upon which the USM has been constructed.
The diagnosis is expected to reveal the faults in the cybernetics
of the organisation so that, upon completion of the examination,
courses of action to rectify problems will have already been
identified. The process of diagnosis is, then, the beginning of the
cure and commences with an examination of System One.
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4.16.2.1	 System One: Implementation
System One is concerned with implementation, the aim of
studying it is to establish whether it is adequately composed to
fulfil its purpose. The first step is to fully detail the environment,
operations and localised management of each of the System One
elements. It is often found that System One elements are not
treated as viable systems in their own right and consequently
lack an adequate management to tend to their own affairs.
The constraints imposed by higher management upon the parts of
System One should next be detailed. This will reveal whether
System One is able to carry out its specified purpose, i.e. does it
have the autonomy, resources etc. The next step is to study how
accountability for resources is exercised and to detail the
mechanisms for evaluating performance.
4.16.2.2 System Two: Co-ordination
System Two exists as a service to System One in damping
oscillations between operational elements. The study of System
Two requires that possible sources of oscillation or conflict
between System One elements be identified and the mechanisms
which exist to harmonise them be detailed. It is often found that
System Two is inadequately represented, or has been replaced by
"instructions" on the command channel. Sources of oscillation
may exist for which no damping mechanism has been
established. The methodology requires that the stakeholders
perception of System Two at the operational level be discovered,
i.e. is it facilitating or threatening?
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4.16.2.3 System Three: Control
System Three exists to control all of the activity of the System
One elements. It should aim to do this while preserving the
maximum autonomy possible at the operational level, consistent
with systemic cohesion. The first step in examining System Three
is to list all of the components of this system for the System-in--
focus. Next the way in which System Three exercises its
"authority" over System One should be revealed. The style and
nature of the Resource Bargaining process should then be
studied, i.e. what mechanisms exist for this process to be carried
out. The System Three individual(s) responsible for the
performance of the parts of System One should then be
identified.
Audit enquiries generated from System Three and conducted
through the System Three* channel should be identified, in
particular their frequency and which aspects are studied in this
way. The "nature" of the relationship between System Three and
System One should be considered and understood. How is the
System Three-System One relationship perceived, interfering
autocratic, consultative, democratic? It is often found that
System Three managers intervene or interfere unnecessarily at
the System One level.
4.16.2.4 System Four: Planning
System Four represents the activities which enable the
organisation to adapt to environmental changes which were not
considered when the organisation was designed. The first step in
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examining System Four is to list all planning activities of the
system-in-focus considering whether the time horizons are
appropriate to the needs of the organisation or the activities are
sufficient to guarantee adaptation to the future. To do this,
System Four must monitor the environment effectively and
assess its trends. Mechanisms and procedures should be in place
which achieve this.
An effective System Four will be open to 'novelty', new ideas or
new ways of dealing with established ideas and the study should
reveal to what extent System Four is capable of handling this
aspect. R common major weakness of System Four, as has
already been discussed within this Chapter, is its inadequate
articulation and coherence in many organisations. The extent of
this coherence needs to be established. Is a management centre
or operations room provided in which external and internal
information are brought together to enable effective decision
making?
4.16.2.5 System Five: Policy
System Five represents the identity of the organisation to the
wider system and creates an "ethos" for the system-in-focus.
Examination first requires that the composition of "the Board" be
identified and its method of working detailed. Then it can be
determined whether System Five provides a suitable identity for
the system-in-focus. Is this identity shared with System One or
does it claim to be something different?
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The "ethos" established by System Five should then be examined
to discover how it affects the activities of System Four. This is
necessary because the "ethos" determines what environmental
occurrences will be treated as relevant by System Four. If this is
too narrowly defined then matters of importance to viability
could be missed; or, alternatively, too broad a definition may
lead to System Four undertaking too shallow a research on too
wide a front. The last step is to determine how System Five
responds to the System Three-Four homeostat, does it tend to
treat either System Three or System Four more seriously?
4.16.2.6
	
Information channels
The final stage in the diagnostic process is to ensure that
throughout the organisation the information channels,
transducers and control loops, have been designed in accordance
with the cybernetic principles. These were elaborated in Chapter
Three.
4.16.2.7 Rectification and common faults
11 diagnosis following the above methodology is expected to
reveal flaws in the organisation which threaten its viability.
Steps should then be taken to rectify these matters having
regard to the cybernetic principles.
Common faults found, not previously highlighted include the
following(5 PG 96):
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The existence of additional and irrelevant
structural features.
Pathological autopoiesis in Systems Two-Five
System Five collapsing into System Three
because System Four is weak or poorly
articulated.
Inadequate, or delayed, transmission of
information and performance measures.
4.17 Summar
This chapter has fully elaborated the Uiable System Model
indicating how it uses and develops the principles of cybernetics.
The second part of the chapter provided a methodology for using
the model. The next chapter will review the major prior works
concerning the model including theoretical and practical aspects
as well as its major criticisms. 11 review of Beer's perceived
ideological position will be included.
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Chapter Fiue 
The Diable Sustem Model: 
Applications, Deuelopments and Criticisms 
This chapter continues the investigation of the Viable System
Model with a review covering prior applications, developments
and criticisms. Beer's apparent ideological and philosophical
position in relation to management and the model are explored.
"In communication everything depends on
what you end up with, not on what was
actually said or written down. u ( 24 PG ix)
5.1 Introduction 
The Viable System Model has been in the public domain for over
twenty years and has been variously reviewed, revered and
reviled by both systems and management thinkers and
practitioners during that time. This chapter aims to explore the
published applications, developments and criticisms of the model.
5.2 Applications 
This first section of the chapter reports and reflects on the major
published applications of the Viable System Model, commencing
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with Beer's substantial work in RIlende's Chile. That application
provides a base for all of the subsequent work.
5.2.1	 "El Pueblo"
Beer gives an autobiographical account of the application of the
Diable System Model to a substantial part of the Chilean economy
under President RIlende in the second edition of "Brain of the
Firm"(24 ). This review is substantially drawn from that volume.
Salvador Allende was elected President of Chile in the autumn of
1970 by a minority (37%) of the electorate. He was the first
democratically elected Marxist president in the western world.
Despite the difficulty of battling with the Chilean Congress and
Senate from a minority government position, he embarked upon "a
programme of nationalisation of the means of production,
distribution and exchange."( 24 PG 246) This nationalisation
programme, which affected both local and foreign businesses,
was being implemented through an organisation called CURIO
(Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion), a form of merchant
bank.
Fernando Flores was Technical General Manager of CORFO and
President of INTEC (Institut° Technologico de Chile). He was a
cybernetician who had previous experience with Beer's consulting
organisation SIGMR (Science in General Management) and invited
Beer to contribute to this programme in a letter claiming to have
direct responsibility for "the complete reorganisation of the public
sector of the economy." He stated that he was in a position where
"it is possible to implement on a national scale - at which
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cybernetic thinking becomes a necessity - scientific views on
management and organisation." Beer met Flores in London and
after he "became enthused with the plans that the government
was making" agreed to take charge of the deliberations of Flores
and his team. Subsequently in May 1972 Beer was appointed
Scientific Director of the project.
The Chilean economy was at the time, under severe pressure. The
price of copper, a commodity which represented eighty per cent
of Chile's foreign earning capacity, had fallen, increasing the
balance of payments deficit. All workers had been awarded a
forty per cent wage rise as part of an attempted redistribution of
wealth, and, peasants, previously paid in kind, were entitled to a
workers wage. While Gross National Product and industrial
production were rising, support for the Government had increased
to fifty per cent and the lower-paid were spending, the higher
paid were not investing. Foreign credit and technical support were
non-existent. Although inflation had been reduced from its
previous thirty-five per cent, foreign reserves would "in all
circumstances" be exhausted within a year.
After much discussion with Flores, his team and with other Senior
Members of Allende's government Beer proposed a project to
manage the industrial economy of Chile. This project would work
in real time, using the Diable System Model as its cybernetic base.
The project was seen as a first step towards the application of
the principles of cybernetics to other aspects of government.
Allende, despite what Beer( 24 PG 258) calls "a certain pride in his
office", was concerned when the proposals were explained to him,
that they should be "decentralising, worker-participative and
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anti-bureaucratic." Beer considered these intentions as
"fundamental" to the task. Beer explained the Viable System
Model to Allende, using the neurophysiological (brain) analogy, and
it was Rllende who proclaimed that System Five, previously
visualised by Beer as the President of the Republic, was in fact the
people, "El Pueblo", as represented by himself.
The overall project envisaged the whole of Chile in terms of
recursions of the Diable System. Beer describes this as follows(24
PG 249);_
"Recursively speaking, the Chilean nation is
embedded in the world of nations, and the
government is embedded in the nation. This was
understood; all these are supposedly Diable
systems.
The government should be conceived as a viable
system (System Five being the President of the
Republic) in which System One consists of the
Headquarters of each major function - health,
education, finance, industry ....
Picking out industry as a viable system
embedded in this (System Five being the Minister
of Economics), we find a set of industrial sectors
constituting System One. These include such
elements as food, textiles, automotive ...
Each sector (System Five being the Under-
secretary for Economics with his appropriate
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committee) contains, as System One, a set of
enterprises, or firms.
Embedded in the enterprise is the plant; within
that the department; within that the social unit
of a working group; and within that the
individual worker - viable systems all."
This recursive embedment is shown diagramatically in figure 5.1
on the next page.
Arising from this Beer was able to propose the uniform use of the
Viable System Model at all levels of recursion. This itself acted as
a variety attenuator and enabled great economy in the modelling
process and in implementing the plans. Project Cybersyn
(cybernetic synergy), as it eventually became known, had a single
objective:
"To install a preliminary system of information
and regulation for the industrial economy ... that
will demonstrate the main features of
cybernetic management ... and begin to help in
the task of actual decision-making by 1st March
1972."
Beer's paper detailing this project proposed a plan of action for a
sample of enterprises in a sample of industrial sectors to be
joined in this new regulatory system within four and a half
months.
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The Recursive Model of Chile in the World of Nations
Figure 5.1
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Project Cybernet aimed to link, through a single communications
network, all units of production in Chile. A suite of computer
programs would be used to enable more effective management
both of individual units and of the economy as a whole. The
idealised design would have used a distributed network of
computers but had to be modified to work within the limited
technological and financial resources then available to Chile. Thus
the decision was made to operate on the computing power
available in Santiago and to communicate with the distributed
production units through established communication systems.
To provide input data for this system a series of operational
research analyses down to plant level were undertaken in each
sector of the economy to identify performance indices
appropriate to each unit. The indices were based on the triple
index outlined in Chapter Four (Page 106-108). It was agreed to
measure "social unease" by monitoring absence rates, and it was
also intended that further development of the model would allow
the "worker committees" in charge of each factory to add
additional measures for their own use. It was found by the OR
teams that ten to twelve aspects were all that required
monitoring in order to assess the performance of each factory.
Problems were encountered in the development and gathering of
commitment to these individual factory models, arising from
differences in approach. 8eer( 24 PG 271) saw the teams as
"briefed to explain the quantified flowchart model in a plant, then
to enlist help in creating it from those who worked there, and
then to obtain agreement on the performance measures to be
used. It was clear that this was not always being done in the
intended spirit." This Beer sees as the likely cause of Project
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Cybersyn being called "technocratic" by some reporters of the
experience.
The Cyberstride Program Suite was the software designed to
enable the monitoring of information flows throughout the
system. This was to be driven by the indices identified, to alert
the operational elements at each level to emergent change and
provide an 'arousal filter' for Systems Four and Five. This
formalised the belief in an information system that was
"prospective and anticipatory, rather than retrospective and a
matter of historical record." The work of writing these programs
was sub-contracted to Arthur Andersen & Co. of London who,
following Harrison B, Steuens,( 27 ) cited by Beer, proposed the use
of Bayesian probability theory. This enabled ready recognition of
changes in the input indices showing whether these represented
"transient errors, step functions, or changes in time, trend and
slope." This was expected to allow much more coherent responses
to changes in the performance of the various systems. The
combined information systems, Cyberstride & Cybernet covered
around seventy per cent of the industrial economy, about four
hundred enterprises, and dealt with the internal operation
(Systems 3-2-1) of the industrial systems, enabling real-time,
day-to-day control.
The Checo (CHilean Economy) Programs were devised to cater for
planning (System 4). It was seen by Beer and his team that no
adequate mechanism existed for planning in Chile. The National
Planning Office (ODEPLRN) had for Beer "become an institution
dedicated to preparing the National Accounts and developing
statistical reports," having no methodology "that could
conceivably discharge those (planning, System Four) functions of a
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viable system." The programs were intended to provide a "real-
time" simulation of the way the Chilean economy could be
expected to develop over a ten year period, drawing information
from both the internal systems and from the environment. It was
intended that, in a fully developed System Four, the Checo
simulations would be updated daily using current information and
providing assistance in decision-making for the performance of
the whole economy. Results from early simulations were
unreliable using historical information and were treated as a
learning tool.
The time constraints under which the entire project operated and
in particular its sudden ending prevented the full development of
the Checo Programs. These were in any case limited by the
practical problem of the recursiuity of System Four not being
resolved, the lack of confidence in the results produced by the
simulations and the external threat to the Chilean cause from
other countries and ideologies.
Opsroom, was envisaged by Beer as an "environment for
decision," (24 PG 254) a place where all of the internal and
external information affecting the organisation (industrial
economy) could be brought together, and using simulation, the
impact of possible decisions could be assessed. The practical
embodiment of this was a large, unobstructed hexagonal room
containing an iconic representation of the Uiable System Model.
Labelling of the model could be changed to represent any chosen
level of recursion. Additional screens were provided to display
alerting signals for Systems 3-4-5 and algedonic signals arising
from lower levels of recursion. Information for the simulations,
rather than being "on-line" to this system was provided through a
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further set of three screens fed by sixteen back projectors.
Through this system it was possible to select from 1200 "pictures"
of information to inform the discussion. Information from Checo
simulations was similarly provided. It was intended that
ultimately these screens would be replaced by computer systems
that would have provided both printouts and a screen
representation of the changes being considered.
The People Project which commenced in March 1972 was aimed at
the "organisation of the state that is not economic, but
societary.., (24 PG 278) A paper parallel to that on Cybersyn
addressed a project to examine:
"the systems dynamics of the interaction
between government and people
in the light of newly available technology such
as TV
and discoveries in the realm of psycho-
cybernetics"
This paper contained a critical review of the interaction of
Government and People in terms of Rshby's Law of Requisite
Variety and showed that whilst the actions and statements of
Government were being amplified to the people through the use of
new technology, the peoples responses were still artificially
attenuated to the use of the electoral mechanism on a periodic
basis. This attenuation of response was perceived by Beer to
"build up pressures in the system" that could not be released
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potentially leading to "demonstrations, agitation, perhaps
violence, possibly revolt."
The paper outlined a proposal for the use of an "algedonic meter"
by a "properly constituted sample of people" through which they
could register a response to Government broadcasts on a scale of
"happy/unhappy." This was envisaged by Beer as closing the
algedonic loop between People and Government. Beer concluded
his paper by noting that this was no more than a formal way of
handling the system that already existed as "clamour of various
kinds." He stated(24 PG 283):
"It is proposed to create a new public response
system, in order to provide convenient and legal
outlets for pressures that are already making
themselves manifest. These pressures constitute
political power - in the limit they may overthrow
governments."
While this public response system was never installed, a
preliminary experiment was conducted which demonstrated that
an algedonic meter to measure public eudemony could be created
in practice. Although not formal channels, Beer saw the music and
art of the people as giving further expression to their level of
contentment and as means by which they shared their views. A
plan to give a more structured approach to this societary self-
reflection was not achieved due to technological and economic
constraints.
The final element of The People Project was a planned "manual"
which translated the whole project from cybernetic terms to
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those of the people themselves. This was to be launched at the
same time as the Operations Room. This was to be an endeavour to
allow the people of Chile to take command of their own
Government and the work that was being undertaken on their
be
Fin attempted coup in September 1972 was followed by "The
Gremio Strike." This was a strike by the small entrepreneurs of
Chile who felt threatened by the proposed nationalisation of
transportation and distribution systems. The strike, which is
perceived by Beer to have been supported by agencies external to
Chile, provided an opportunity to utilise the cybernetic systems
which had been established in an attempt to enable the
Government to deal with this strike which "was a serious attempt
to pull the government down." Beer( 24 PP 313-314) describes the
adaptation as follows:
"Rn emergency operations centre was set up
next to the communications centre, and divided
into eight functional commands (transportation,
food, and so on). One of our own people was put
in charge of each. Similar centres were set up
regionally, on the disseminated net model, using
Cybernet. Within twenty-four hours messages
were flowing, non-stop around the clock, at the
rate of two thousand telexes per day. This
immediately posed an enormous problem in
providing the requisite variety to handle such an
inundation. Two of the senior cyberneticians
organised a filtration system: some signals were
algedonic, requiring instant decisions, while
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others could be attenuated into elements of the
pattern that established the situation in real
time. There are major lessons to be learned from
this experience, the first group as illustrating
the cybernetic principles of the national system,
and the second as teaching much about
innovatory praxis.
The first cybernetic point is that the huge surge
of information into the regulatory system
operated as a negentropy pump: instant
communication loops sprang into being, and
instant decisions were available. This contrasted
with the turgid operation of the bureaucratic
system, the entropy of which was close to unity
- as is so common. Secondly, the inefficiency of
the existing distribution system has lead to high
physical redundancy - again, as is normal in
unplanned economies (think of idle motor
transport pools, railway marshalling yards,
demurrage); the ability of the cybernetic
regulator to survive the hostile action, derived
from the effective use of the few physical
facilities remaining under the government's
control. Thirdly, such a network as this exhibits
that very redundancy of potential command
described in Chapter 15 (of Brain of the Firm,
Ref. 24). This not only helps to absorb
proliferating variety: it is decentralising, and it
is robust. Finally, it had at last been made
dramatically clear that properly organised
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information deployed in real time is a major
national resource.
As to innovatory praxis, the lessons learned
were very clear indeed. Let us first of all note
that the cybernetic projects on which we were
engaged had the full knowledge and support of
the relevant ministers and managers from the
President down. We had intellectual assent to
the proposition that information constitutes
regulation, and we had political commitment to
the reorganisation that would embody this
principle. There were no complaints on either
side. But it was not until the top officials and the
socially responsible ministers were plunged into
the traumatic experience of the gremio battle,
lived with the problems non-stop, used the tools
provided however makeshift, and mastered the
revolt, that they fully and deeply understood. We
really had been talking about a managerial
revolution, and not about the introduction of
some rather slick administrative tricks."
The Allende administration survived the gremio strike and Beer
quotes one Senior Minister as stating that "the government would
have collapsed" without the cybernetic tools at its disposal.
The practical development of the various projects continued to
develop in Chile over the next months against a background of
increasing political instability although still increasing popular
support for the ruling party. R new level of recursion was
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identified at the Gouernment level and proposals were being made
for major change in the methods of public administration. R
second attempt by the gremio to bring down the government was
made in August 1973 and was again foiled with the assistance of
the cybernetic tools. On 11th September of the same year Allende
was assassinated and this brought the project to a conclusion.
"Rs far as it went, it seemed to work" is Beer's own comment(28)
on this experience and perhaps summarises the position as
regards the Viable System Model itself. Project Cybersyn showed
that it was possible to rapidly apply a single organisational model
across a number of recursive levels of a national economy and to
create a coherent, (relatively) cheap information system, working
in real time to aid management decision making in the subject
system and that this could assist in a crisis (the gremio strike)
which had not been envisaged in its initial design.
Beer draws a number of lessons for practitioners from the overall
experience commencing with "the first and foremost lesson 	
Act Fast...(24 PG 350) He justifies this comment not only on the
grounds that "the threats were imminent and seen to be so" but
that if a delivery date is a parameter of any manager's problem
then "that is a parameter of his situation with which the
management scientist must deal - otherwise he is no good." He
argues that a perfect solution not delivered within a given time
scale is of no benefit whereas an imperfect solution, given within
the time scale, and carrying the caveat that "the probability that
my advice is correct is lower than I would like, but as high as can
be generated by the evidence that could be collected and analysed
in so short a time", provides some guidance. He also argues from
this a need for the scientist to be as fully equipped as possible in
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terms of his "armoury of weapons" in order that his advice may
be as "correct" as possible.
The other, confirmatory, lessons are, taken together by Beer as
"The Cybernetics of Crisis":-
"(i) The system is obedient to Rshby's Law of
Requisite Variety;
(ii) Information Channels maintain variety
entrusted to them;
(iii) Transducers neither attenuate nor amplify
variety;
(iv) The time cycle is synchronous for all
subsystems.
The extent to which a self-organising system
recognises these requirements, seeks to obey
them, flouts them (by accident or design), and
finally achieves its come-uppance at their
instigation will indeed determine that system's
viability."
This may be seen as a statement that the laws of cybernetics will
assert themselves, whatever the circumstances.
Ultimately, the application of the Viable System Model to the
Chilean Economy may be said to have failed, in that the identified
problem situation (of a failing economy) was not resolved.
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Perhaps this should be seen as a failure in the methodology rather
than of the model itself. Espejo( 29 ) makes the point "the project
did have methodological weaknesses" and sees that the major
one was that:
... not only the structures of the Chilean public
and industrial sectors were weak, but - and this
was, and still is, a much more general problem -
the concerned people did not see the need for a
good cybernetics. A realisation of this assertion
should have implied a stronger focus in the
softer aspects of the process..."
This potential weakness ought, perhaps, to have been apparent
from the outset. Allende's Government was comprised of a
minority coalition, supported initially by only 37% of the
electorate. This weakness was arguably compounded by the
radical programme proposed for fundamental change in the
organisation of the industrial and, later, the social economy and
the use of a then not proven cybernetic approach to such
organisation.
Flood C, Jackson( 5 PG 42) have proposed that the Viable System
Model is applicable in a Complex-Unitary situation. That is a
situation where the system of interest consists of a number of
elements "in close interrelationship, exhibit probabilistic
behaviour which is difficult to predict, are open to the
environment and include purposeful parts. There is, however,
assumed to be general agreement about the goals to be pursued
(a unitary situation)." Clearly in Chile there was no such general
agreement although the situation was undoubtedly complex.
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It can be argued that if 63% of the electorate voted against
fillende, his government "had a battle on its hands in both the
Congress and the Senate." (24 PG 246) To progress a programme of
fundamental reform against such opposition was clearly going to
prove difficult, yet Project Cybersyn, which threatened the power
and wealth of significant sub-groups in the country, appears to
have paid no heed to this aspect. Machiavelli f s (30 ) admonition
that "there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of
success, and more dangerous to carry through than changes in a
state's constitution" was apparently ignored. The project failed to
address the needs and aspirations of some social groupings.
The Viable System Model views the organisation, in this case the
state of Chile, as being in dynamic interaction with, and seeking to
survive in, its environment. The Cybersyn projects undertaken,
whilst recognising the economic interactions of Chile and its
environmental trading partners, failed to address the political or
ideological interactions of states in a world system. These latter
interactions may be seen as acting at a higher level of recursion
than the industrial projects undertaken. Within the constraints of
the recursive nature of the model, the "Industrial Economy" is a
contained System One element of the State which is itself a
contained System One element of the World of Nations. In this
case the activities and behaviour of the system are limited by the
activities and behaviour of the system(s) in which it is contained
and to which it seeks to belong. Failure to act voluntarily within
these constraints may lead initially to "corporal punishment"
(economic sanctions and blockades, withdrawal of aid for
development) and subsequently "capital punishment" (eitternally
supported revolution or direct acts of war).
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This failure to engender support for the project at the national
and global level is also reflected at lower levels of recursion. The
OR projects undertaken at factory level were handled by teams
"picked for their professional merit, and without
regard to their political stance. Not surprisingly,
a typical Chilean professional would be inclined
to treat a worker with some condescension -
unless he had strong political convictions
towards the left."
Beer's opinion that this may have generated the "technocratic"
opinion of the experience has already been quoted. At individual
worker level it may also have contributed to the support or lack
of it revealed through the strikes and subsequent overthrow of
the Allende administration. The workers of Chile had been
promised a major role in the management of their production
units. They may have perceived that the cybernetic tools and
approaches being adopted by the OR teams were threatening that
role. This may have been as a result of the attitudes of the
professionals, the language in which ideas were expressed and
questions asked or combinations of these factors.
The attempt to reorganise the Chilean Economy and subsequently
its government process, with only minority support internally and
potentially considerable opposition externally, was
methodologically flawed. Regardless of the particular cause of
failure, it was, cybernetically, bound to fail since its start point
was a level of recursion which did not enable the consideration of
environmental factors bound to impact upon the outcome of the
process.
(24 PG 271)
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Ulrich( 31 ) sees Beer's work as "an outstanding example" of the
attempt to progress towards "a more adequate systems concept
in respect to societal problem solving or planning", with the intent
of "contributing significant tools towards the management of
complexity in social systems." Explicitly reviewing the Chilean
experience he saw a preoccupation with the efficiency of
production to the exclusion of other social issues. Specifically
Ulrich considers that the decentralising potential of the approach
was negated by the use of the algedonic signal. This operated in a
way which enabled the ultimate authority, the Government, to
override or intervene in any lower level decision which had
originated an alarm message and to which no suitable response
had been given. Thus if a local management decided to ignore an
alarm message, deeming it irrelevant for local decision purposes,
the message would continue up through the system and local
autonomy could eventually be lost to a centralised decision
maker. (In theory by these means a Government Minister, or even
the President himself, could be making decisions affecting
operations at factory level.) Such a mechanism, as well as
potentially overloading Senior Management in the event, for
example, that the critical variables being monitored are
incorrectly selected, or change in such a way that a mass of
algedonic signals are generated, also artificially limits the
freedoms of operating managers to work "outside" the critical
variables for some local reason. This militates against the
proposed worker participative and democratic stance adopted
throughout the project. Ulrich( 31 ) states "Cybersyn's alleged goal
of devolving power to workers is not confirmed by its design.
Instead, its strongly hierarchical organisation and its concept of
'autonomy' one-sidedly serve the top decision maker, the
Government."
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He further comments that Cyberstride would only reveal, the
"location of internal symptoms, but not real time explanation of
problems nor real time decision making." The management of
underlying problems would still require more traditional
approaches, analysis, reports etc., the tools perceived by Ulrich to
be in use by CORFO. Thus, as a problem recognition tool the
Cybersyn project was useful but as a problem soloing tool it could
not offer assistance.
Cyberstride is seen by Ulrich as having an "unreflective value
system" with the controller of its inputs also controlling that
aspect. For Ulrich this raises a problem of "potential for
manipulation" since control over inputs is the only means of
controlling the system's "quasi-autonomy." This is seen as
potentially leading to a power struggle for the right to control the
inputs, with a probability of "increasing centralisation, corruption
and sabotage." The whole system is seen to be open to systematic
abuse and manipulation to produce "the desired feedback
reports", with Ulrich commenting that "History teaches us that
tools which can be abused sooner or later will be abused, be it
under a socialist or capitalist government."
Criticism is also aimed at the role of "The Experts" in Project
Cybersyn who essentially fulfilled a System Four (planning)
function. Ulrich sees that although proclaiming a democratic and
participative approach, the experts in conjunction with the
government "decided on what socio-economic progress and
democratization means" and, "what kind of 'socialism' is good for
them" (the people). No mechanism was provided for democratic
participation in the selection and design of the cybernetic tools
used. To counter this it should be recalled that the "People
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Project" would have more adequately addressed this aspect had
the project not been halted (by undemocratic process), and, the
"worker committees" were involved in the selection of the
criteria against which the performance of their production units
would be measured.
Ulrich's final criticism is reserved for the exclusion from Cybersyn
of "dialogue between purposeful and responsible humans." He
sees that decisions, based on the "logical truths" derived from the
computer system, drive decision-making throughout and
"eliminates the possibility of avoiding hidden political values and
social irrationality." It may be argued here that the "Opsroom,"
while providing technologically based information, ultimately
relied on human interaction, and as such allowed for Ulrich's
desired dialogue, at least between the decision makers. The
proposed, but never completed, feedback loop between
Government and people had the potential to support and enrich
this dialogue although there is no guarantee that its messages
would have been acted upon.
Despite his criticisms, Ulrich regrets the premature end of the
Chilean project since this prevented the full implementation and
development of Beer's ideas which Ulrich sees as committed to
ethical, democratic social ends.
Since the Chilean Project, Beer has continued to develop his ideas
and undertaken a number of projects at National level. None have
been as substantially reported as this one. This chapter will return
to a fuller critique of the model but now turns to some other
significant applications.
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5.2.2 "Useful or not"
Note 5 to "The Heart of Enterprise" (1) is an account of Beer's
extended consultations with a large mutual life insurance
company. The intervention is summarised and developed in "The
evolution of a management cybernetics process." (32) The
interventions stretched from 1973 to 1982.
The company had already been introduced to cybernetics and the
USM prior to Beer's involvement and had realised that a number of
the developments which they were pursuing fitted with the USM
approach. Beer's help was sought by the Company to develop their
understanding more completely. The model never became fully
utilised in the course of twelve interventions but a number of
useful "learning points" emerged. Unlike Chile, this was an
attempt to utilise the model in a purely commercial context and
there was no democratic or aspirant democratic process
considered. Help was sought by the Senior Management in
fulfilling their management roles, but as with Chile there were
pressure groups and power blocks within the organisation.
The first task, in any intervention using the Viable System Model,
is to identify the "purpose" of the system, the "System-in-focus."
and its contained and containing systems, i.e. the various levels of
recursion of the viable system. The Company had attempted this
but had failed to reach consensus on these issues, seeing the
company as Recursion Zero and its territorial markets and
functional activities as System One at that level while imputing
different purposes to the activities.
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The top management of the organisation had reached their
positions via two different routes, insurance sales and
investment. The first group saw the total organisation as an
"insurance selling" system, the second as an "investment
system." Their expectations about the purpose of the system
were therefore fundamentally different. The debate about
purpose could not be resolved within the levels of recursion
recognised, i.e. the Company (0), territorial markets (1). Beer
conceived that with the Company at Recursion Zero its System One
components were Insurance and Investment and other activities
such as marketing territories were contained within these. The
link between these two distinct activities had been hitherto
established by System Five intervention. There was no "formal
mechanism" directed to this end.
Rs the Company continued with its modelling Beer encouraged the
resolution of the issue of its nature, i.e. what sort of Company
was it? He proposed the drafting of a memorandum called the
"Joint Normative Decision" which would "exercise a governing
intention for the firm." The argument for this was supported with
the following statement:
'a great appearance of competence and expected
victory in a forthcoming battle might be created
by marching soldiers around the battlefield in
complicated manoeuvres, digging trenches,
shouting commands and blowing bugles. But if
the generals have not yet agreed upon the
reason for the war, nor identified the enemy, nor
formulated their campaign, all of this activity is
nugatory'
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Despite this proposal, by the end of the third intervention the
"Corporate" model had not been completed. R comprehensive
modelling of the insurance side had been undertaken but this did
not allow the fundamental issue of purpose highlighted in the first
intervention to be addressed. This underlined for Beer "the
absolute need to determine the total recursive system" before
engaging in detailed work, a point that was arguably
underestimated in the Chilean intervention. The chance
involvement of a member of the top management team in this
process served to emphasise to Beer how institutions are, in
effect, managed ( 1 16 518):
"We perforce rely on the human genius to know
how, precisely to apply itself. This is in reality,
all cybernetics apart, the heart of enterprise."
The fourth intervention (1976) deals with the nature of the model
and the calculation of variety. Here Beer reiterates that the model
is not a substitute organisation chart but "an account of the firm's
activity in terms of the criteria of viable systems" hence it is not
right or wrong, it is more or less useful as an explanatory device.
Under measurement of variety, it is again stated that "the
measurement of variety is not an exact science" but an attempt
to understand the "variety amplifiers and attenuators whereby
the firm meets the requirements of Ashby's law." Beer shows how
the number of insurance plan combinations to be regulated is
dramatically less than the possible number of plan combinations
that can be classified (386 as opposed to 30 million million (sic)).
This is achieved by identifying possible sub-types of plan as the
starting point for calculation and adding rather than multiplying
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alternatives. This is represented in figure 5.2 on the next page and
explained as follows( 1 PG 522):
"What the new systemic diagram shows is that
attention must be directed to the contract: the
sub-plan that relates to the individual. But
obviously, everyone in insurance knows this
already! Then, says the cybernetician with
curiosity, why is this not mentioned in the
'bibles', nor reflected in the company's
regulatory system (except at local levels), nor
matched within the huge computing
arrangements? Somehow, that key relationship,
which the variety analysis so far shows as
determining everything else, is spread all over
an information system in which all variety
sources appear to be combinatorial. .... The
argument was that the crucial item in controlling
selection entropy is the sub-plan. This is what
absorbs the variety of the individual client."
The fifth intervention addressed the total modelling of the
company as a viable system. Taped contributions were received
from all eight members of the top management group of the
Company on both sides of the Atlantic and Beer emphasises( 1 PG
530 ) that "work of this kind requires the full-scale involvement of
the client organisation." The results of the intervention were
communicated to the team through diagrams and audio-tape and
Beer sees that medium as offering "something approaching
requisite variety between human beings who already know each
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other, and the nuances of each other's voices, that printed reports
often lack." This suggests that whilst the model itself may be
"technocratic" and somewhat clinical, its practical use in an
organisation requires a recognition of human beings and the
complexity of their interactions. The modelling process
undertaken by the Insurance Company was not comprised of a set
of "facts" but of a set of more or less subjective views about the
structure of the total system.
The sixth intervention highlighted the utility of the model and
language of cybernetics for discussing aspects of the viability of a
system. Use of the language of viability was seen to free the
debate from the influence of "conflict of personalities and the
apportioning of personal power"
focused on the lack of an adequate System Four (Planning)
function when an experiment demonstrated that the Senior
Management of the organisation had not understood the function
of System Four at the Corporate level of recursion.
This aspect was addressed in the seventh intervention. Here
Beer (1 PG 552) demonstrates the need for a System Four, on
behalf of the system, to engage in what fickoff( 33 ) calls "idealised
redesign." This approach, based on a supposed destruction of the
enterprise as it is, calls for a re-conception of the design of the
Company based on what is possible given the current state of
technology, society, legislation etc. In his argument for an
effective System Four, Beer argues that its existence at the
Corporate level enables external constraints which regulate the
variety of the organisation to be explicitly recognised. This in turn
enables debate within the organisation on how to influence the
constraints for its benefit.
(1 PG 549). This intervention also
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The second argument for System Four focused on the use of
technology(1 PG 551):
"I had long been urging the opinion that within
only a few years there will be a data-handling
revolution that will make the original computer
revolution of the fifties seem trivial.
There could be an entirely new method of selling
insurance, whereby the high variety of the
individual at risk could be matched by requisite
actuarial variety carried in a small box of
integrated circuits. It was to this possibility that
the variety analysis of the Fourth Intervention
(Page 142-143) referred. The idea may be
vacuous: who can say? What can be said is that
only System Four can handle it, and that System
Four is void."
The Insurance Company Management came to see the necessity of
an effective System Four and the practical problems of creating it.
The proposal was made to create a surrogate System Four at the
Corporate level comprising a Policy Group of Senior Managers from
the next recursive level and charged with the task of Normative
Planning for the organisation as a whole.
The final part of this intervention was the attempt to publicise the
cybernetic process within the organisation. This was tried through
both a house journal and video and failed. Beer( 1 Pg 554) sees this
as highlighting the difficulty of inter-recursion communication,
saying "Most talk about communications assumes a single level of
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recursion." This illustrates the point that each level of recursion of
the system conducts its transactions in a language which is unique
to it. Effective communication across system boundaries requires
that messages be conveyed through the transducers in a language
which can be understood by the receiving system, without
translation error or nuance.
The Eighth Intervention was aborted due to the attempt to merge
the subject organisation with another, activity that inhibited the
pursuit of the cybernetic process. The experience did highlight two
issues. Firstly, in terms of viable systems, a System Four at the
subject company emerged from the Corporate Structure despite
its apparent lack of articulation within the organisation. Beer sees
this as a problem, commenting that( 1 PG 556 ) "If System Four is
disseminated, and has no focus, there is bound to be trouble."
Secondly, in discussing what is to be called "success", cybernetics
was acknowledged to have played a role in the events. For Beer,
the perception that this was the case was enough, its explicit
acknowledgement being regarded as a bonus.
The Ninth intervention shows Beer arguing for the application of
the Diable System Model to the organisation at the formative
stage. He attempted to show how it can contribute to the
understanding of the need for design of that organisation and how
its generality can be utilised to address the questions which must
arise.
The Tenth intervention, which followed the collapse of the merger
plans, commenced with an enquiry into its failure. An experience
from which the Senior Officers of the company wished to learn.
Rgreement was reached that a formally articulated System Four
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was necessary to ensure that the whole System remained viable
and to prevent its collapse back into being a System Three led
organisation. The idea became possible in terms of the people,
processes and systems of the organisation. A second theme to the
intervention was that the internal structure of the organisation
needed to be reviewed to enable the adoption of new groupings of
business.
While the completion of these processes is not reported in Beer's
study he concludes with two major points in relation to the
interventions. The first is that: (1 PG 560)
"The heart of the enterprise is embodied in its
own people. Consultants cannot catalyse
interactions that do not exist, or are persistently
and perversely held at bay."
The second point is in relation again to success. Briefly reflecting
on the outcome he refers to the lack of any formal conclusion and
states that "Life is a process, not a justification." This I take as
suggesting that the value of the work is in the process that has
been undertaken and not in post-hoc rationalisation of the events
to show a successful outcome. Perhaps an action only has
meaning in its own time and context - its results are neither
success nor failure; fl Bull's success is a Toreador's failure!
The process of intervention continued and is reported in "The
evolution of a management cybernetics process .. ( 32 PP 211 - 270).
The Eleventh intervention saw Beer reviewing progress and
proposing changes in the effective organisation to enable some
degree of autonomy at local levels, proposing investigations
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which would show how this could be achieved without loss of
cohesion in the organisation. The establishment was such that the
metasystem for each territorial unit of the organisation was
located at Head Office rather than locally and lengthy and
numerous interventions had failed to alter this case. Beer
concludes his report of this intervention with a quote from the
Bible that he sees as an early expression of the Law of Cohesion
but which may also be seen as an expression of early systems
thinking:
"For the body is not one member, but many./ If
the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I
am not of the body; is it therefore not of the
body?/ And if the ear shall say, Because I am not
the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not
of the body?! If the whole body were an eye,
where were the hearing? If the whole were
hearing, where were the smelling?! But now
hath God set the members every one of them in
the body, as it hath pleased him./ And if they
were all one member, where were the body?/
But now they are many members, yet but one
body./ And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I
have no need of thee: nor again the head to the
feet, I have no need of you."
1 Corinthians 12, 14 - 21
This argues the case for the interdependence of sub-systems in
the creation of the whole and also for local autonomy of action
within the constraint of continuing to belong to the system.
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Throughout the Twelfth intervention attempts to focus System
Four activity in a coherent . manner continued without success,
albeit some experiments were undertaken in which the
assumptions of the insurance industry were questioned. The
subject company did acquire another company although Beer
comments that "the absence of System Four thinking was
stark" (32 PG 265) . No statement was given by the company
demonstrating why the acquisition was desirable or what benefits
were expected, the President even being quoted as stating that
no cross-fertilisation of each other's business was planned.
During the period of the Thirteenth intervention the International
Head Office was finally separated from the Operating
Headquarters of the Company in Canada, an implementation
which, whilst long urged by Beer, is seen by him as an expression
of "real-politique". The development of a full and coherent
cybernetic plan at this stage led to an elaboration of the model
from several different perspectives seen as orthogonal
dimensions of the whole. The three dimensions chosen were,
operational, people and financial, being three different accounts
of the organisation at each recursive level. Figure 5.3 on the
following page, taken from Beer, shows this orthogonal mapping.
This multi-dimensional view is continued in later applications
where various authors have examined organisations through the
model with various perspectives, e.g. as Information Systems,
Quality Systems etc.
The Fourteenth intervention saw the conclusion of Beer's work
with the Company. Reflecting on the overall process Beer
considers that the failure to articulate an adequate System Four,
or to find a candidate to take on that role may have been inhibited
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Different Organisational Dimensions
of the Whole System
• Intersect of the three
perspectives
Orthogonal Mapping of Different Perspectives of the Whole System
(Adapted from Beer (32 PG 268))
Figure 5.3
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by his presence in the company undertaking that role, the impact
of the observer on the observed! This final thought suggests that
the consultant intervening in a situation must have great
awareness of the impact of his presence. Perhaps his/her role
should not be prime in the intervention but supportive to it, aiding
the internal management in the development of their own process
of enquiry rather than leading that enquiry for them.
5.3 Safi Raah!: Diaqnosinq the Sustem 
The review so far has concentrated on two of Beer's own
applications and published criticisms. This section will examine
applications by others and looks at the use of the 1JSM as a
diagnostic and conceptual tool.
The initial methodology was published by Beer in "Diagnosing the
System for Organisations"( 3) and has been given definite form by
Flood C, Jackson.( 5 ) The diagnostic approach commences with the
belief that the VSM provides an account of a healthy organisation.
The procedure requires a modelling of the organisation as it is, in
order to reveal aspects of its design which do not meet the
requirements of viability, i.e. a comparison of a perceived
organisational reality with a cybernetic ideal. Solutions emerge
from this comparison process as flaws are revealed. Rt the end of
the process there is arguably little need to identify solutions to
problems, the solutions may be self-evident or the problems
resolved in the process of intervention.
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5.3.1
Espejo, (34 ) a keen proponent of Beer's work who was extensively
involved in the Chilean Experience, used the IJSM in 1978 as a
practical diagnostic tool in an engineering business. The Company,
P.M. Manufacturers was suffering from poor productivity, falling
liquidity and falling sales. Espejo's intervention showed how the
USM could help to recognise ineffective structuring of the
organisation, poor communication channels and the necessity for
operational elements of the business to have the discretion and
autonomy to fulfil their expected functions. Elements of the
corporate level of the organisation were seen to be performing
inadequately. This was seen to be because they were attempting
to absorb variety which should, in cybernetic terms, have been
absorbed at a lower level of recursion. This had a double impact of
inhibiting the performance of the lower level managers who had
no autonomy, and the senior managers who were swamped with
low level information.
Concluding his paper, Espejo highlights the structural weakness of
the company that was constraining the ability of its staff to solve
their own problems. He points to the lack of shared identity
throughout the organisation. This he saw as limiting its
organisational capacity and as responsible for the lack of adaptive
and control capabilities at the corporate level. His study closes
with practical implications for the company. This application
shows the applicability of the model in resolving problems facing
a small company, emphasising its practicality and generality for a
range of organisational situations.
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5.3.2
Flood 8,
 Zambuni( 25 ) and Beckford(35) have utilised the model in
situations of organisational crisis. Whilst Beckford's intervention
is fully explored in Chapter 8 of this thesis, that of Flood Di
Zambuni will be briefly reviewed here.
This application was undertaken in what the Western World
considers to be a lesser developed country still struggling to
obtain political and economic stability and with a generally under-
educated workforce that led to an autocratic management style.
Corruption was rife throughout the country and there was a high
level of black-market activity. A major thrust of Flood 8,
Zambuni's work was to challenge the autocratic management with
a "more liberated democratic management style for these largely
potentially capable staff "from all races"." The subject company
operated a safari tour business.
While some control and monitoring mechanisms were in place
these were ill-used and their value not understood. Poor control
of costs and bookings in the previous season had led to losses.
Staff/management relations were poor, aggravating feelings of
neglect and victimisation at operational level. Financial control
and monitoring mechanisms, whilst comprehensive, were limited
in use by poor understanding and time lags.
Flood g, Zambuni saw the situation as one of incipient
organisational collapse with the Company unlikely to survive
through the next high season. Total Systems Intervention(5)
provided a metamethodology for this intervention and the llSM
was selected as the most appropriate approach to a situation
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where urgent action was required. General agreement had been
obtained about the purposes and goals to be pursued, and, in a
turbulent environment, rapid adaptation and learning was
essential to enable organisational survival.
The methodology for the intervention followed that proposed by
Beer( 3 ) and adapted by Flood C, Jackson.( 5 ) The intervention
proceeded with the identification of the recursive structure of the
organisation, promoting a degree of local autonomy. This was
supported by the development and implementation of new
procedures for the operation and development of the Company
and, perhaps in the context most importantly, a programme of
education for the workforce aimed at increasing skills to enable
them to exercise their new autonomy in a competent manner.
This application perhaps reflects Beer's admonition to "Act Fast"
or as Flood Ce Zambuni put it "Organisation now or bust!" and
demonstrates the speed with which a Diable Systems Diagnosis
can holistically address a problem situation and generate
implementable proposals for change. The whole intervention took
place in under two months for an organisation of nearly 200
people.
5.3.3
Espejo (36) , Schuhmann( 37 ) and Latin,( 38 ) have each shown how
the Viable System Model can contribute to the design and
implementation of Information Systems.
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Espe jo,(36) in a "personal interpretation of aspects of Beer's
work," examines the need for managers and designers of
information systems to understand what constitutes information
at any particular structural level. He points to the need to
discriminate information for control from information for policy
making and highlights the limited information processing capacity
of individuals. The underlying model for this interpretation is the
Viable System Model.
Discussing "information dilemmas" Espejo shows that Senior
Management decisions are often forced by the information
provided from lower levels, such that the Senior Managers "feel
that they are rubber stamping what has already been filtered for
their consideration." (36) He then moues on to show that "an
information gap is inherent to management" and suggests that
this should be explicitly recognised and accepted. Whilst
acknowledging that inadequate use of information does not stop
organisations "defining policies and implementing complex tasks"
he does question whether the resource cost arising from poor use
of information is too high or if this threatens the viability of
organisations in turbulent environments.
Referring to the self-awareness and purposefulness of individuals
in social systems, Espejo suggests that these factors define
information for the individuals concerned. There are also a range
of transactions with "potential informational value" with which
an individual cannot deal and which, if they cannot be managed
within the autonomic level of the organisation, are transactions
for which there is no control capacity. Espejo proposes that "this
implies the necessity of autonomy within the system, that is, the
ability from within to give closure to information loops, with no
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reference to the above managerial level." He draws four
conclusions from this part of the work; the more variety that is
absorbed within the system, the less information is needed by
managers to exercise control; the more ambitious the proposed
level of performance, the more transactions have to be absorbed
within the system; the balance of the organisation with its
environment will be largely determined by the effectiveness of its
organisation; the mechanisms coupling managers to the systems
they strive to control need to be better understood and
information systems should make this possible.
Arguing that "the capacity to define policies" is essential at all
structural levels of organisation, Espejo proposes that policy
making is a conversational process taking account of relevant but
filtered internal and external information. He proposes that the
filtering mechanisms must be properly constituted and designed
so that information is balanced and that decisions are not biased
by undue emphasis of either source of information. Parallels are
drawn between these mechanisms and Systems 3-4-5 of the
Viable System Model.
Examining internal control, Espejo shows how the control function
both filters and controls internal transactions and that the need
of a control capacity leads to a control dilemma arising from
unfolding complexity within the system and inadequate
"managerial theory in use." He suggests that, in a turbulent
situation, greater flexibility is needed and larger information gaps
are inevitable while the normal managerial response is to consider
that the system is out of control and to tighten controls thus
reducing flexibility. Espejo proposes that a better response is to
maintain local autonomy but provide a powerful co-ordinating
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mechanism that will enable local managements to behave in ways
which are consistent one with the others. The control mechanism
may then monitor and audit the system for consistency rather
than directly control the operations, inducing higher degrees of
self-regulation at the lower level. This Espejo compares with
Systems 3-2-1 of the Viable System Model.
Espejo concludes his paper with guidelines for the definition,
design and implementation of information systems and these may
be summarised as follows:
Consistent development of co-ordination
systems across divisions enables a larger
acceptable information gap between the
controller and the controlled. (System 2)
It must be possible to audit the integrity of
inputs to the system and thereby enhance the
information available at higher levels of the
organisation. (System 3*)
Management Information Systems must enable
rather than constrain the conversations between
the control and intelligence functions. (System
3-4 Homeostat)
Management Information Systems and co-
ordination systems must be available at all
structural levels of organisation. (Recursion)
158
This work has shown how the concepts of the Viable System Model
can contribute to Information Systems design.
S c huhm a nn( 37 ) reports the use of the DSM as "an all
encompassing and comprehensive framework" for establishing an
information systems strategy in the film division of Hoechst FIG.
This comprehensive application of the model demonstrates its
practical utility and the importance of the people in the
organisation to its successful use. Schuhmann shows how the
Viable System Model provides a language which enables
competent discussions between the participants in the
organisation and makes it possible to consider shared values in
problem solving and information systems design. He concludes
that the model highlighted that:
"Management must accept certain laws about
the nature of complex systems."
"We can, however, utilise this knowledge
consciously to design organisations and
decision-making processes."
"This approach enables an increase in the
effectiveness of the management processes."
"Decentralised decisions do not give rise to loss
of control."
"Based on (our) Guiding Principles, strategies and
operational actions are moulded into plans which
can be considered as agreements pertaining to
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intended objectives and resources, and as a
method of communication they guarantee
organisational cohesion."
"The essential variables are identified and
monitored by the structuring of an architecture
for the MIS which is homologous to the IJSM."
This integrative application brings together the theoretical
importance of a properly designed MIS, as proposed by Espejo(36),
and its practical application to support the ongoing managerial
activity of an organisation with demonstrable benefits.
Latin( 38 ) shows how cybernetics and control theory, articulated
through the IJSM could provide a common language and
architecture for the design and development of network systems.
He argues the necessity as arising from the increasing range and
incompatibility of information systems and communication
devices, suggesting that from a Viable System perspective, "the
majority of so-called integrated networks today are in a state of
quasi-chaos, whatever their operations managers might wish to
say in defence."
Latin proposes that the LISM offers an opportunity to develop a
"DNA" for network systems enabling recursive standardisation of
components, protocol and information transfer. While his
conclusions are principally suggestions for further work in the
field, the paper overall suggests that the 1JSM may be useful as a
framework of thought in this regard. It has possible consequences
for greater economy and effectiveness of network system design
and control. It is certainly the case that as more organisations
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become totally dependent upon their information systems, e.g.
Banks and insurance Companies, the necessity for effective
information management becomes greater. It must not be
forgotten however that while information management is a
necessary and supportive aspect of achieving organisational
purpose, normally it is not, in itself, purposeful.
5.3..4
Foss( 39 ), Britton D McCallion(40 ) and Leonard(41 ), have each made
use of the Viable System Model to examine systems which would
not, by conventional rules, be recognised as organisational
entities.
The application by Foss( 39) , "escapes the confines of conventional
thinking" by interpreting the organisation of a bee-hive as a
naturally self-organising, autopoietic and viable system. This is
undertaken to pursue the search for "a higher-level of
understanding of organisation." Foss refers to his account as a
"mere caricature" of the reality. However he makes the point that
if we measure performance in terms of the "return on the most
limited resource," in the particular case energy, then the bee
colony through its effective organisation obtains a return of 29
kilocalories of food energy for every one kilocalorie expended.
This is four times the effectiveness of a foraging bushman and
ninety times as effective as modern agriculture. Whilst
acknowledging the differences in freedom of behaviour between
man and the bee, Foss nonetheless suggests that the
effectiveness of its organisation should be admired.
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Britton D McCallion (40) used the Diable System Model as a
diagnostic tool to suggest changes in Gouernment Policy to
increase the viability of the New Zealand trade training network.
In this case while each of the entities involved "belonged" to the
network they did not comprise one hierarchical organisation and
the dominant approaches to organisation would not have enabled
this comprehensive investigation. The examination excluded some
influential bodies whose contribution could not be investigated
within the terms of the research project and focused on those
which were "the most conspicuous .... and those most frequently
criticised." The contribution of this application in appreciating the
Diable System Model was to show that it could be applied to a
diverse network of "around 300 committees, quangos and
government departments" and generate useful and usable results.
Britton D McCallion suggest that "the diagnostic power of Beer's
model can be appreciated."
Leonard (41) uses the Diable System Model to examine the place of
the television station in United States commercial broadcasting.
This is a further interpretive application to a system which may be
considered as conceptual. The organisation of broadcasting is
composed of a set of interacting but separately owned or
controlled entities, the system is created by the relationships that
bind the entities together. Leonard emphasises that the purpose
of television may vary according to the commentator/observer
but in her paper selects the television station as the "system-in-
focus." She considers its relationships with its owners, network
affiliates, regulatory agency and the community. Her examination
shows how the Diable System Model can be used to examine, in
this case the television station system, and its contained sub-
systems, as part of different chains of higher recursion.
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Leonard's conclusions show how the Television Station is
constrained from fulfilling a social role in "linking people with
their environment" by the forces of marketing and hence loses
interactive variety. She considers that the whole future of
television is threatened by its isolation from its consumers and its
emphasis on short run ratings as measures of success. This, she
considers, inhibits risk-taking and the development of more
qualitative measures of programme value.
The contribution to the use of the Diable System Model rests in
two areas. Firstly in highlighting the diagnostic power of the
model to address the problems of a conceptual system. Secondly,
to demonstrate the ability of the model to allow a single
organisation to be viewed from a number of different
perspectives yet still produce practical proposals for
organisational reform. This theme emerges through Leonard's
paper with emphasis in the conclusion of the need to utilise the
model further to examine the nature of communication, its
structure, context and accessibility in contemporary society.
5.3.5
Holmberg(42 ) demonstrates the use of the model in supporting a
programme of decentralisation at IISSI in Sweden. Holmberg
recognised increasing levels of education and internationalisation
affecting RSS1. Together with the Company's Senior Management
group he utilised the Viable System Model to help in expressing to
all employees the philosophy of the organisation and in achieving
an acceptable balance of autonomy and control in the
organisation. In applying the DSM, Holmberg and his associates
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sought to create a normative model for the employees. This
described how they ought to behave to support the achievement
of organisational viability. This led to emphasis on delegation of
authority, increasing adaptability, formulating and preaching(sic)
key ideas and showing 'heart.' The emphasis being supported by
three key words of Quality, Training and Information, and seeking
to attain a position where the information needed to undertake a
task was available to those responsible for the task, who, in turn,
had the requisite skills to make competent decisions.
Whilst not a completely trouble-free implementation, Holmberg
considers that the project was successful overall in achieving
many of the changes required, including a return to profitability,
which he sees as the 'acid test.' El number of difficulties were
encountered including the tendency to isolation of newly
autonomous groups with emphasis needing to be placed on the
need for cohesion of the total system to counter this. Human
difficulties were experienced in achieving understanding of the
advantage of delegating authority. Achieving full co-operation
between autonomous units for synergistic benefit proved difficult
and the language of the model did not become a part of every
individual's vocabulary.
Role confusion was an initial difficulty with staff not
understanding that they may act in more than one system as
opposed to sitting in one box as with a conventional organisation
chart. Stress was required on the interdependent nature of the
systems. Finally, Holmberg states that the organisation can see
how the new generation of middle managers are becoming action
centred rather than as previously "waiting for their marching
orders".
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5.3.6
Ben-Eli(43 ) reflecting on his application of the USM to strategic
planning and reorganisation of a medical centre, considers that
the model contains concepts which "are invariably comprehensive
enough" to absorb the dynamic behaviour of individuals in
organisations. He suggests that they enable the clarification of
the "amorphous cloud" in which the structure of the organisation
its people and processes are contained. He suggests that while the
LISM offers an "eHcellent metaphor" for the process of
interactions and communications that bind individuals together in
the organisation it must be emphasised that the model must not
be mistaken for "the real thing!"
Ben-Eli proposes that the model-user combination is crucial and
that the Law of Requisite Uariety must apply to this combination.
He suggests that in order to succeed, the process should be
constructed to embody the principles of viability and should
become an integral part of the management processes that are
being described. He emphasises, with Beer(3 ) that the model
should be used in a creative and innovative way to amplify its
variety, rather than literally and pedantically. The role and
importance of the individual in the organisation is highlighted,
stressing that "in every human organisation, the basic unit of
autonomy, the ultimate recursion, is the individual himself."
5.3.7
Walker(44 ) demonstrates the use of the Diable System Model as a
device for effective organisation in a large co-operative where
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the political principles of the members militate against the
creation of any form of managerial hierarchy. The USM was used
to create a Hub-Sector system whereby the Sectors and
individuals maintain maximum autonomy consistent with systemic
cohesion. Metasystem decisions are made by delegates from the
Sectors whose function is to represent the views of his/her Sector
at the Hub meeting,. Reporting back by the Hub delegate to the
Sector ensures closure of the information loop and "It is virtually
impossible for any member of the Hub to grind his or her own
axes, as they know that a few days later they will be scrutinised
by a Sector to ensure that they have adequately represented their
views."
The non-hierarchical nature of the organisation meant that the
implementation of ideas arising from the USM could not be forced
and, at the time of Walker's paper, was not complete. Nonetheless
the USM enabled the creation of a "Senior Management"
mechanism. This he considered to enable the effective
management of the Co-operative whilst maintaining a fully
democratic decision-making process.
This application perhaps adheres most closely to some aspects of
Beer's ideal organisation whereby the "people" provide closure to
the system at the highest organisational level. This echoes the
unachieved aims of the Chilean intervention which ceased before
Beer and his colleagues could develop the Government-people
informational loops which had been proposed and experimented
with.
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5.3.8 Summar
This section has reported the major published applications of the
Diable System Model over the last twenty years, identifying the
major lessons which have been learned from each one. It is
opportune to note that despite the wide ranging nature of the
applications undertaken and reviewed here, the final work from
Walker(44 ) should carry such strong echoes of the initial work
undertaken by Beer in attempting to devise a management
process which reflects the wishes of "the people."
5.4 Deuelopments 
This section of the Chapter briefly reports developments and
interpretations of the Viable System Model, showing how it can
contribute to the understanding of organisations from a range of
differing perspectives.
5.4.1
Clemson( 20 ) reviews the whole cybernetic approach. He seeks to
demonstrate that "Management Cybernetics establishes the
fundamental principles and provides limits on what is and is not
possible for organisations." He suggests that cybernetics provides
the science for the art of management in the same way that
physics provides the science for the art of designing bridges.
Seeking to make this "science" accessible to Managers, Clemson
provides practical assistance in using the Diable System Model as
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a tool for problem solving and organisational design. His work is
non-mathematical, emphasising that "if the problem is adequately
formulated it is relatively easy to select the requisite technical
expertise." This reflects the "diagnostic" approach adopted by
Espejo, Flood D Zambuni, Britton D McCallion and others,
comparing a perceived situation with an idealised conception of
that situation (the Viable System Model) in order to identify the
need for redesign of aspects of the system being studied.
Clemson concludes by showing the use of the I1SM as part of the
ongoing process of organisational learning and management. He
points out that "managers will use the models only if the models
are their own and if the information system meets their
perception of utility." This emphasises again, with Beer, Ben-Eli
and Walker the importance of the individual in the successful
utilisation of the USM.
5.4.2
Beer(3) and Flood and Jackson( 5 ) have provided methodologies for
using the Viable System Model which were noted in Chapter Four.
Espejo(45) and Espejo D Harnden(46 ), cite the abstract nature of
the model. They highlight the ability to use the USM from a variety
of different perspectives, e.g. as a diagnostic tool for organisation
structure, a conceptual model for information systems design, a
method for assessing the organisational impact of alternative
policies and for designing, and building flexibility, into, large
organisations.
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Espejo regards organisations as "not single systems but
multisystems, being the outcome of the negotiations of multiple
viewpoints." He goes on to argue that an examination from a
single viewpoint is "bound to fail because it lacks in multisystemic
variety." He proposes that the identification of a system and its
purpose must be pursued at the commencement of an intervention
through a "soft systems" approach, such as Checkland's Soft
Systems Methodology(47 ) and that this aspect should be revisited
at appropriate times throughout the period of intervention. He
asserts that the resolution of the organisations identity (purpose)
implies the structure which is effective for it. It can certainly be
argued that the identification of purpose will determine which
activities are regarded as being "autopoietic" (producing the
system) and at what point these activities become pathological.
Espejo's second concern is with the identification of recursions of
the system, i.e. those "activities which fall within the regulatory
capacity of particular managerial levels." He sees two modes of
approach to this, diagnostic (for fault rectification) and
prescriptive (for design). Identification of recursions is a key
determinant of the complexity (variety) with which any given
managerial level must deal. Espejo considers that the USN1 helps
the intervenor to identify the "more effective" divisions of the
structural levels but warns of the danger of confusing
"complexity that the individual managers should see" with
"complexity that they appear to see." This point reflects the
difficulty experienced by Beer when seeking to resolve this issue
during his extended intervention at an Insurance Company.
Espejo, with Beer, emphasises the prime nature of the activities
which fulfil the organisations purpose in this context. Whilst Beer
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emphasises that contained viable systems must, in principle, be
capable of independent existence, i.e. they could be separated
from the main body of the organisation and continue to exist,
Espejo(42 ) refers to "all those activities which, in the framework
of the currently agreed identity for the enterprise, have a
transformation of their own. If hived off they would not lose the
content of their transformations."
Referring to the possibility of a number of interpretations and
influences on the decision about recursive levels, Espejo
concludes that, in a diagnostic study, the structural position of a
sub-system is "defined de facto by its relationship with other
primary activities." In a design study, "the modelling of primary
activities should be done with the support of expert advice.
alternative decomposition's of the organisational tasks will
depend upon both the technologies-in-use and the control
strategies."
Whilst proposing the rule that:
"Partitioning of primary activities should aim at
achieving a balanced distribution of complexity
along each of the lines in which complexity
unfolds." (45 PG 380).
Espejo acknowledges that particular strategic requirements or
technological implications may demand that it not be applied, and,
that structural position may alter over time with an increase or
decrease in the complexity being managed. This leads back to the
suggestion that, whilst the identified sub-system must be in
principle "capable of independent existence" to be considered a
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viable system, its position in a modelling of the organisation will
be contingent upon the views expressed by the participants in the
intervention and the degree of "usefulness" of the model so
derived.
5.4.3
Britton(48 ) proposes the joint use of the Diable System Model with
Rckoff's Interactive Planning (33 ) suggesting that, "A more potent
combination for developing an organisation is difficult to
imagine." He proposes that either the USM can be embedded in the
process of Interactive Planning, or that Interactive Planning can
be used to support an intervention using the USM.
Flood g, Jackson( 5 ) indicate in the grouping of types of systems
methodologies that the Viable System Model be used in complex-
unitary situations. That is, those where there are "many elements
in close interrelationship, exhibit probabilistic behaviour which is
difficult to predict, are open to the environment and include
purposeful parts. There is, however, assumed to be general
agreement about goals to be pursued." Interactive Planning on
the other hand is proposed as a methodology for "complex-
pluralist" situations, those where there is "a lack of agreement
about goals and objectives amongst the participants concerned,
but where some genuine compromise is achievable." Checkland's
Soft Systems Methodology is also in this category. This difference
in perception of the situational utility of the various models does
not, for Flood G, Jackson, mean that they are mutually exclusive.
Their process of "Total Systems Intervention" enables and
encourages the use of methodologies in a complementary manner.
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Britton's proposal is also supported by Espejo's work which
suggested the use of a "soft systems" approach, in his case Soft
Systems Methodology, interleaved with the use of the Viable
System Model. After establishing the relationship between the
Viable System Model and Interactive Planning, and discussing the
role and essential skills of a consultant, in particular the ability to
"motivate people to plan for themselves", Britton proposes a 15
step iterative methodology for their joint application. This
methodology with Beer, Ben-Eli, Espejo and Walker emphasises
the importance of the individual in the process of intervention.
Britton augments the proposal to include internal stakeholders
with the suggestion that external stakeholders such as
customers, suppliers, debtors and creditors should also be
considered and their views of the organisation understood.
5.4.4
Harnden(49) argues that organisations and their environments are
"structurally coupled." For Harnden this means that, rather than
an organisation seeking viability in a dynamic interaction with its
environment, perhaps in the form of a battle, "viability is
indicated as a satisfying embrace of, or a coherent dance with,
that world."
He uses this base to propose that System Four, rather than being
seen as containing a model of the organisation and its
environment, is viewed as a modelling facility. This is provided by
"instruments" with an interpretation of the organisations posture
in relation to its environment. The modelling facility enables the
organisation to adapt that posture to achieve a better "fit."
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Concluding a closely argued section on the nature of the Viable
System Model, Harnden proposes that the user may either choose
to interpret it as a model of some objective entity, or as "an
algorithm for a quality of control that emerges out of and in turn
enables a valuable heuristic for structural coupling, specifically in
terms of our own efforts to coherently orient ourselves within our
own cognitive space."
Harnden( 50 ) returns to this theme. He proposes that the Diable
System Model provides a language and set of conventions within
which it is possible for a variety of views to be exchanged with
relation to a system in order to achieve a "consensual domain", a
continuously negotiated agreement between observers of "what
is." This, for Harnden frees the model from the constraint of trying
to describe an "object" or "entity" and supports its use in the
more interpretive sense demonstrated by Leonard, Britton &
McCallion and Foss.
5.4.5
Schwaninger( 51 ) uses the Diable System Model as a guide to
defining organisational fitness. He criticises traditional metrics
such as profitability and share price as "inadequate measures of
organisational effectiveness," saying that, "They are, in principle,
no more than short-term indicators of business achievement." He
suggests that "assessing the effectiveness of a business by the
level of its profits is similar to drawing conclusions about what
season it is by measuring the temperature. For this aim, the
calendar, and definitely not the temperature, would be the
appropriate source of information."
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Rrguing that increasing environmental turbulence has rendered
traditional methods derived from accounting procedures less able
to help the organisation survive, Schwaninger proposes that "a
new understanding, rooted in a more comprehensive view of
organisational fitness, is needed." He considers that what he calls
management, and this thesis with Jackson( 17 PP 102-104) calls,
organisational cybernetics, and planning theory, taken together
can contribute to this understanding.
He then shows how cybernetics and systems ideas can underwrite
"systemic effectiveness" at three levels of management,
operational, strategic and normative, suggesting different criteria
of organisational fitness at each one:
"At the operational level, it is the criterion of
economic efficiency/profitability.
Fit the strategic level, capability in the
competitive and in the co-operative senses, and
Fit the normative level legitimacy, defined as the
potential to fulfil the claims of all relevant
stakeholders."
lie sees the "key duty" of an integral management as being to
meet these three criteria "in the long run" and that the control
systems suggested by the Viable System Model can contribute
significantly to this.
Schuianinger then provides a brief eHample of "organisational
fitness in action" demonstrating how an organisation using this
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approach had maintained its strategic direction despite short run
difficulties, such as low profitability at a time of high investment
need, and in so doing had supported its own long term viability.
This may be compared with the more conventional approach seen
in most organisations where the emphasis on short run
profitability inhibits the fulfilment of longer-term needs and
thereby threatens or destroys the organisation.
The work concludes with a reiteration of the criticism of low-
variety models used in business administration and re-emphasises
the need for richer and more adequate control and development
mechanisms. Schwaninger proposes the Diable System Model in
this role since, inter alia, it enables organisations to adapt their
structure to changing needs in a self-aware manner. It provides
both short and long run control systems and it provides a
conceptual framework for adaptation and learning, leading to a
new understanding of "organisational fitness."
5.4.6
Espejo and Schwaninger( 52 ) return to this theme with a diverse
collection of works on "Organisational Fitness" which aim to
underline the contribution which Cybernetics can make to the
viability, in its wider sense, of organisations. Espejo(53)
emphasises again the methodological need to "ground the model
in the reality of the people affected" and sees this as vital to
successful use. Recognising the contribution of "soft"
methodologies to this process he states that "the cybernetic
methodology braids action and structure into an integrated
framework for problem solving."
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5.4.7
Malik( 54) after arguing the need for the practitioner to properly
comprehend the meaning of the Viable System Model, also
emphasises the importance of involving the people in the
diagnosis and redesign of an organisation. He states "The more
people have been involved in the process of discussing their
system, the easier it (implementation) is." Malik's application was
undertaken in what he refers to as "Trojan horse" style, revealing
the model only after using it for two years to guide his
interuention.
5.4.8
Flood (55 , 56 , 57 ) demonstrates the contribution that Diable
Systems thinking makes to the contemporary pursuit of Total
Quality Management, a particular approach to organisational
fitness. He shows how an "appreciation of viability" can be used
to interpret the principles of achieving quality, an achievement
which many organisations see as fundamental to their long term
development.
Flood shows that the "Intelligence function" of a Diable System
can be used to focus on prevention rather than cure, to enable
"planned management action", and to identify customer
requirements which can be met, "first time and every time,"
through effective co-ordination and control systems which
emphasise organisation to achieve objectives. He shows how the
"audit" system helps to reduce waste and total costs and how
real-time control enables effective decision making. Participation
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is encouraged to ensure "total" involvement in the quality process
and measurement of achievement is undertaken through Beer's
performance indices of actuality, capability and potentiality.
Finally, creativity and continuous improvement are enabled by the
creation of a system which has at its core mechanisms of
adaptation and learning. Flood concludes by arguing that viability
and quality imply each other in a complementary manner such
that a viable organisation will achieve quality and a quality
organisation, adhering to the principles which he elaborates, will
be viable.
5.4.9
Gomez( 58 ) examines the need for autonomy of organisations from
their environment and within the organisations themselves.
Autonomy of organisations is considered to be a function of
achieving "an optimal mix between responding to the environment
and differentiating itself from the environment." With Harnden,
Gomez seems to be arguing the need for organisational balance,
Harnden's "satisfying embrace" or "coherent dance."
Looking at internal autonomy, Gomez acknowledges the historical
arguments for centralisation against de-centralisation and points
to the lessons to be learned from political federalism and "the
organisation of autonomy" implemented by Sloan at General
Motors. Again he argues that the need is for an appropriate
degree of autonomy to enable the system to fulfil its purpose. He
cites the Viable System Model as "the most developed approach"
reflecting the idea that "problems should be solved at the place of
their occurrence," and supporting the basic principle that "the
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autonomy of organisational units is a variable which should
depend on environmental developments and the interests of the
whole. This can be seen as a restatement of Beer's requirement
that "The metasystem 	  should make only that degree of
intervention that is required to maintain cohesiveness in a viable
systern,4 1 PG 158)
5.4 .10
Semler,( 59 ) Gottfreund( 60 ) and Seara( 61 ) each show how the ideas
of Viable System thinking have contributed to the achievements of
their organisations.
Semler reports the recovery and survival of his organisation
founded on changes in its management concepts to employ three
key values, democracy, profit-sharing and information. In this
case, the business was restructured to create autonomous units
on a human scale (System One Elements) and the traditional
hierarchy was overthrown in favour of an "organisational circle"
which reduced the number of management layers. This change
was supported by a change from having supervisors of units to
co-ordinators (System Two); reward systems were changed to
enable careers and salaries to be enhanced without the need for a
hierarchy of management. Subordinates evaluate managers on a
regular basis and anonymous audits of staff attitudes to the
organisation are undertaken (System 3*). Important decisions are
taken on a collegiate basis (System Four, environment for
decision) and some are made by company wide vote ( System Five
- Identity - Democracy - "El Pueblo") including instances of the
proposed acquisition of another Company and a new factory. This
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participatory stance extends to sharing of information and an
expectation that staff will use their common sense to determine
their behaviour, rule-books and regulations have been abolished.
Structures of work groups are not imposed from above but are
allowed to emerge from the group in a natural manner. Finally,
planning and budgeting are ongoing adaptive processes that
reflect the ongoing state of the organisation which is thereby
working, as nearly as possible, with "real-time" information. Staff
functions have been abolished.
Whilst this is not an explicit use of the Viable System Model, it is
relatively easy to see how its major principles have been utilised
to good effect by this organisation. Particularly interesting is the
participative "humanitarian" use of cybernetic principles which is
also shown in the work of Gottfreund( 60 ) who emphasises, with
Schwaninger, the interrelatedness of Normative, Strategic and
Operational management .
Seara, (61) more explicitly using the Viable System Model, records
its use to distribute control throughout his organisation. This
detailed application shows how the various sub-systems of the
organisation function together in order to achieve objectives, in
particular the "intensive interaction" of the control and
intelligence functions.
5.4 .11
Bowling and Espejo( 62 ) demonstrate the Cybernetic Methodology
as a "soft" approach to an organisational situation, already
espoused by Espejo and Britton, as necessary to support and
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enable agreement about, and understanding of, the issues to be
addressed, participation and implementation. This provides for an
iterative enquiry-learning loop enabling explicit discussion of
different viewpoints and interpretations of the organisational
situation. Bowling and Espejo conclude that the value of the
Cybernetic Methodology is in its heuristic power and not its step
by step application.
5.4 .12
Concluding their work, Espejo C, Schwaninger( 52 ) reaffirm that,
for them, organisational effectiveness can no longer be measured
purely in terms of profitability. They consider that viability
demands not just survival but "control by transformation" and
"control by development", restating that organisations both
influence, and, are influenced by, their environments and
suggesting that the increasing complexity of a world linked by
global communications demands better organisational models and
managerial processes. They propose that organisational
cybernetics can contribute to the search for increased
effectiveness but that the need for "visionary leadership" cannot
be provided by these processes, they simply make such leadership
more possible.
5.4.13
Britton 6, Parker( 63) is used to close this section on developments
of the Diable System Model. Working from the general model they
have developed a particular version, known as the "Project
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Management 11SM" for use in the diagnosis and design of project
management systems. Whilst the logic, connectivity and structure
of the original model has been maintained the specific language of
Project Management has been utilised for descriptive purposes.
The development methodology for this model is drawn from
Beer. (26)
Filthough this development has been undertaken to assist in a
particular case it underlines again the generality of the Viable
System Model and its applicability to a wide range of
organisations. Perhaps the most significant point is that
traditional management approaches work on "snapshot" views of
organisation, organisation charts being "frozen out of history"(3
PG i ) and describing an inert system, and yet, organisations must
be dynamic in order to be viable in an increasingly turbulent
environment. Project Management deals with the process of
managing change. Managers, through the use of the 11SM can be
enabled and encouraged to recognise that management is not a
series of discrete and independent decisions, but, like Project
Management, the process of maintaining organisational viability is
a project for "life".
5.4.14 Summar
This section has briefly reviewed the major developments in the
use of the Viable System Model, concentrating mainly on "how" it
can be interpreted and used, and the adaptations of methodology.
Several important themes emerge from this.
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Firstly, with Beer, each writer sees people as "the heart of the
enterprise"(1 PG 560) proposing a variety of ways of including the
stakeholders in the intervention such as Soft Systems
Methodology, Interactive Planning and the Cybernetic
Methodology. Secondly, the focus on "organisational fitness" has
proposed that traditional measures are inadequate and has
suggested ways in which the model can contribute to the total
health of an organisation. Thirdly, Harnden has indicated how the
language of the model provides a mechanism for enabling
agreement about what constitutes the system under discussion.
Fourthly, Flood has shown the close link between viability and
quality, demonstrating that they imply each other and that quality
programmes will fail unless principles of viability are adhered to.
Finally, the nature of management as a process has been
underlined by the derivation of the "Project Management LISM" by
Britton G, Parker.
5.5 Criticisms 
This section reviews the principal criticisms of the Viable System
Model, taking account of the Rpplications and Developments
already examined.
5.5.1
Jacksoo,(64 9 65 C,
 17) Flood C, Carson,( 10 ) Flood & Jackson,( 5 C, 66)
Morgan(67) and Ulrich (31) have all critically reviewed the Diable
System Model. From these reviews, eight points dominate and
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were recorded under three headings as follows by Flood G,
Carson(10 PG 98):
Methodological
"1) The cybernetic model is often accused of
adherence to misplaced mechanical and
biological analogy.
2) The concept of variety has been criticised as:-
(a) a poor measure inappropriate for scientific
work,
and
(b) deficient as it is employed in cybernetics as
an absolute, observer-independent measure of
complexity.
Epistemological
3) The cybernetic model is held to give an
impoverished, or subset, picture of
organisations.
4) The cybernetic model emphasises stability at
the expense of change.
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5) It is dangerous for the organisation to
function on a set of a priori identified goals in a
dynamic environment.
6) The cybernetic model underplays the
purposeful role of individuals in an organisation.
Utility
7) Following (6), there are clear autocratic
implications when the cybernetic model is used
in practice.
8) The cybernetic model is difficult to apply in
practice.
In reviewing these criticisms, Flood D Carson utilise the
distinction between Management Cybernetics and Organisational
17 PP 102-104)
.
 The second ofCybernetics drawn by Jackson(
these being represented by the Diable System Model and being
developed without reference to analogies and recognising the role
and impact of the observer. Considering only Organisational
Cybernetics, and regarding the prior work that has been reviewed,
these criticisms may be examined to assess their validity.
5.5.2
The accusation of adherence to "misplaced mechanical D biological
analogy" is seen by Flood D Carson as incorrect for the Diable
System Model, it having been derived from first cybernetic
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principles. Even agreeing with them, it would still be considered
that the utility of the analogy as a framework for thinking about a
system and for describing its functioning is helpful to both the
stakeholders in a system studied and to the observer of that
system. It helps to impart "semantic" meaning to communication,
the absence of which in the purely synactic messages is criticised
by Ulrich (31) . Morgan( 67 8,
 68) and Flood 8, Jackson( S ) for
example, have made extensive use of metaphors for describing
the observed appearance of systems and organisations to aid
understanding.
5.5.3
The concept of variety is again defended by Flood 8 , Carson,
although whilst arguing that it "adds to the systemic power of
reasoning" they "find pointless" the idea of creating an
instrument of measurement whose uncertainty of content would
necessarily be high. They conclude that awareness of the concept
is "the key." Jackson( 17 ) dismisses the criticism of the measure
as "obviously misplaced in relation to the USM." The concept
obviously has been considered helpful in various applications of
the Diable System Model undertaken and as such should be
accepted as useful in appropriate contexts bearing in mind its
limitations.
5.5.4
The accusation that the cybernetic model gives only an
impoverished, partial, or, subset view of organisations would hold
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good against any model. li model is necessarily an abstraction
from "the real thing" and will necessarily be impoverished when
measured against that "reality."
The richness of the model-in-use must be dependent on the skill
and craftsmanship of those applying it and, with Flood C , Carson,
"the people who apply the approach can do so in whichever way
they so desire." Beer provides that the Diable System Model offers
an account of the organisation, to be "useful"( 3 PG 2 ), the model-
in-use must be rich enough to satisfy the needs of those involved
in the application. The basic framework of the abstract model is
inevitably enriched in the process of use when the various sub-
systems of the model are given substance from the organisational
context.
5.5.5
The charge of "emphasising stability at the expense of change"
cannot be substantiated. The whole point of the model is to assist
in the design of systems or organisations capable of learning and
adapting in a turbulent changing environment that implies
organisational change. The stability that is sought is dynamic
stability, or "dynamic equilibrium" (51) , that is the organisation
adapts to maintain its "balance" in the environment; Harnden's
"coherent dance." It is essential that the metasystem functions
correctly, i.e. an adequate balancing of the System Three-Four
demands, to prevent the organisational boundaries becoming
fixed or institutionalised.
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Flood C,
 Carson consider that "organisational cybernetics allows
for democratic processes which inherently permit dynamic
changes of goal" thus avoiding the danger of functioning on "a
priori" goals. It may be argued that the super-ordinate goal of a
system is its own long-term survival and the Viable System Model
sets out the mechanisms by which this may be achieved. The
particular lower order goals of organisations to which the model
is applied may be seen as objectives towards survival. "The
purpose of the system is what it does"( 3 PG 99 ), and, what it does
may change in relation to the demands of its environment and
itself.
5.5.6
The arguments that the Viable System Model "underplays the
purposeful role of individuals" and is open to "autocratic abuse"
can be treated together. The model sets out to provide an account
of the structure and processes of organisations, i.e. the
mechanisms by which they work. Whilst Flood D Carson, with
Jackson, consider that it does account, in principle, for the roles
of individuals, Jackson suggests that a more explicit incorporation
of the nature and organisation of satisfying work would be
helpful. As regards autocracy, the proper use of the model
demands autonomy at each level consistent with systemic
cohesion.
That the model can be used to autocratic ends is undisputed in the
short term but, it must be questioned whether such an application
would generate a truly viable system, or if it would be, with
Beer's waue, (69 ) "in a state of systemic conflict within it
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determined by its form of organisation," "a dynamic system in
catastrophe, as a result of its internal organisational instability,"
with, "its destruction built into its organisation." Viability is about
long term survival, learning and adaptation; for the system to be
viable System Five is required to share the "identity" of System
One; in a situation of autocracy, this would not be the case and
the system would not meet the established criteria of viability.
Similarly, from the Total Systems Intervention meta-methodology
of Flood C-, Jackson( 5 PG 42 ) Viable Systems Diagnosis is useful in
complex-unitary situations, where there is, or can be readily
achieved, general agreement about the goals to be pursued. Rn
autocratic system, by definition, does not exhibit this feature.
The history of man is littered with examples of the outcomes of
"autocratic" management, such as, the French Revolution, the
Russian Revolution and the economic weakness of the former
communist bloc countries. These all show the failure of autocratic
systems of management which by definition did not adequately
take account of the needs and wishes of the people. Similar
approaches in industry may be said to have provoked the rise of
trades unions and "worker power" throughout the industrialised
world in the early twentieth century.
An autocratic management can only maintain its position by a
massive attenuation of local variety through the command and
audit channels of the system. This inhibits local autonomy in
contradiction of cybernetic principles and will be inefficient,
requiring massive metasystem forces to "police" behaviour. It will
be ineffective because the goals of the stakeholders in the
system at the lower levels will not be shared with its "Senior
Management." The stakeholders at the lower level may seek to
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pursue their own goals and to subvert those of the organisation
as a whole. Examples of this behaviour can be seen in the rise of
illegal drinking establishments during the American prohibition
era, and the maintenance of religious faith in Countries
throughout the world during periods of oppression, e.g.
Catholicism in England, Judaism in Germany.
The accusation that the Viable System Model may lead to
autocratic abuse may be correct in the short term. In the long run
the system which supports it is likely to collapse as it will be
inefficient and ineffective in the pursuit of its goals.
5.5.7
The argument that the Viable System Model is difficult to apply in
practice is one which continues. The examples of its application
earlier in this chapter demonstrate that it can be used and has
been used in a wide variety of situations from nations and large
enterprises to very small organisations. The success of these
applications does not alter the difficulty of using the model which,
because of its requirements, is perceived as threatening the
position of those already "in power." This theme is best explained
by Machiauelli(30):
"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand,
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain of
success than to take a lead in the introduction of
a new order of things, because the innovation
has for enemies all those who have done well
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under the old conditions and lukewarm
defenders in those who may do well under new."
There are a number of practical difficulties in using the Diable
System Model. Firstly, it requires a new framework of thought
about the nature and purpose of organisations and of the
individuals who comprise them. Secondly, the language and
concepts of cybernetics in general and the Viable System Model in
particular are unfamiliar to most people who thereby feel
excluded. Thirdly, the diagnostic implications for the elements
which comprise the metasystem are likely to inhibit success since
these are the people most threatened by the changes and
responsible for enabling their implementation, and "passive
resistance is the most potent weapon ever wielded by man."(70)
Finally, the grant of greater autonomy to managers at the lower
level of organisations needs to be supported by higher levels of
competence at those levels which carries with it implications for
investment in training and education. Western Management and
Economic thought still regards training and education as current
expenditure not capital investment, and does not recognise that
the increase in expenditure to achieve higher levels of education
and training may enable an increase in self-regulation
(autonomy). The consequent reduction in expenditure on control
activity which should arise from this would be the return on that
investment.
5.5.8
Finally in this section, Jackson(71) seeks to encourage the debate
between the "structuralist" and "interpretive" views of the Diable
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System Model. Jackson's preferred alternative is the structuralist
view which accepts the subjective, observer dependent nature of
systems. This allows the Diable System Model to be used as a tool
"to consider the implications of different system identities," and
"once a particular identity and purpose have been chosen, certain
structural laws need to be obeyed in designing a system to
achieve that purpose effectively and efficiently and to maintain
that identity." Jackson recognises however that the [liable System
Model may "be interpreted differently" and cites the
"interpretive" view of Harnden and Espejo, which proposes that
"Organisational models should be seen not as seeking to capture
objective reality, but as aids to orienting ongoing conversations
about complex social issues." Jackson concludes that the
"structuralist reading" of the Diable System Model offers the
opportunity "to enhance the steering capacities of organisations
and societies, and this is central to their successful evolution,"
whilst soft systems thinking "is not equipped" in this way.
5.5.9 Summar
This section has highlighted the major criticisms of the Diable
System Model and considered some of the arguments used to
counter them. The criticisms of the use of analogy and the concept
of variety are shown to be weak, whilst the epistemological
concerns are perhaps more matters of opinion and interpretation
rather than "fact" although the charge of emphasising stability
(Ulrich) appears to be unfounded.
Rutocratic use of the Diable System Model is possible in the short
term, but any of man's knowledge can be abused, e.g. nuclear
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power, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The potential for
abuse, highlighted at the outset by Wiener( 16 PG 38) does not
alter the matter of its existence, it merely serves to emphasise
that we must learn to use that knowledge wisely, since
knowledge cannot be "unlearnt," or 'undiscovered." The difficulty
of application of the [liable System Model has been suggested to
be partially methodological, partially linguistic and partly political,
and will vary according to whether the model is used as a
diagnostic, explanatory or exploratory device.
5.6 Beer, a latter dati Diogenes?(21)
The intention of this section is to briefly explore the philosophy
and ideology which Beer reveals through his writing and work. The
aim is to show his concern with human freedom and well being.
5.6.1
Diogenes was labelled a "cynic,"( 72 ) literally someone canine or
dog like. In the common, contemporary, interpretation of a cynic
as someone, antisocial, hostile or misanthropic this label would
not apply to Beer. However if we take Russell's (72 PG 241)
interpretation of Diogenes' philosophy as being "quite the
contrary" of what we now call cynical, then it is easy to accept
that Beer is Diogenesean, a radical thinker, proclaiming his
brotherhood with the human race. He believes that radical
alteration in the organisation and management of society is
necessary to prevent its self-destruction, and like Diogenes, he is
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"a man about whom stories (have) gathered, even in his
lifetime:(72 PG 241)
5.6.2
Stating that "I wish that people would refer to my original
texts"(73 ) Beer reflects on the way in which he considers that the
Diable System Model has been "misunderstood" as hierarchical,
deterministic and prescriptive, continuing, "It is none of these
things."( 70) My understanding of the Diable System Model has
been derived primarily from Beer's original texts and each of
these shows in some way his concern with the state of society, its
impact on human beings and his perception of the need for radical
change before its collapse.
The clearest elaboration of his concern is in "Designing
Freedom" (69) in which he explains his position. This sets out what
Beer considers as the major threat to freedom, that is the
dysfunctional organisation of society and its institutions that he
sees as inefficient and ineffective in the service of mankind. He
shows the availability of cybernetic understanding and tools to
enable necessary changes to be made in an informed manner. Very
importantly he argues that science is currently supporting the
established order, becoming "oppressive and alienating" except to
those who currently hold power in our societies. He shows how
science needs to be brought into the service of man through the
democratic process, so that we, the people, can be "no longer at
the mercy of a technocracy which alone can tell us what to do."
Beer illustrates ways in which this could be achieved.
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Discussing "The future that can be demanded now"(69 PG 70) Beer
reviews the centralisation-decentralisation dichotomy and
illustrates again the need for the correct balance of these factors,
i.e. central control only in so far as it is necessary for cohesion of
the system. This, in the Diable System Model, is determined by the
creation of identity in the system, the task of System Five. This
identity needs for viability of the system, to be shared with, or in
a democracy, determined by, System One. The system can then
define itself through the democratic process and thereby the
constituents determine their own freedom since they control
control. This argues the need for a more effective democratic
process than is available in most nations, although Switzerland
perhaps is closest with its federal structure and extensive use of
referenda on major issues.
Finally in that text, Beer argues that(69 PG 87) "We can embark on
that process of liberation only by constantly and consciously
testing the ways in which our personal variety .... (freedom to act
in the way that we wish) .... has been and is being constrained by
the very things we tend to hold most dear," i.e. our institutions
and systems of government. He proceeds with the explanation
that freedom does not mean the complete absence of regulation,
saying: (0P• Cit)
"We are not free if we are dumped in the middle
of the Sahara desert, despite the absence of
walls and bars on the non-existent windows. We
are free when the doors of our intellectual suite
of rooms are unlocked, and we walk outside to
breathe some new and fresher air. But we still
need maps."
I
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Reiterating his meaning of "in control" as "ultrastable: capable of
adapting smoothly to unpredictable change" Beer proposes his
view that cybernetics offers the "maps" necessary for "Designing
Freedom," giving this as an "appeal for scientific efficiency, which
belongs to the word "designing", as providing a regulatory model
to give requisite variety to human joy and fun, which belong to
the word "freedom"."
He reviews the discord between these two apparently conflicting
requirements as follows( 69 PG 89):_
"There are two things wrong with the role of
science in our society. One is its use as a tool of
power, wherever that is concentrated by
economic forces. The other is its elite image.
None of us wishes to be manipulated by power;
and if science is the tool of power, to hell with	 1
it. None of us wishes to entrust our liberty to a
man in a white laboratory coat, armed with a
computer and a row of ball-point pens in his
pocket, if he does not share in our humanity (my
italics).
The contrasting argument is just this. 	
Civilisation is being dragged down by its own
inefficiency. We cannot feed the starving; we
cannot stop war; we are in a terrible muddle
with education, transportation, the care of the
sick and the old; institutions are failing, and
often we feel unsafe in the streets of our own
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cities. RH this is inefficient. Then it cannot be
correct to say that the only way to preserue
liberty is to be so damned inefficient that
freedom is not euen threatened. (sic) We have to
become efficient in order to solve our problems;
and we have to accept the threat to freedom
that this entails - and handle it."
Beer's concern then is that human freedom, for many societies, is
threatened by their present organisation which is inefficient and
in danger of catastrophic collapse. Recognising that a complete
lack of government (control) is anarchy, a feature of some parts
of major cities throughout the world where the "established
authorities" have lost their power to maintain order in society,
e.g. parts of New York, Beer shows that some constraint on
behaviour is necessary to establish control. He suggests that this
should be determined by the people themselves not the current
holders and brokers of power. He proposes that cybernetics
provides the science that can make this possible.
The concern with the collective well-being of mankind recurs
throughout Beer's writing and is very clearly evident in his more
contemporary work, an attempt to create a democratic
management process. Beer's proposal here is to create a fully
participative management structure, constructed in such a way
that, "not only do we have a complete democracy within our
organisational globe, 	 , but we have a network that exhibits
total closure." (74) Whilst this is not an appropriate place for a full
examination of the approach it demonstrates again Beer's belief in
the democratic process and his determination to pursue that end
such that the people may take control of their own present and
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future. Schecter(7 5 C,
 76) has reported working with this idea in a
commercial organisation and July 1993 saw a world-wide
eliperiment under the heading "World Syntegration" in which
teams in a number of locations considered courses of action to
change the operation of what Beer( 77) has called "the triage
pump", the organisation of the world which ensures that the rich
get richer whilst the poor get poorer. The results of this work
have not yet been formally reported although during a
conversation with Beer in September 1993 he stated that it was
not as successful as he had hoped.
5.6.3 Summar
Stafford Beer has been demonstrated to be a man who believes
emphatically in the power of science, particularly cybernetics, to
improve the lot of mankind as a whole and who demands that this
science be employed by the people of the world in their own
interest, rather than by the holders of power in theirs.
He is not content to philosophise about this topic, he is a man of
action, and would I suspect, like Diogenes( 72 ), "live in a tub" if
this was demonstrably the best way to change the "World in
Torment."
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to review the substantial body of work which
has already been published about the Viable System Model in
order that its strengths and weaknesses could be revealed. Whilst
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at an epistemological level there remains ongoing and useful
debate about the interpretation of the model, the "structuralist"
and 'interpretive' views, at a more pragmatic level its general
utility has been demonstrated in a wide variety of situations.
Jackson's(' 7 ) conclusions provide the base for this summary. The
Uiable System Model is a general model of any organisation, it
deals with both vertical and horizontal interdependence and
focuses attention on the sources and distribution of command and
control. It provides a starting point for the design of information
systems and recognises the interaction of an organisation with its
environment. Finally it provides a useful diagnostic tool for
improving organisational effectiveness and, addresses the
matters of autonomy and democratic management. The
weaknesses appear to be, the simplistic view that the Viable
System Model provides from an interpretive perspective, that it
underplays the purposeful role of individuals, that it may lead to
autocratic abuse, and, that it is difficult to apply in practise. On
this point it is worth reiterating that there cannot be general
agreement about goals and purposes - an agreement which is
fundamental to the use of the model - without a participative
management approach to create that agreement, "it is clear that
the model depends for its full and satisfactory operation on a
democratic milieu."( 17 PG 120)
The next chapter will review the whole of the first part of this
thesis, summarise the cases for and against the Viable System
Model as a more adequate representation of organisation for
contemporary managers and indicate the areas of interest that
will be pursued through the practical research.
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Chapter Six 
The Uiable Sgstem Model; 
A More Adequate Representation? : the Cases for
and against 
This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis by briefly
reviewing the work so far, and presenting a summary critique of
the Viable System Model. The chapter finishes by highlighting
those matters that will be pursued through the various case
studies.
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter One highlighted the increasing complexity and dynamism
faced by contemporary managers from factors both internal and
external to their organisations. Flawed and ill-timed responses
to this complexity were suggested to be arising from the use of
inadequate management tools. Chapter Two, highlighting the
limitations of all models in general, critically examined the
dominant, or mainstream, organisational models, i.e. the
classical, human relations and systems views of organisations,
and revealed their strengths and weaknesses. The Viable System
Model was then suggested as being "a more adequate model of
organisation for contemporary managers." Chapter Three
introduced the science of Cybernetics and related the cybernetic
model to the dominant models, demonstrating its potential
utility. Jackson's( 17 ) distinction between "management
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cybernetics" and "organisational cybernetics", represented by
the Diable System Model, was then elaborated. Chapters Four and
Five were dedicated to explaining and reviewing the Viable
System Model, the first examining its conception, construction
and methodology the second reviewing the major applications,
developments and criticisms.
6.2 The Dominant Models Revisited 
The "machine" model of organisation, derived from the work of
Taylor, Fayol, Weber etc. relies on three main assumptions that
are considered to be flawed in the contemporary context. These
assumptions are, that an organisation can be treated as isolated
from its environment, that improvement in performance of a
part will necessarily improve the whole, and, that the
organisation must be studied from the perspective of its
management. Whilst the machine view is useful in stable
environments and for straightforward tasks using unthinking
human parts, it is considered to inhibit adaptation and
dehumanise people. Its strengths rest in the systematic analysis
of tasks and the derivation of order from chaos. Its weaknesses
are that, it ignores the environment and the interdependence of
parts, does not recognise the need for adaptation, and, does not
consider the "purpose" of an organisation. It fosters control
through hierarchy. The machine model only deals with formal or
real organisations and although it may help to diagnose faults it
does not offer assistance with cures.
The organic model of organisation, representing the Human
Relations and Systems view derives from the work of Mayo,
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Maslow, Herzberg etc. for its human relations aspects, and
Barnard, Selznick and von Bertalanffy for the systems view.
The Human Relations view has strength in its recognition of the
contribution and needs of the individual but it has a number of
weaknesses. Firstly, many applications assume that human
needs must be fulfilled through work despite warnings from
Herzberg et al. to the contrary. Secondly, it does not allow that
the needs and goals of the organisation may sometimes
necessarily override those of individuals within it. Finally it does
not help with the specific tasks of designing and structuring
organisations to deal with tasks which are becoming increasingly
complex.
The systems model does have the strength of recognising the
environment of the organisation as being of importance,
however, it also has weaknesses. It appears to accept survival
as being the primary aim of the organisation, seeming to ignore
achievement of goals and achievement oriented activity.
Secondly, it is considered to "reify" the organisation, perhaps
ignoring the rational activity of human actors. Thirdly, there
exists no adequate method of measuring "success" and although
interdependence is stressed, effective measurement of this is
difficult. Finally, the solutions offered for problems are untested
and vague, emphasising maintenance and inhibiting radical
change, possibly to the detriment of survival.
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6.3 The Cases for and against the Diable Sgstem Model 
The Diable System Model portrays any organisation as a system
which, through cybernetic processes, is capable of survival. Rn
organisation designed in accordance with the cybernetic criteria
is expected to learn and adapt in a changing environment with
which it is in dynamic interaction.
Unlike the machine model, the Diable System Model is systemic,
recognising both the environment and the interrelationships of
the parts of a system. The environmental interaction enables the
system to both influence, and be influenced by, its environment.
It enables purposes to be imputed to a system by its observer(s),
such that a number of different perspectives on the existence
and description of the system and of its situation may be
considered. Like the machine model, it enables the systematic
derivation of order from chaos, but, it does this in a way that
holds the total organisation in view whilst changes are
considered, and, it enables learning and adaptation by the
system.
With the Human Relations model, unlike the general systems and
machine views, the Diable System Model enables the
consideration of the purposeful role of individuals, although it is
considered that this may be underplayed. It also offers
mechanisms by which the system can recognise when human
needs are being met, whatever those needs may be. It is also
argued that it may be used autocratically, although this point is
disputed, e.g. Beer, Jackson.
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Unlike the other models, it recognises that survival is a primary
aim, but it also encourages dynamic goal seeking behaviour in
pursuit of survival. The Diable System Model offers precise help
with diagnosis of and rectification of organisational faults,
provides help with the design and structure of organisations
whilst enabling measurement of success. Its theoretical
generality is supported by a widening variety of practical
applications in both large and small systems. The principal
remaining arguments against the model are the difficulty of
applying it in practice, and its "simplistic" view of organisations
from an "interpretive" perspective.
The Diable System Model, at this stage of the thesis, can be
considered to be demonstrably "more adequate" than the
dominant models of organisation for contemporary managers.
6.4 Research Proposed and Empirical Inuestiqations 
The general utility of the Diable System Model has been
demonstrated and its superiority to the dominant models
considered. There nonetheless remains further research to be
undertaken.
The second part of this thesis will consist of a number of case
studies that will be used to address several areas of interest.
First, if the Diable System Model is more adequate, then it must
be made available to Managers. Rimed at "science in the service
of the people"( 69 ) work will be undertaken where the concepts
and ideas of the model are expressed in the language of the
stakeholders in the systems examined, rather than that of
283
cybernetics, to improve accessibility. This follows Beer's
admonition that when information crosses system boundaries, in
this case from the "cybernetician system" to the "case study
subject systems" it must be expressed in the language of the
receiving system if communication is to take place. Second, the
diagrammatic conventions and the numbered sub-systems will
also be experimented with to avoid the interpretation of the
model as an alternative hierarchy.
The efficiency and effectiveness of self-regulating systems will
be examined in terms of the impact of a reorganisation using
cybernetic principles. The quantity of purposeful rather than
autopoietic work undertaken and its further impact on
profitability will be assessed. The utility of the Diable Systems
Model as a process of managing rather than as an abstract tool
will be addressed. Its contribution when used in consulting
practice in organisations, not as a tool but as a way of exploring,
understanding and developing the "models-in-use" of the
participants in the system will be considered. The investigations
will show how the Diable System Model can help to deal with the
softer issues of organisation, such as culture, values, beliefs. The
way in which the Senior Management of an organisation can be
thought of, and operate, as an Operations Research group, using
their diverse skills to holistically address the needs of the
organisation will be examined.
The impact of these investigations on the perceived utility of the
model and the implications for methodology, diagrammatic
presentation and accessibility will be considered.
204
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the first part of this thesis, restating
and summarising the principal arguments. The strengths and
weaknesses of the dominant approaches to organisation and
problem solving have been reviewed and then compared to those
of the Diable System Model. The principal weaknesses of the
Diable System Model have been highlighted and in response to
these a research programme of empirical investigations outlined
in summary form. The neHt Chapter will provide an introduction
to the various case studies, elaborating the purpose and
objectives of each.
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Chapter Seuen 
Empirical Inuestiqations 
This chapter introduces each of the case studies undertaken,
setting out the case background and extent of involvement. The
objectives and constraints of the studies are revealed.
7.1 Introduction 
Part One of this thesis established the need for a more adequate
model of organisation and suggested that Beer's Viable System
Model might offer this. The background of cybernetic theory was
revealed and the substantial prior work undertaken with the
model reviewed.
This second part of the thesis, consists of a series of case studies
undertaken to explore the further development of the Diable
System Model, demonstrating its use and in particular exploring
how it can be made more accessible to contemporary managers.
Each study has been undertaken either in the case of FinCo as
part of salaried employment, or as remunerated consultancy.
R constraint on the content of all of the studies except for the
last is the need to preserve commercial confidentiality. To
satisfy this need the names of the organisations concerned have
been changed and only abstracts of financial information
included. These are considered sufficient to fulfil the needs of
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this work and demonstrate the points made although inevitably
it would be richer if further information could be provided.
7.2 Carco 
This study utilises the Diable System Model in a family owned and
financially failing retail car dealership. The original involvement
was at the request of the then Sales Director who, on behalf of
the Managing Director, was investigating the potential for a
relocation of the dealership to a new site. Help was sought with
designing a layout for a new building. In order to achieve this it
was necessary to discover how the organisation operated and
how a new design of building could best support that operation.
The preliminary investigation revealed that, whilst a relocation
would resolve some of the difficulties being faced by the
organisation, there were a significant number of issues that
would not be addressed in this way. At the commencement of the
study the business had not operated at a profit for eight years.
It was facing increasing competition with which it appeared ill
equipped to deal.
The major issues facing the organisation were its consistent
failure to finance itself adequately through retained earnings,
continued operation being funded by way of an increasing bank
overdraft. Staffing and management problems were evident in
terms of both numbers and quality and the organisation had
apparently ineffective or non-existent information systems and
performance standards. Communication, co-ordination and
control were inadequate. These problems were compounded by
the lack of a common sense of purpose amongst the staff and
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the failure to undertake any proper form of planning. Decisions
were made on the basis of short-term local expediency rather
than long-term overall benefit.
These internal problems were further aggravated by an
increasingly competitive and difficult business environment.
Sales were falling throughout the industry and a rise was being
seen in the number and strength of local competitors.
Withdrawal of support by the Franchisors and by the Company's
Bankers if improvement was not seen were further
considerations.
Collectively, the management and staff of Carco had little or no
management training other than from "in-house" courses run by
the Franchisor. This presented some difficulty in utilising a
sophisticated contemporary approach such as the Diable System
Model. It was considered that, notwithstanding this difficulty,
the Diable System Model could offer significant assistance in
addressing the problem situation. If the model is to be
considered more adequate for contemporary managers it must
have utility in a situation such as this. The work undertaken used
the ideas and concepts of the model but these were largely
expressed in the language of the organisation being studied
rather than in cybernetic terms. The impact of this on the
success of the project undertaken will be considered as part of
Chapter Eight in which the study is more fully reported. The study
also examines the impact of the concept of purposeful behaviour
in achieving focused activity aimed at achieving organisational
goals.
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• .3 FinCo 
This study implicitly utilised the Diable System Model in the
substantial redesign of a relatively autonomous part of a major
finance company. This work was aimed at changing its structure
from an internal control focus to an external market focus. The
writer was Project Manager for this undertaking, charged with
the design and implementation of the new approach. The use of
the [liable System Model was necessarily implicit since the
organisation was unfamiliar with systems approaches in general
and an explicit use would have been unacceptable to the Senior
Management outside the area of concern.
The project sought to use the Diable System Model to provide a
set of guiding principles for the redesign of the organisation
whilst utilising the Senior Management team of the Strategic
Business Unit concerned as an Operations Research Group. This
enabled the bringing together of their models of the problem
situation in an open forum in which problems could be explored
and proposals for improvement made. The scientific and
cybernetic expertise was provided by myself.
This application emphasises the importance of the purposeful
behaviour of the participants in a situation. It may not be viewed
as a pure and technically perfect application of the model but it
aims to show how the model may be used and its ideas and
concepts taken into mainstream management thinking.
Particularly important in this case are the attempt to develop a
self-regulating unit, composed of a large number of individuals,
working together but without any control hierarchy. The issues
of purposeful and autopoietic behaviour will be examined along
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with aspects of efficiency and effectiveness arising from the
study.
7.4 Cakes 
This study shows the explicit use of the Viable System Model in a
cake factory. R functionally autonomous unit of a public company
in the food manufacturing sector, the factory had been milked as
a cash cow by its owners for a number of years, whilst operating
under a threat of closure. The management of the factory were
instructed that "output at all costs" was their objective, and, in
pursuit of this many of the conventional approaches to operating
the factory had been suspended. The organisation was suffering
from a high absence rate, poor morale, ineffective organisation
and a lack of control, co-ordination and planning. An abundance
of management and supervisory positions were in evidence
although in some cases Supervisors were unable to speak the
same language as their subordinates or superiors in the
hierarchy.
This application explores the use of the model in improving
organisational effectiveness and looks at ways in which the
essential non-purposeful, supporting activities of the
organisation can be focused to avoid pathological autopoietic
behaviour. The use of the model to assist in exploring,
understanding and describing management roles is also
discussed.
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7.5 Teaching Uiabilitu 
This final study reports the use of the Diable System Model for
structuring a Singapore MBA class studying the Diable System
Model. MBA students have previously been schooled in the more
traditional approaches to management, and, the cultural norms
of Singapore society see the Manager in a hierarchically superior
position, commanding and controlling the subordinates in a
relatively autocratic manner; questioning and criticism are not
encouraged. Similarly, in the classroom setting the normal
behaviour is that the Lecturer lectures and the students record
the given wisdom.
When teaching a subject such as Organisation Design, and,
proposing the Diable System Model as the most useful approach
the traditional non-participative teaching method seems
inadequate. 11 wholly different approach was taken. This required
full and active involvement from the students in the processes of
learning and classroom management.
The study reports the use of the Diable System Model for
structuring the classroom, and its implications for the roles of
both students and lecturer. Some experimentation with the
diagrammatic representation of the model is also reviewed. II
modelling of the writers "self" is undertaken in this study as a
means of highlighting the importance of understanding the roles
in an organisation.
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the four case studies that will be
reported in the next two chapters, highlighting the major issues
to be addressed through each. The major aim is to reveal ways in
which the ideas and concepts underpinning the Viable System
Model can be made more accessible to contemporary managers.
The various applications are expected to reveal implications for
the methodology, descriptive language and diagrammatic
representation of the Diable System Model.
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Chapter Eight 
Passinq on a Familu Business, or a Familu 
Business Passing on? 
This chapter reports an application of the Viable System Model to
a family owned motor vehicle retailer in the UK. An earlier and
shorter version of this paper was published in Systems Practice,
Vol. 5, No. 5, pp 543-560, Plenum, 1992 (Reference 35). The
chapter covers the diagnosis and reconstruction of the business
and highlights the importance of purposeful behaviour and the
use of language appropriate to the system being studied.
Account is taken of developments since the original paper was
written in 1990.
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports an application of the Viable System Model to
a retail car dealership. The project has been ongoing for over
three years having mainly been conducted in an informal,
people-oriented manner, matching the management style of the
organisation itself. The skills of the management, the size of the
organisation, and the financial constraints under which it
operated determined that this would not be a technology driven
project. Similarly, few formal reports have been produced; it has
normally been possible to develop and implement changes as
part of the daily process of managing the business, seeking and
obtaining the support of the management and staff. The process
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of intervention has been one of learning and experimentation,
with new ideas and approaches being encouraged and
implemented with varying degrees of success. R feature of the
project throughout has been the impact of the personality of the
Chairman/Managing Director on the decision processes of the
organisation and the success of the changes made.
8.2 Background to the lipplication 
8.2.1	 The Initial Situation
Carco, in business since 1903 initially as a bicycle shop, is now a
family-owned car dealership, managed by the third generation,
with a turnover of approximately £,5m sterling. The Company
employed fifty people at the outset of the intervention, many of
whom were long-serving. Carco offers a full range of services to
the motoring public including new and used vehicle sales,
servicing, body repairs, parts sales, car hire and forecourt
services.
The project began when the Directors realised that the continued
existence of the business depended upon the development and
implementation of change to overcome an eight year record of
unprofitable trading. Substantial reduction was required to the
ever increasing bank overdraft secured by the freehold site
which was the Company's principal asset. The Directors
considered that the value of the site would be sufficient if
realised to eradicate the overdraft and re-establish the business
in new premises operating with a lower cost base (arising from a
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reduction in interest charges, staffing levels etc.). They initially
sought help with drafting the layout of the proposed new
premises.
Rn initial intervention showed that Carco was comprised of
seven highly differentiated but closely interdependent business
areas. Control of these areas required a careful balance of
central direction and autonomy to ensure operational freedom
coupled with organisational cohesion. The Directors needed a
composite view of the organisation to enable rapid decision
making in a deteriorating situation and to ensure that changes in
one area could be evaluated in the light of the likely impact on
others. This initial intervention showed that Carco was in a
serious condition and suggested that, while a realisation of the
value of the freehold land might alleviate the immediate concern
with financial viability, a number of other symptoms present
would, if not cured, lead to a recurrence of the financial
difficulties.
Carco was suffering from poor leadership, inadequate financial
control and a lack of recognised and enforceable performance
standards. There was tacit conflict between some members of
the management team which inhibited already inadequate
communication and meant that limits of authority were badly
defined, managers referring queries to the superior most likely
to grant their wishes rather than to their formal superior. The
lack of cohesion at the Senior Management level meant that
there were no policies in use, each decision was being made in
isolation, reinforcing the conflicts.
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The accounting system of Carco was inadequate, incompatible
computer systems leading to many tasks being undertaken
twice, for example, a parts sale being entered into one system
for stock control purposes and to another for accounting
purposes. The business operated without an adequate business
plan or any budgets. Management accounting information was
almost two months out of date. This meant that management
effort was concentrated on managing the past, they had little
information about the present and virtually none about the
future, not least what they wished it to be!
There was almost no Senior Management involvement at the
level of implementation. Senior Managers seemed to be unaware
of implementation activities, and had no useful knowledge of the
relevance and benefit of them to the poorly defined objectives
of the organisation. Job descriptions and guidelines were either
out of date or, in many instances, non-existent.
Carco was considered to have two principal assets which could
provide its salvation. Firstly, the previously mentioned freehold
site which was considered at the outset to have sufficient value,
if sold, to both eradicate the overdraft and fund the
development of a new site. Secondly a high reputation in the
locality with a loyal customer base.
This section has introduced the initial situation at Carco, the
subject of the case study.
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8.2.2 The Retail Motor Industry
The motor industry in general forms a significant element of the
manufacturing base of most industrialised nations. World-wide
manufacturing capacity exceeds market demand and both
competition, at the retail level, and collaboration at the
development and manufacturing level between manufacturers
are very strong. UK vehicle manufacturing has experienced a
period of significant decline since the 1960s although this has
been reversed during the late 1980s and early 90s by the
development of manufacturing plants by three Japanese
manufacturers, Nissan at Sunderland, now a significant exporter,
Toyota at Derby and Honda at Swindon. These plants represent
attempts by the manufacturers to consolidate their products in
the UK market, reducing the cost of manufacture by taking
advantage of lower labour costs and increased automation. This
will also enable penetration of the larger European market by
the companies becoming manufacturers within the European
Community boundaries. While the UK based manufacturers have
revitalised their manufacturing to become more competitive
with the Japanese products, competition has been further
increased by the larger number of manufacturers, the newly
industrialised nations in the Asia-Pacific Region being a
significant part of this, for example Proton Cars from Malaysia,
Kia from Korea.
These new products have been introduced to a consumer market
which after significant growth in the 1980s experienced a
downturn during the UK economic recession which reached
nearly 30% but is now undergoing a slow recovery. The market
peaked at 2.1 million registrations in 1989, falling to less than
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1.5 million in 1991 and is expected to increase to approximately
1.7 million in 1993( 78 C'
 79) . The nature of the market is also
changing in response to other factors such as the open European
market, an increasingly hostile tax situation with respect to
company owned vehicles and rising environmental concerns
which have led to a significant upsurge in the volume of diesel
engined and fuel-efficient cars being sold.
The dealership structure, which drives the retail motor industry
in the United Kingdom, has evolved over the last century. Its
roots were in direct selling by manufacturers but it is now a
combination of solus garages, multi-outlet dealerships, and
multi-franchise, multi-outlet dealerships. The majority of
dealerships operate under franchise agreements with
manufacturers although some chains are exclusively owned by
vehicle importers and another, Nissan, has recently been bought
in by the manufacturer.
Dealerships vary in size from major Public Limited Companies
owning chains of outlets to family-owned single-outlet
businesses such as Carco. The majority of dealerships are
operated on a franchise basis, an arrangement where the
franchisor grants to the franchisee the exclusive right to market
its products in a particular territory subject to a number of
conditions. These may include the establishment of operating
guidelines, marketing and quality parameters, and sales/stock
targets. The franchise normally includes a commitment by the
franchisor to provide assistance with the management of the
enterprise. It is currently the case that due to high competition,
the fall in vehicle sales and poor management, many dealerships
are not trading profitably and a number have gone out of
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business over the last three years, some voluntarily, some into
receivership at the behest of their creditors.
While the particular marque with which we are concerned has
traditionally held about 30% of its home market, it gives the
appearance in the United Kingdom of being uncertain whether it
wishes to be a participant in the volume or in the specialised
sectors of the market. RIthough market share has grown from
less than 4% to over 5% during the course of the project the
Franchisor is continually demanding from its dealers both higher
sales volume and greater retained profit, objectives which
appear to be incompatible one with the other in the highly
competitive market. This is exacerbated by strong competition
between the Franchisor's dealers who regularly undercut each
other in order to obtain additional volume. The Franchisors have
undergone some organisational difficulties of their own recently
which fall beyond the scope of this enquiry, but they are
undergoing extensive reorganisation in an attempt to improve
their performance, the impact of this on the Franchisees cannot
at this time be assessed. It must suffice to say that the
Franchisor has not asked the Franchisees (their customers) what
they could do differently to support them. The Franchisors are
reviewing their organisation in isolation from its environment; I
am doubtful of a successful outcome.
Training and development of staff is not a priority area for most
parts of the retail motor industry. Whilst on technical matters
mechanics undertake an apprenticeship and must reach
nationally recognised standards, in respect of the broader sales
and management activities little or no training is undertaken.
Franchisors run short courses for dealership staff covering
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particular skills and techniques but, the fragmented structure of
the industry, the wide spread of ownership and the frequency of
job changing means that there is no coherent personal
development system. This poor quality of training is reflected in
many aspects of the management of motor businesses, e.g. good
salesmen are appointed as Sales Managers regardless of their
suitability for the post, good mechanics become Foremen and
After Sales Managers based upon their technical not their
managerial ability. R consequence is the apparently poor quality
of management throughout the industry reflected in the number
of failing dealerships and the reputation of the motor trade in
general.
This section has introduced the Retail Motor industry and the
Franchisor as well as elaborating some of the threats and
difficulties facing the industry in the 1990's.
8.2.3 Why Use the Diable System Model?
The Viable System Model appeared suitable for this case since it
offered a rational framework for the creation of a composite
view of a complex organisation. Following Flood 8 , Jackson(5),
the choice of the Viable System Model as a diagnostic tool is
supported, in systems terms, by the complex and non-
deterministic nature of the situation, the close interrelationship
of the elements of the business and the requirement, initially
unfulfilled, for effective communication.
This choice carried with it a degree of risk, the stakeholders in
Carco had collectiuely little practical experience outside their
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own business and a narrow theoretical knowledge base in the
field of management. They were unaware of systems thinking
and cybernetics. A continuing feature of the work has been
translation between conventional terms and those of the Viable
System Model for those involved, this has been undertaken to
ensure that communication between parties has been effective.
The Directors agreed at the outset that whilst the organisational
hierarchy might alter (and indeed has), the operational elements
of the business were clearly defined and, importantly for the use
of the model, in principle capable of independent existence.
These elements formed seven business units within one legal
entity, Carco. The organisation had a perceived purpose of
wishing to represent itself as a system for selling, maintaining,
and hiring vehicles for profit. 11 number of other purposes were
contained within that envelope, as was revealed during the
course of the study. These included an employment system, a
family income system, and a system for generating private profit
at the expense of Carco. These findings are of little surprise in a
system serving human interests. Nevertheless, the systemic
nature of the enterprise is evident - a number of elements, in
relationship with each other and purporting to share a common
purpose.
To continue, using the human metaphor employed by Beer, Carco
could be described as suffering from "organisational Parkinson's
disease" (a progressive chronic disorder of the central nervous
system characterised by impaired co-ordination and tremor,
Collins Dictionary, 1988), coupled with "corporate cataracts."
Ashby's law, that "only variety can destroy variety," was clearly
"more honoured in the breach than the observance," (Hamlet,
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I.iu.14); the explosion of unconstrained variety was tearing
Carco apart. The organisation lacked viability.
The intention of the use of the Viable System Model was that this
would assist the business to survive in an increasingly turbulent
and competitive environment. It would help to develop effective
control and monitoring mechanisms, serve to absorb variety,
lead to reduced oscillation, encourage structured research and
planning activity, and develop a sense of common purpose among
the operational elements and the stakeholders. The financial
viability of Carco has been seriously in doubt throughout the
project, constraints have continued to be placed upon it by a
financial and legal system that supports the closure of loss-
making organisations.
This section has explained the choice of the Viable System Model
as a diagnostic tool for the Carco project and detailed some of
the constraints of the work.
8.3 "Organisation now, or bust,H(25)
The system-in-focus of this study is Carco, a retail motor trader
selling into the private and business sectors. The methodology is
drawn from Beer( 3 ) and Flood D Jackson(5).
8.3.1	 System Identification
The first step in the diagnostic process is to determine the
purpose to be pursued. The initial intervention, as already
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reported, revealed a number of purposes being pursued by Carco
and its stakeholders:-
a system for selling, maintaining and hiring
vehicles for profit
an employment system
a family income system
a system for generating private profit at the
expense of Carco.
Beer( 3 PG 9 9 ) suggests that, "the purpose of a system is what it
does," and these were the things that Cam) was doing. The first
was not being fulfilled, since Carco had not made a profit for
some years. The second was being achieved, Carco employed 50
people to do work that could have been accomplished by 35. The
third purpose was how some of the family owners of Carco
treated the business, many being provided with a fully expensed
car and a petrol card while some other expenses were drawn
from the business account.
The last purpose was derived from the behaviour of key
individuals within Carco who treated the parts stock and
services provided as resources to be utilised for their own ends,
a treatment which went unchecked since Carco had no effective
metasystem. Discussion with the Senior Management of Carco
led to an agreement that the last purpose was unacceptable and
that the second and third should not be regarded as purposes of
Carco but as forms of behaviour which might be acceptable to
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them if the first purpose could be achieved. It was made clear at
that stage that operating a business in a highly competitive
market with small gross profit margins could only be sustained in
the long term by good sales performance and proper cost
control; the probable alternative was liquidation.
The legal entity Carco was agreed with the Directors as being the
system-in-focus and its purpose as being:-
'To provide a comprehensive sales and support
system to existing users of the franchisor's
marque and through effective presentation of
the franchisor's products to attract new
customers, these activities generating profit for
the shareholders of Carco."
Reorganisation of Carco to pursue this purpose then became the
objective of the project.
Carco was seen as the system-in-focus (Recursion one) in a triple
recursion with the franchisor at Recursion 0 and the operational
elements of Carco forming Recursion 2. Each of these was
perceived as capable of independent existence, i.e. a viable
system in its own right. Figure 8.1 on the following page
represents this triple recursion diagramatically.
An immediate difficulty encountered in the diagnosis was the
selection of this triple recursion. The apparent organisational
problems led the study to concentrate on Carco as the system in
focus with its System One being the operational elements. II
number of possibilities presented themselves for level U. The
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situation could be considered from a number of different
perspectives. The family, as owners of Carco, could be considered,
as could the local motor industry, the local economy and the
dealer/marque structure.
Outline diagnoses were attempted with the different nominees.
The local motor industry and the local economy were considered
to be too remote and not exercising a "management" influence on
the business and came to be treated as environmental factors. The
family was discounted, as whilst it had no doubt been a significant
controlling influence on the business, this was seen to be
unhealthy in terms of its impact and not a part of an effective
control structure for the given purpose of Carco. The family has
been treated as part of the environment at Recursion 0.
The dealer/marque structure was selected as the most useful
modelling perspective. Carco is perceived by the public to share an
identity with the Franchisor and the franchise agreement
determines Carco to have relinquished some of its autonomy in
return for belonging to that system. The Franchisor exercises a
control function over Carco.
The selection of the Franchisor as Recursion 0 has caused some
difficulties during the study, as will become apparent, but it has
remained useful, and, as Beer so helpfully puts it( 3 PG 2):
"you are not determining absolute facts: you are
establishing a set of conventions." "Fl model is
neither true nor false: it is more or less useful."
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The System One divisions of Recursion 0 are the dealers, each one
is a separate and autonomous legal entity but is bound to the
franchisor by a contractual arrangement. Each of these System
One elements promotes the sale of all of the Franchisors products
within an exclusive territory.
The purpose to be pursued has been agreed with Carco but cannot
be agreed with the Franchisor. They, as already indicated, have
problems of their own which have precluded any substantial
dialogue with them although this has improved during the course
of the project. It had been hoped to undertake a further modelling
at the level of the Franchisor but this has not proved possible due
to their internal difficulties and the requirement for
confidentiality of other Dealers.
Recursion One is Carco. It has embedded in it its own System One
divisions, these are, New Sales, Used Sales, Parts, Service,
Bodyshop, Forecourt and Car Hire. The focus of this study is
recursive levels 1 8, 2.
8.3.2 System Diagnosis: Reorganisation of Cann
Carco is considered to be potentially viable from both the financial
and organisational perspectives; that is, it could in principle be
separated from the Franchisor and maintain its existence. The
organisation of Carco at recursion One will now be described.
Figure 8.2 represents the initial situation diagramatically.
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Carco: The Initial Situation
Figure 8.2
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8.3.2.1 System One
Carco, by virtue of historical accident rather than design, was
already divided into seven potentially viable elements.
1F is the Forecourt operation. Its capital, staff and site are
provided by Carco and yet, whilst it is subject to constraints from
the metasystem has been attempting to achieve full autonomy,
representing a threat to the cohesion of Carco. Performance
standards for volume of petrol sales and operating standards
covering pricing, presentation, corporate image and all other
areas are determined by OiIco through a franchise agreement.
OiIco provides a separate accounting system, incompatible with
that of Carco, leading to further administrative work in the
metasystem. The manager of 1F does not seek to communicate
with the rest of Carco, and OiIco is attempting to take over the
System 3 role of "inside and now" management and System 2 co-
ordination of 1F as part of its, differently defined System. The
metasystem of Carco only belatedly realised this but had taken no
action to resolve matters.
1H is a car hire operation. Rgain, it was a part of Carco but
appeared to be trying to break away. Direct control was taken by
Hireco, a further Franchisor, representing another threat to
Carco's cohesion. RII operating standards, performance levels and
so on were again determined by Hireco. The metasystem of Carco
had again been bypassed and this had led to a situation whereby
1H was unprofitable. Changes in the growing local environment,
including new competition, had not been responded to and a
return to a profitable situation could not be envisaged without
substantial capital investment. This could not be supported by
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Carco. The first decision arising from the project was to close this
operation in view of its lack of profitability and the inability of
Carco to fund the relaunch necessary to achieve a turnaround in
performance.
Care was taken in this respect to avoid inventing a machine for
eating Carco (like Beer's machine for "eating the railways"( 1 PP
14 - 16) . It was considered that although there would be some
small loss of business to Carco as a result of closing this operation
it would not significantly affect the rest of the business. This
subsequently proved to be the case, the closure having no
noticeable impact on the other aspects.
111, a used car sales operation, has similarly been closed down
since the commencement of the project. The operation had been
established to become the first local quality used car outlet and in
its early years was successful. The metasystem of Carco however
granted this unit almost complete autonomy amounting to an
abdication of its position and eHercised no effective control over
behaviour. The staff were found to be undertaking private
transactions, profiting personally to the detriment of Carco. The
financial constraints under which Carco was operating meant that
this operation, which required significant capital to maintain
became insupportable in an environment when sales were slow
and profit margins small.
The operation was closed down, at which time it was discovered
that a number of items had been stolen and were not recoverable.
The closure of this unit did have a noticeable impact on the rest of
the business of Carco, it had provided a useful outlet for vehicles
traded in to the New Sales unit which subsequently had to
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undertake this activity for itself. The unit had had a distinct and
separate image in the local marketplace, trading in its own name
but under the umbrella of Carco's reputation, the message sent to
the market by its closure was that Carco was in financial
difficulties, an active used car sales operation being seen as a
fundamental requirement for any motor retailer. The decision to
close this unit clown was made in the belief that failure to do so
would definitely lead to receivership for the whole business
whereas by closing it there was some hope of survival.
This description shows that whilst System Four initially functioned
well in recognising an opportunity it subsequently failed to notice
changes in the market. Systems 3 0, 2 failed to monitor behaviour
and establish performance standards.
IN represents the key purpose of Carco, the sale of the
Franchisor's vehicles. The Sales Manager and his staff were unsure
of their reporting lines within Carco and worked towards targets
and standards determined by the Franchisor. These were, as with
OiIco D Hireco, imposed directly at Recursion 2, rather than
negotiated through Recursion 1, the metasystem was again
bypassed. The sales levels imposed and stock levels demanded by
the Franchisor were insufficient to ensure the financial viability of
Carco and had been progressively relaxed as Carco had
consistently failed to achieve targets set, leading to a downward
spiral in performance. Carco, with no effective metasystem, had
no means of recognising this problem, nor any means of
controlling the behaviour of this element, as there were no
adequate reward or sanction mechanisms in place. It was in any
event unlikely that the higher levels of sales necessary to sustain
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Carco could be achieved as this would have meant obtaining a
market share of twice the then average for the Franchise.
In addition to the foregoing failings, there was no mechanism in
place for tracking the profitability of transactions, management
accounting information was 2 months old, and stock of products
was subject to unpredictable constraints from the manufacturer
(a higher recursive level and beyond the scope of this work).
Collectively these problems represent System 3 failure to control,
System 4 failure to plan, and System 2 failure to monitor and co-
ordinate behaviour.
1P is the Parts Department, selling to both internal and external
customers. When the franchise agreement was signed between
Carco and the Franchisor in 1973, a major factor in the decision to
take on the particular franchise was that Carco was to be a parts
distribution centre supplying a large area of the United Kingdom
on behalf of the Franchisor. It was this profit opportunity that
was expected to make the change from the previous higher
volume franchise worthwhile. Shortly after its inception, the
Franchisor changed its policy and established its own national
distribution centres taking business back from the Franchisees,
this had the effect of reducing the value of the franchise to Carco
but no consideration was given to a further change being made. A
franchise change incurs considerable capital cost.
At the outset of the intervention, the Parts department was
operating with no internal budget, aiming to hit purchasing
targets established by the Franchisor, achievement of which led
to personal reward for the Manager. No heed was paid to the
volume of sales. This had led to a position of significant
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overstocking and what can only be described as "silly" ordering.
For example, the Manager purchased 150 glass sunroofs to be sold
into the lifter Sales market, these were bought at the beginning of
winter and when most vehicle ranges were being factory
equipped with such items. The personal rewards for the individual
were determining his buying behaviour.
fl computerised stock control system was inadequately used - of
78 menu options, the staff knew how to use two, one to enter
new stock and one to issue sold items. This was contributing to
the overstocking situation with many items being effectively
unsaleable. Stock turnover achieved of 2.5 times compared
unfavourably with an industry standard of 4 - 6 times. Failure of
systems 2, 3 D 4 was again indicated here.
1B is the Bodyshop, undertaking all kinds of body repairs for both
internal and external customers. While on the basis of historical
information the element appeared to be marginally profitable it
was operated without the benefit of any budget. There was no
form of measurement in place to assess workshop utilisation,
faith being placed in the ability of the Manager to maximise use.
Similarly, no quality assessment was undertaken, System 3
becoming aware of the operation only when a customer complaint
was received. Rn example of poor communication in this element
is the occasion when two similar vehicles were scheduled for
work on the same day, one for a body repair, the other for
installation of a sunroof. The vehicle requiring the body repair was
fitted with a sunroof whilst the other vehicle was returned to its
owner with the comment "no damage found!" This element again
demonstrated the failure of System 3 in its role and a lack of
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communication with System 4 (the quality assessment) which
would enable the future development of this activity.
1S is the Service Department, preparing and servicing vehicles for
both retail and commercial customers. No performance standards
were in existence, there was no budget and workshop utilisation
was dependent upon the judgement of the service receptionist.
Further evidence of the failure of Systems 3 D 4 is drawn from the
expensive training of a "technical expert" whose newly acquired
skills had been ignored rather than exploited.
Reorganisation of System 1 commenced with an examination of
the need for local control of each element and an attempted
clarification of the reporting lines and job requirements for the
individuals concerned. This was seen as a first step in effective
absorption of variety at the operational level, it also ensured that
every manager knew to whom he was to report. This was
accompanied by a reduction in the numbers of staff employed,
certain positions being recognised as superfluous to requirements.
The initial reduction in numbers concentrated on those who it had
been demonstrated were profiting privately from their
employment, the decisions being "forced" upon the metasystem.
IH, the car hire operation was closed down; it was unprofitable
and was absorbing time, capital and staff resources which could
be better used in other parts of Carco. 1U, the separate used car
operation was also closed, its marginal profitability and the
difficulty of supporting its capital requirements in a slow market
meant that it could not be sustained despite its value to the whole
business. The management of this element, having been granted
almost total autonomy through the inertia of the metasystem had
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determined a purpose for the element which was totally different
from that of Carco as a whale. It was apparently being operated
for the personal profit of its staff while trading on the capital and
reputation of Carco. This reputation was beginning to suffer from
the staff's behaviour and the apparent difficulty of recovering a
strong trading position on very limited resources made closure
inevitable. The staff were made redundant.
The remaining operational elements became involved in the
development and negotiation of budgets for both financial
performance and activity volumes. The focus of attention was on
activity volumes since it was perceived that the financial
performance was determined by this, and it was considered that
budgets in terms of vehicles or workshop hours sold expressed
the needs of Carco in the language of the sub-system. This was
seen as a means of improving communication and commitment at
that level, these individuals not being trained in financial analysis.
Subsequent reports and returns had to undergo a translation
between System One and Three such that they were expressed to
each System in its own language.
This process reduced previously uninhibited variety by providing
negotiated targets and helping to clarify the objectives of the
organisation. It also made clear to System One for the first time
the financial and organisational difficulties being faced by Carco
and enabled an understanding to be achieved of the unstable and
critical nature of the organisations ailments. In addition to the
operating budgets, certain procedural issues were addressed,
including a capital expenditure approval system, capital
expenditure had previously gone unchecked. Training plans and
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budgets for the development of management staff were also
prepared.
Operationally, parts purchasing was brought under control, orders
for stock parts being kept to a minimum in an effort to reduce
stock levels. Training was instigated (at Recursion 2) in the proper
use of the stock control system to minimise future errors and a
"sell-back" arrangement was reached with the franchisor in
respect of certain stock items. This represented approximately
30% of the stock by value. The agreement required that Carco
reinvest the funds released in current stock. This was to be put
into fast moving lines and an objective was set to reduce the
stock level by 30% over time, aiming towards a stock value of less
than £100k and stock turnover of around 8 times. These actions
further served to reduce variety at System One by providing clear
rules and performance expectations and provided the metasystem
with a facility for monitoring System One behaviour. Direct control
by the Franchisor and OiIca at System One also ceased due to the
increased activity by the metasystem and internal changes at the
Franchisor. This will be further dealt with in the examination of
Systems Three, Four and Five.
Further changes have included an overall increase in the level of
communication between System One and the metasystem, serving
to attenuate variety of the operational elements and amplify the
variety of the metasystem. Formally, this communication is
represented by meetings between the senior management and the
System One managers. This is supported by regular informal
discussions on a daily basis, the activity of "managing by walking
about." (81)
 The greater visibility and approachability of the
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senior management through these tactics, while not directly
measurable in impact, are certainly beneficial.
The negotiation of budgets also led to an examination of the
practice of discounting, which is prevalent throughout the motor
industry. It would prove impossible for a sole dealer to cease this
practice altogether; market capacity is such that many
prospective purchasers would simply go elsewhere. However, it is
possible to recognise that no profit is made on certain discounting
arrangements. These have been reviewed, and wherever possible
changes made to ensure profitable trading, or, at least, immediate
recognition of a non-profit transaction.
It was also proposed that the incompatible computer systems be
replaced with a single integrated system to deal with all the
information needs of Carco. It was envisaged that this would be
developed on a platform of Personal Computers, enabling both
local control of information by the System One elements and cost
effective information sharing and transmission to other parts of
the organisation. This would have had immediate benefits in
reducing the number of people employed by enabling many tasks
to be completed once rather than twice or more. Further benefits
would have been obtained through the eradication of many
duplicate, manual records. Brought together in a shared database
the information could be used for more effective marketing
activity such as prospecting for service and repeat sales business.
The original multiple manual records are difficult to maintain and,
consequently, frequently out of date. Recent examples of the
failure of the system include a client receiving two service
reminders in the same post and another receiving a reminder to
service a vehicle which he had sold to Carco some six months
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previously. The proposal would have directly saved Carco £10k in
its first year, being the difference in direct cost between the
leasing and maintenance of the original systems and that of the
replacement. There would have been a cost of training and
installation. The Directors of Carco shelved the proposal as the
initial investment could not be made available and the medium to
long term future of the organisation was so uncertain.
These changes were implemented over a fairly short period of
time. It was to be the function of the metasystem, not the
consultant, to monitor performance and behaviour, rewarding and
sanctioning as appropriate.
8.3.2.2 System Two
System Two exists as a service to System One, providing
organisational cohesion by monitoring behaviour and damping
oscillation caused by the varying demands of the operational
elements. To achieve this objective, monitoring must be
established and standards of behaviour determined against which
actual behaviour can be measured. While some monitoring had
been ongoing in Carco, it will be apparent that with an ineffective
metasystem and the independent actions of the System One
elements there were few matters available to System Two.
Such standards as did exist were purely qualitative, such as, "We
must strive to achieve a high quality of service." Few measurable
standards were determined internally, and, where they did exist
they had been established by the Franchisor and OiIco without
taking account of the particular circumstances of Carco. They
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were extrasystemic rules, not System Two policies. This tended to
make them either unachievable or unacceptable, usually for
financial reasons.
The creation of budgets, performance standards and monitoring
mechanisms it was hoped would enable System Two to perform
more effectively in the future. For this to be achieved, changes
needed to be made in the management accounting system to
enable it to operate nearer to a real time basis. It is, after all, of
little benefit to know that an unacceptable disturbance occurred
two months ago.
II monitoring return (Appendix i) was introduced which served two
purposes. First, since it was completed individually by the System
One Managers, it focused their attention on the weekly
performance of their operational units. This enabled them to
respond much more quickly to emergent individual problems such
as poor productivity in the workshop. They were also able to
quickly assess the impact of any operational decisions and to
calculate, using known fixed costs and the information contained
in the return the approximate profitability and overall
performance of the area for the preceding week. Consideration
was given to generating this information on a daily basis but it
was considered that, in the nature of the enterprise, a weekly
assessment was sufficient. Carco is not operating in a production
environment at this level of recursion and the managers believed
that reacting to a single day change could lead to higher levels of
oscillation, a days assessment being likely to misinform.
Second, it provided information to the metasystem which could be
used to measure patterns of performance over time without
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explicit use of the command channel. The return was regarded as
being "for information only," not a formal return to which a
response would be made since performance expectations were to
be monitored over longer periods. It was intended that the return
would enable the detection of serious perturbations at the time of
occurrence enabling the future development of a system for
predicting emergent problems.
Rpart from the absence of adequate performance and financial
monitoring procedures, which played a significant part in the
complacent attitude of the metasystem and the poor performance
of the Company, other "softer" standards aspired to by the
metasystem were not being communicated. They were not
effectively shared with System One. Evidence of this is seen in the
abuses, particularly in relation to financial matters, which have
already been recorded. Whilst much of this might have been
detectable through competent financial monitoring, much of the
impact could have been achieved through other standards being
utilised. Effective checking of prior employment records and
references, formal employment contracts, and communication of
the needs and expectations of the Company would have helped.
Firm and visible responses to theft would have helped even
further.
The improvements in communication between the metasystem and
System One were seen as enhancing this situation, monitoring
being through System Two on an informal basis. It was intended
that "Good Behaviour" should be enforced through the creation of
policies to encourage it rather than through the use of "laws" and
effective detection of faults. System One elements were to be
encouraged to recognise that non-viable behaviour threatened
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the continued existence of the entire system-in-focus and that it
was in their own long term interests to conform to the
"societary" norms of Carco and encourage others to do likewise.
8.3.2.3 System Three*
This system, a part of System Three, audits the System One
operational elements to amplify System Three knowledge of
System One activity. This closes the gap between the total variety
arriving at System One and that absorbed by System One and the
other communication channels.
Carco had no System Three* function other than those legally
required activities such as the annual stocktaking and financial
audits. Even these were carried out later than should have been
the case, rendering financial statements inaccurate if not totally
misleading. Normal applications of System Three* activity such as
quality audits, internal audits of financial information, personnel
reviews and analysis of operating performance did not happen.
My intervention in the Company was the first attempt to institute
this type of audit.
Carco was persuaded to introduce reviews of this type using its
own staff resources and calling on external expertise where
necessary. As part of the project a review was undertaken of the
System One Managers, comparing their abilities and expectations
with those of the allocated task. Similar work was undertaken
with the information systems and accounting systems to
determine how well they were used, how well they matched the
requirements of the organisation and what changes were seen as
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necessary or desirable by those who had to use them. These
various internal and external reviews were seen as supporting the
effective implementation of the other procedures. System Three
cannot determine what it wants or needs to investigate until it
has some current and relevant information concerning the
activities of System One. Similarly, its interaction with System
Four must be informed by this knowledge, if it has none then it
cannot engage properly in that dialogue. This information can be
provided through an effective System Three*.
8.3.2.4 System Three
System Three, the "inside and now" management of Carco was
evidently ineffective. The catalogue of symptoms displayed by
System One show that Carco was not under control. At the outset
of the study, few effective rules or agreements had been
determined with System One which, in consequence, could not be
held accountable for its behaviour.
System Three of Carco operated an inadequate accounting system,
this leading to employment of additional staff and completion of
tasks in duplicate. There was no clarity in the command structure.
This stemmed in part from the lack of clearly defined and
understood roles amongst the Senior Management and from their
failure to control Carco.
Fl particular example of the problem in this system was the
inability of the participants to resolve conflicts arising from
mutual participation in other systems. Father and son working
together as codirectors were unable to separate their working
242
and personal relationships, which arguably existed, for this study,
in different systems. While this particular problem was later
resolved by the resignation of the son from Carco this generated a
further problem. Disregarding advice not to take the course of
action, the Chairman/Managing Director, in conjunction with the
non-executive Director, appointed the Finance Director and Sales
Manager as "joint General Managers," they could not choose
between them. This served to obfuscate the roles in System Three
and led to renewed confusion amongst the System One managers
as to who was responsible for what. The Sales Manager was the
first to have active roles in both Systems One and Three but was
again unable to separate them such that he knew in which one he
was performing at any given time. He tended to act always in the
interest of his operational element rather than in the interest of
the system as a whole.
Rttempts continued to clarify the roles within System Three by a
process of education and ongoing debate and the problems were
largely resolved. One further member of this management team
was required to resign. He was a prime cause of the previous
subversion of the purpose of Carco. The individual concerned
worked in an autocratic manner, managing by fear and was
believed to be responsible for the embezzlement of Company
funds. Nothing was proven against him, but he resigned when
challenged.
Despite these difficulties the functioning of System Three has
been improving, benefiting from the implementation of negotiated
budgets and targets. Resource bargains are now agreed with
System One management. This simplifies subsequent decision
making through prior definition of standards and policies against
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which new options can be judged and as a result of which, many
questions are no longer asked. System One managers perceive
that their autonomy has increased. Budgets have been critically
examined following an exploration of past financial data which
served to highlight loss-making areas and those which were
absorbing cash. Resource bargaining has drawn upon this
information and attention has been focused on loss-making and
low profit activities in an attempt to boost income and reduce
costs where possible.
One illustrative example is the operation of the parts sales to
other traders, most of which business arose when Carco was a
parts centre for the Franchisor. Carco buys parts from the
Franchisor with variable discounts which depend upon the part
supplied, its frequency of use and whether it is a unique or
patternable part. For example, a light bulb is a patternable part,
obtainable through a large number of non-franchise outlets, it is
thus made available at a large discount in order that volumes can
be maintained. II transmission shaft is unique to the manufacturer
and will consequently be supplied at a much smaller discount.
Around 30% of Carco's parts sales are to non-franchised outlets
and Carco allows them a large proportion of the discount which it
itself receives. For example, a part discounted to Carco at 22%
might be discounted to a trader at 19%, leaving Carco with a gross
margin of 3%. This margin is reduced by overheads of Carco, such
as delivery costs, so the net apparent margin to Carco might be
say 1.5%. While marginal this at least appears to be a transaction
for profit. However, analysis undertaken showed that, in addition
to the discount given, most traders were being extended credit on
all purchases of 60 days. fit then current interest rates payable of
15% (1.25% per month) the notional profit of 1.5% was being
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eradicated. Trade parts debtors represented about 14% of the
then borrowings of Carco, costing £30k at contemporary interest
rates. fin improvement through both a reduction in discounts and a
tightening of credit has been achieved. This example helped to
illustrate to the Directors and Managers of Carco the need for a
systemic view to be taken of the enterprise and the need for the
individual decisions at System One to be assessed for impact on
both other areas and the business as a whole.
Further improvements in the accounting and internal intelligence
functions of Carco were still needed. Investment in a new
computer system was still required and many tasks were still
being carried out in duplicate. Fl decision was made to replace
those functions and it was intended to implement this when
funding permitted. Meanwhile manual systems have been
improved to reduce repetition of tasks and the support staffs
have been reduced significantly in number.
The value of systematic gathering of information on performance
has been recognised and changes implemented. Again, this is
based on manual systems and meetings. These meetings now
involve the genuine exchange of information rather than "noise"
and are seen to have benefits for both System One and Three
participants. During the course of the project the System One
managers have been progressively integrated into the System
Three functions, further enhancing purposeful communication and
holistic understanding of the business.
Fl major use of the information gathered is advice to System Four,
the intelligence function, of the current states of the operations.
This information was not previously being passed because none
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was being gathered and there was no apparent System Four to
which to pass it!
2.12.5 System Four
The function of System Four is to enable adaptation of the
organisation by recognising changes in the external environment,
engaging in dialogue with System Three regarding changes
perceived as necessary and generating survival plans. This should
take place on a continuing basis. At the outset of the study, Carco
had no intelligence function.
While recognising that "we cannot carry on like this," virtually all
activity was concerned with the day to day running of the
business and not with the future, although as stated some
consideration had been given to a relocation. The Company's
Bankers were becoming increasingly concerned about their
lending exposure as property values were falling and Carco's
freehold site was the security for their borrowing. An absolute
limit was placed on the overdraft facility. This led to the decision
that all or some of Carco's assets would have to be sold to reduce
borrowings and increase the chances of survival.
H number of options were identified, each of which, in conjunction
with the operational changes already started, could be expected
to lead to financial viability for Carco. These options are detailed
below.
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Sale of the forecourt operation.
Whilst this would have raised sufficient funds to
reduce the overdraft, it would also have reduced
the Bank's security by an identical amount to the
funds raised, leaving Carco in an arguably worse
position. Since the sale would place operational
limitations on the remaining business, and
reduce its overall market value this option was
discounted.
Sale of approximately one third of the site.
This was then used for vehicle storage, and
involved no short term relocation. Rn agreement
was reached with a property developer to
pursue this option which was expected to raise
E330k immediately with a further £200k on
completion and sale of a building. Since the land
was only valued at the original sum this
represented an attractive option as it would
have generated cash with which Carco could
have revitalised its business. During the delays
in obtaining detail planning consent the value of
the land has fallen and the previously active
property market has moved into recession. lit
the time of writing, recovery is under way and
the prospects for a sale are much better.
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Sale of half the site.
This would have involved major property work
and the acquisition of additional land elsewhere
for part of the business. The cost of building
work and the time delay involved seemed to
make this unacceptable.
R full relocation of the business to a cheaper site.
This was seen as almost inevitable in the longer
term in order to ensure the full financial viability
of Carco. The local planning authority also
wished to see a redevelopment of the site which
is on the main access route to the town centre.
Negotiations have continued over the course of the project to
complete one of these courses of action.
Meanwhile, other System Four activities have been addressed.
These include training and succession planning, and a review of
ownership of Carco. Ft search for additional sources of income has
been commenced and ways of increasing market penetration for
the Franchisor's products in the local market are being sought.
Since Carco is a small organisation, 35 employees at the time of
writing, System One managers have been brought into the
Corporate level (Recursion One) intelligence function. This
promotes effective exchange of information among Systems One,
Three and Four. System One managers, as well as acting at System
Four Recursion Two, looking after the interests of their individual
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operations, are undertaking surveys of the Corporate
environment, seeking to define opportunities for new business, to
identify threats and suggest responses.
This represents a significant change in activity for most
individuals. They are technically well trained but have little or no
theoretical or practical experience of management or planning at
the Corporate level. Hitherto, their main management function has
consisted of planning the day's work and supervising the staff on
the basis of those short term plans. The involvement of many new
people helps to ensure effective communication between the
operational elements and the metasystem but may also be seen
as a precursor to changes then being considered at System Five.
8.3.2.6 System Flue
System Five of Carco is comprised of the Board of Directors, being
the Chairman/Managing Director, the Finance Director and a non-
executive Director. lit the outset of the study this board did not
fulfil an effective System Five role of arbitrating between the
conflicting Systems Three and Four demands for adaptation and
change. It acted more in a System Three capacity, monitoring the
ongoing financial results although failing to make any adequate
response to them.
R company with a wide spread of shareholder control derives a
power of adaptation from this. If the shareholders are unhappy
with the performance of the Company they can elect new
Directors and fire poorly performing ones. This was not the case
with Carco which is a private company, the Chairman/MD holding
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the majority (68%) of the shareholder voting rights. The true
intrasystemic power over the fate of the company rests with him.
The votes of the other Directors, and the opinions of non-
enfranchised shareholders have no effective value.
This individual was granted the position by his father, who had
been similarly placed by his father, the founder. The current
incumbent had no significant power in the Company until his
father retired, and he would have preferred to pursue a different
career. As the only son, he felt obliged to continue in the business
as requested. He is in effect System Five. I have come to think of
this individual as a variety mirror, rather than Beer's "uariety
sponge...(3 PG 125) The problems and challenges emerging from
the system are reflected back into it, generating further
confusion and chaos: an organisational greenhouse effect. This has
been a major factor in Carco's decline over the last ten years. The
situation has changed to some degree over the course of the
study, principally in response to pressure from external agencies,
e.g. the Bankers and Franchisors.
The Chairman/MD had at this stage expressed his desire to retire
from the business when it was financially, and honourably,
possible. R change of ownership then became a prospect as none
of his children wished to have an active involvement.
Consideration was then given to a further reconstruction of Carco.
This would have split the Company into trading and property
divisions, the trading company would then have been sold to the
employees and the property leased to that new enterprise after
the sale of one third for the redevelopment outlined above. This
option proved to be unachievable financially. The employees were
unable to raise sufficient capital from their own resources and
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they were unable to demonstrate to potential backers their ability
to competently manage the business. The important point to be
addressed is that the employees would then have been formally
represented at System Five in a new system whose purposes they
not only shared, through self-interest, but would be able to define
and redefine. This would have been reminiscent of Beer and
1111ende's proposed System Five in Chile.
Such an approach carries with it its own problems, both of politics
and of effective management. The number of truly successful
commercial organisations owned and run by "non-professional"
employees is limited, although Walker( 44) has elaborated one
situation in which it was achieved. It was recognised that, while a
"technology transfer" taking the skills to the people would have
been a proper way forward, during the interim period the team
would have needed to "buy-in" the requisite skills. This does not
denigrate the abilities and potential of the employees, it simply
recognises that each of us employs others to carry out tasks
which are beyond our own range of competencies. The
reorganisation of Carco is shown diagramatically in figure 8.3 on
the following page. flppendix ii gives summarised information
demonstrating the improvement in financial performance between
the financial years 1990-91 and 1991-92. Figures for 1992-93 are
not yet available.
8.4 Further deuelopments 
When it became apparent that this employee/management buy
out scheme would not proceed, consideration was given to other
courses of action. Meanwhile the financial situation continued to
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deteriorate, reductions in staffing and other costs being
outweighed by the increasing interest burden and a failure to
consistently achieve better profit performance at the operations
level. The Chairman/MD continued to avoid the hard decisions
which faced the business. For example it had become evident that
the Sales Manager for the New Car Sales element (1N) was unable
to raise the performance of his area despite considerable
assistance from the Senior Management and representatives of
the Franchisor. It was recognised that he needed to be replaced
and this was agreed at a meeting of the Board in September 1992.
Action was finally taken in March 1993 by which time the situation
had deteriorated further, and, this action was taken at the
suggestion of the Sales Manager who indicated his willingness to
leave. Other similar decisions were made but no action was taken.
It was found during October 1992 that a forward profit deal could
be struck with OiIca in respect of the forecourt. This, taken
together with the sale of part of the site would generate
sufficient funds to reduce bank borrowing to a level supportable
by the business. It would also have allowed for some
refurbishment of the premises and restocking of Used cars which
were by this time in strong demand but, for Carco, in short supply
due to lack of funding. During previous months used car stocks
had been regularly liquidated to generate funding to meet the
ongoing costs of the business. This forward profit deal initially
seemed to offer a new way ahead for the recovery of the
business, however the Chairman/MD continued to vacillate, and
before a formal agreement could be made with OiIca two further
events occurred.
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The Banker's to Carco, concerned about the security of their loan
asked for a revaluation of the Company premises. This revealed
that the value had fallen to a level not far above that of the funds
lent, and the Bank indicated that a substantial repayment was
required within six months together with formal proposals for
repayment of the balance of the overdraft. This in itself was
enough to force decisions on System Five. The Chairman was, and
remains, personally liable to the Bankers for any debts of the
Company to them.
lit the same time a formal meeting was held between the
Franchisor and Carco. It was made clear during this meeting that
substantial improvement in vehicle sales performance and the
condition of the premises needed to be seen in the short term
otherwise the franchise would be withdrawn. While not a formal
notice of withdrawal of the franchise this was a clear indication
of the route that would be followed.
This meeting was followed by numerous informal discussions
between the Franchisor and Carco seeking clarification of their
requirements and expectations. Whilst during the previous period
direct intervention by the Franchiser and Oi!co at System One had
been inhibited although not completely stopped this was an
attempt to integrate the Franchisors representatives into at least
Systems Three and Four of Carco. This was to some extent
successful in that a reasonable degree of co-operation was
achieved but did not alter the fundamental position of the
Franchisor's Director. On reflection this course of action could
have been taken much earlier but was prevented by the degree of
antipathy between the two parties, Carco's System Five
considering the Franchisor to be to some degree responsible for
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the company's difficulties, the Director of the Franchisor
considering that System Five of Carco was unfit for his role.
The Director subsequently made it clear to me as Consultant to
Carco that a change of Senior Management was required at Carco
if the Franchisor were to continue its support. This message was
conveyed, not without imposing some strain on the
Consultant/Client relationship, to System Five.
R meeting was subsequently held involving the Directors of Carco
and myself, the conclusion was reached that with the demand
from the Bank for substantial repayment and the pressure from
the Franchisor for a change of control, a sale of all or part of the
share capital of Carco was necessary. fin accountants
investigation revealed that a cash injection of at least £.250k was
necessary in order for Carco to trade through the summer of 1993,
funding which was not available from the existing enfranchised
shareholders. Further discussions with the Bank led to the
imposition of a cut off date of 30th dune 1993 by which time a
deal for the sale of the business, or the injection of new funds,
had to be completed. Meanwhile the Bank suspended application
of interest charges on the overdraft.
The requirements faced changed the objectives of the project.
While the original purpose, the reorganisation of Carco to achieve
its purpose remained in order to preserve the employment of the
35 staff, it also became necessary to focus on the personal
financial well being of the Chairman/MD. He had given personal
guarantees to the Bank and the Franchisor to cover Carco's
liabilities, guarantees which he would find it difficult to meet
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from his personal resources. If these were crystallised and called
upon then he would face the possibility of personal bankruptcy.
Great reluctance on the part of the Chairman/MD was overcome
and advertisements were placed in the trade press and other
papers seeking an outright sale of Carco or alternatively an equity
partner. R possible buyer was eventually found and a sale
completed on the following terms:-
Carco retains the development site together
with a related proportion of the borrowing with
a view to completion of the development. This
site has a profit potential for Carco of up to
£200k. This profit is dependent upon the final
terms of the development agreement and
arrangements for renting out the building.
R subsidiary company has been formed and the
purchaser has acquired the share capital of this
subsidiary for EL It also takes on the majority
of the assets, debts and liabilities of the new
Company, including that part of the overdraft
not related to the development site.
The present Chairman/MD of Carco receives a
small pension from the new owners and all
existing employees have been transferred.
This deal was agreed and largely completed during July of 1993. At
the time of writing (September 1993) final details of the
transaction are still outstanding. Rn agreement, albeit reluctant
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on the part of Carco was struck very rapidly between Carco and
the new owners, however the external agencies have exhibited
behaviour which, while it may be legally necessary for the
protection of their client's interests, is certainly not supportive or
enabling of the transaction.
8.5 Summar
This case study has highlighted the need for a composite view to
be taken of an organisation and shown how the Viable System
Model can enable this. The Retail Motor Industry was introduced
and the original situation and reorganisation of Carco outlined,
showing the gradual emergence of order from chaos.
While the final outcome, which is yet to be fully resolved, is not
that which was hoped for, the continued existence of Carco seems
assured, at least for the time being. The original purposeful
system has, in cell-like fashion, divided into two systems, one
fulfilling the original purpose under new ownership, and, a second
one fulfilling a wholly new purpose related to property
development and management. The system will survive.
The Viable System Model has proved invaluable throughout this
process in a number of respects. It has enabled each part of the
analysis to be undertaken with the whole organisation in view.
Conclusions have been reached only after rigorously taking
account of the requirements of, and impact on, other areas of the
business. The need for information to be effectively generated
and shared has been established and welcomed by most of the
participants at all organisational levels. It has enabled the
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creation of a more effective metasystem, albeit this has been less
than perfect in operation.
The operation of the metasystem, in particular System Five, has
underlined the impact of the purposefulness (or lack of it) of
individuals within an organisation. It has demonstrated that
however useful a model may be, unless individuals are committed
to making proper use of the information generated and are
prepared to make decisions the outcome will be less than might
be hoped for. Perhaps, concentration on improving the
effectiveness of the metasystem, particularly System Flue, should
have been the first priority of the project and this might have led
to a different final outcome. The practicality of consulting is that
the consultant must work, at least at first, in the areas where he
is invited to go, and which are perceived by the problem owners
to be the focus of the issues to be resolved.
As a practising consultant it has been my perception that the use
of the Diable System Model aims to achieve some of the same
results as some of the more traditional approaches to
management, a reduction in chaos through variety engineering.
Whilst more traditional approaches would have focused on the
performance of the parts without looking at the whole; the Viable
System Model concentrates on the whole and may accept sub-
optimal performance of some of the parts to achieve a defined
overall objective. The two perhaps should be seen as
complementary, rather than alternative, the reductionist
analytical techniques being seen as supportive to the holistic view
through a more detailed examination of particular parts of the
operation, e.g. procedures.
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8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported an extensiue application of the Diable
System Model to a retail motor trader. The outcome is perhaps a
little unusual but the case demonstrates the utility of the Viable
System Model in a crisis situation.
The next chapter will report further experiences with the model.
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Chapter Nine 
Guiding Freedom, Deueloping Organisation D 
Action Learninq 
This chapter reports three separate studies using the Diable
System Model. The first involves the reorganisation of a
complete region of a Financial Institution, the second a diagnosis
and redesign of a Cake Factory and the third shows how the
Viable System Model may be both taught and used as a
pedagogical device.
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains three discrete applications of the Diable
System Model. Each was undertaken with the objective of
developing understanding of the model. They explore how it
could be made accessible to contemporary managers in
substitution for the dominant "machine" and "human relations"
views. The names of the companies concerned have been
changed in the first two studies to preserve confidentiality and
safeguard commercially sensitive information.
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9.2 FinCo
9.2.1	 Introduction
The original report for this case study amounts to over 120,000
words in nine volumes comprising in the first volume, an
overview of the whole project, being a statement of the purpose
and philosophy underpinning the project and a review of the
lessons learnt. The second and subsequent volumes contain
reports of the seven pilot implementations undertaken and the
appendices which propose outline job descriptions, model
structures etc. This is necessarily a very brief version of that
report.
The project was undertaken in a cybernetic fashion in as much
as, while the broad objectives were explicit at the outset, the
implementation was undertaken in a heuristic manner, changes
being agreed and implemented with subsequent monitoring and
modification where necessary. This enabled continuous
movement towards the "goal" of being a financial institution
able to meet the needs of its stakeholders. The somewhat radical
approach meant that the plan was written after the event to
provide a future "platform for change" rather than before the
event as a procedures manual. The writer was the sole
management scientist involved in the project, the bulk of the
work being undertaken by those affected and in their language
rather than that of cybernetics. The decision to undertake the
project in this way was joint between myself and the Chief
Manager as it was considered that an explicit modelling in
cybernetic terms from the outset would mainly serve to alienate
those whose contribution was most vital. Over the course of the
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project cybernetic terms were introduced as a means of
exploring and explaining some of the ideas, and throughout, the
words Implementation, Co-ordination, Control, Planning and
Policy, were used instead of sub-system numbers.
This approach was unique in an organisation that was
accustomed to developing new structures, procedures etc. in a
Head Office department and "passing them down" to Office level
for implementation. Whilst some consultation always took place
in these circumstances, in the event of a dispute or
disagreement the view of "the Centre" would prevail. In this
particular case, we had the freedom to design the organisation
that the participants wanted within the constraint of fulfilling
the purposes of the higher recursive levels.
9.2.2 Background
FinCo is a broadly based financial institution with world-wide
coverage but a predominant reliance on the UK market. It has
been in existence for around four hundred years in a variety of
forms and through a number of changes of ownership, mergers,
acquisitions etc.
FinCo operated in the UK on a basis of three Regional offices
headed by General Managers with responsibility for all business
activity in a geographical area. Each Region was further broken
down into smaller regions under the control of an Assistant
General Manager with a number of Area Managers each
responsible to him for between 10 and 30 offices which operated
semi-autonomously but within "Head Office" guidelines. Each
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Office had its own management team and internal hierarchy. The
whole organisation operated in a hierarchical and bureaucratic
manner, adherence to the rules, doing the "right thing," being
more important than doing things right. Figure 9.1 on the
following page is an outline of the original organisation chart.
Lending decisions in excess of office manager authority were
referred to a Lending Department within the Regional Office with
sanction either being granted by personnel within that unit or by
the General Manager or Rssistant General Manager responsible
for the office. This Lending Department also carried out a number
of monitoring and audit procedures on behalf of the Regional
Office officials. The Regional Office also had support functions
responsible for Personnel, Property and other administrative
matters.
The corporate plan for FinCo in the late 1980's called for a review
of the operation of the UK office network. It was considered that
the organisation was failing to compete adequately with its
major rivals in the market and that this threatened long-term
profitability. It was perceived that the organisation needed to
improve its performance in a number of key areas if it was to
continue to be considered a major participant in its markets.
Following an extended study of competitors' practices;
customers and non-customers opinions; staff views and reviews
of the current organisational structure, the desired service
improvements were seen as being achievable through:-
a faster more professional response to customer
queries
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Finco: Original Organisation Chart
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pro-active development of relationships
improved understanding of customer's business
accessibility, availability and continuity of
staffing.
The original Regional structure was seen as inhibiting many of
these factors, in particular with regard to staff issues and
response times to customers. The decision was made by the Board
of Directors to restructure the organisation, reducing the number
of layers of management in an attempt to both speed up decision
processes and to gain greater economies available from the grant
of additional local autonomy.
The revised organisation chart is shown as Figure 9.2 on the next
page, and this change was implemented simultaneously with the
changes which will be outlined in the following case study. The
basic changes were the abolition of the positions of Assistant
General Managers and Area Managers, all branches being grouped
under Chief Managers. They were responsible for between 12 and
30 branches in a particular area, this was seen to flatten the
structure, shortening communication lines and speeding decisions.
Although no account was taken initially of the need to devolve
greater decision authority to the new Chief Managers, authority
for some administrative issues, such as Personnel and Property,
was delegated to them.
The outline proposals at the Corporate level were developed in
conjunction with a number of officers from various disciplines
within the organisation and when submitted to the board carried
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their support - they were not the proposals of a group of isolated
management scientists. The Uiable System Model was used
implicitly to support the development of the proposals and
provided the underlying logic to the work.
The initial Corporate level changes having been outlined the case
study concentrates on the organisation of the newly created
Groups and the changes in organisation design, procedures and
systems that were developed to support them. The methodology
used was drawn from Beer( 3 ) as crystallised by Flood D
Jackson(5).
9.2.3 System Identification
The "purpose" to be pursued in this case was given by FinCo at the
Corporate level and was:-
"to maximise business growth of FinCo
throughout the Group in a secure manner."
Scope was not available within the terms of the project to debate
the validity or legitimacy of purposes such as growth and profit.
The nature of the enterprise and the legal and commercial
environment within which it operates entailed these features.
The relevant system (Recursion 1) for achieving the purpose was
"the Group" since it was this that the project had been
established to study and redesign as necessary. The contained
systems (Recursion 2) were initially the thirteen offices
comprising the Group and the containing system (Recursion 0) was
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Finco: Triple Recursion with the Group at the centre
the Region. Figure 9.3 on the previous page shows this
diagramatically.
The identification of the Group as the "system-in-focus" at
Recursion 1 was an enforced decision, the selection of the offices
as contained systems at Recursion 2 was seen as reflecting the
traditional approach of the organisation. It was agreed with the
Senior Management team that an initial modelling using that
approach would form the basis for discussion of any inhibitions to
the achievement of the Group objectives of profitable and secure
business growth.
9.2.4 System Diagnosis
9.2.4.1 System One
Whilst each of the thirteen offices was studied in turn as a System
One element of the system-in-focus, the essentially common
organisation enables the presentation of only one element for the
study. The environment of the System One elements consisted of
geographical areas surrounding the offices ranging from the
central commercial district of a major city to suburban and rural
areas. The principal environmental factors with which it was
decided the organisation needed to deal were competitors,
customers (who were at the time divided alphabetically at
Recursion 2) and non-customers. The operations carried out by the
offices were the provision of the full range of financial services
products, and each was under a Local Manager, an officer of
FinCo.
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Under the then existing arrangements, local managers had a
limited lending discretion, varying from L5k to £250K, and were
charged with growing the assets (lending) of the business locally.
Propositions for lending sums in excess of local discretion were
referred to the Regional General Manager's office. Local Managers
had negligible input to many decisions affecting their office, such
as the level and quality of staffing, premises appearance, and
range of products to be offered. While they would be "punished"
for transgressions of FinCo's many rules and regulations, they
were rewarded, other than in basic salary which related to their
seniority, in an annual bonus which was derived from the total
performance of FinCo as a whole rather from the specific
performance of the local office.
Local managers were held accountable for the performance of
their office but the only measurements taken were of quality of
lending and adherence to standard procedures and centrally
imposed budgets. These were reviewed on a biennial basis. During
the intervening period lending positions which had become out of
line with expectations were identified by the Regional General
Manager's office and referred to the Local Manager for comment.
R number of significant problems were identified by the Local
Managers during the process of studying System One. Firstly a gap
was shown between the skills and operational capabilities of the
Managers and Staff of the local offices and the needs of the
customers. The customers were demanding greater "variety" from
the office than it could provide. Secondly, the wide differences in
demands between the customers, from simple personal finance
issues to complex problems of corporate finance were not
recognised by the organisation of the system, nor matched by the
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variety generating capability at most offices. Thirdly, the
organisation was exclusively internally and control focused in its
operating procedures, recognising customers as a "necessary evil"
to its continued existence, rather than the driving force behind its
survival.
9.2.4.2 System Two
There were a number of possible sources of conflict/oscillation
existing between the various elements. The geographical areas
had considerable overlap such that more than one Local Manager
was competing for the business of the same potential customers.
Different lending discretions and managerial abilities led to
conflicts where one Local Manager could be more aggressive in
Business Development and obtain business which another manager
regarded as "rightfully his." Staff resources were allocated by the
Regional Office without any specific local knowledge or
information provided so that there were frequently too many
staff in one office with too few in another, or a poor mix of skills.
No formal co-ordinating mechanisms were in place to alleviate
these difficulties although local managers would, if both were in
agreement, use their "squiggly" line connections to overcome
them on an ad-hoc basis. Co-ordinating mechanisms did exist for
some other aspects such as the hours of opening, corporate image
etc.. These were imparted from Head Office rather than being
matters of local control and the organisation was unable to
respond to local needs. The various Managers involved in this
diagnosis were firmly of the opinion that no adequate System Two
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was in place and considered that such a system would be helpful
to them in the fulfilment of their tasks.
9.2.4.3 System Three
The Group of offices was newly formed and as such had inherited
a minimal System Three function from the previous corporate
structure. The only constituent member of this System at the
outset was the Chief Manager for the Group. He carried
responsibility for the maintenance of discipline, the achievement
of business targets and for the direct management of the largest
of the local offices. This final duty absorbed the bulk of his time.
In effect therefore there was no System Three in existence,
control functions being either not exercised at all or brought into
operation at times of crisis.
Authority was rarely exercised by the Chief Manager, great
reliance being placed on the individual Local Managers to work
within the corporate limitations. This was not an example of
effective delegation but of abdication by the metasystem.
Meaningful resource bargaining was non-existent, budgets being
based on the previous year's performance plus allowances for
inflation and growth. Little consideration was given to whether
the resultant targets were either desirable or achievable.
Bargaining for all other resources e.g. staff, premises, equipment
was carried out on the same basis. While the Chief Manager
carried overall responsibility for the performance of all of the
parts of System One, his dual role focused his attention on the
performance of his own office, with the others being neglected.
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Audit enquiries through System Three* were minimal,
investigations being carried out after a crisis had hit the System
One element rather than as an ongoing part of the organisation of
the system. This meant that System Three had little knowledge of
the activities of System One. Whilst it might have been perceiued
that System One had considerable autonomy, in practice it was
considered that System Three had abdicated its function. Thus
System One was in a state of mild anarchy rather than freedom.
System Three, when it operated was perceived to be autocratic.
9.2.4.4 System Four
There was minimal System Four activity, this relied on the work of
the Chief Manager who was so engrossed in System One activity
that this function was neglected. The Chief Manager was open to
novelty but could rarely find time to "indulge myself in that way.
There is work to be done."
9.2.4.5 System Flue
While the Chief Manager was responsible for matters of Policy, no
attention was paid to this aspect of his duties. There was in effect
no System Five function.
9.2.4.6 Communication C, Information Channels
It will be evident by now that communication and information
distribution within this system were in a state of crisis.
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Communication channels were either non-existent, or "busy."
Essential information, such as that needed for the completion of
Head Office or Statutory returns was made available and the
Management Rccounting procedures provided monthly statements
of the financial position in relation to the pre-set budgets. Little
other information was routinely shared or called for and the
absence of an effective metasystem made it impossible for many
difficulties to be resolved.
9.2.4.7 Commentary
FinCo had operated on a "machine" model, relying heavily on the
bureaucratic approach to ensure internal control, with little
attention paid to the need for adaptation and learning at the local
level. Decisions taken at the centre were aimed at modifying the
bureaucratic structure rather than at revolutionising the
organisation. The Head Office assumed that the changes would be
implemented with appropriate beneficial effect.
R number of major faults were identified in the foregoing
diagnosis. The lack of an effective metasystem, poor co-
ordination, a failure to match the organisation to its customers,
no planning, ineffective communication and, considerable direct
involvement from Recursion -1, the Head Office. The Group was
described by one Manager as being "a loose lump of offices under
the control of the Chief Manager." In terms of the Diable System
Model the situation may be expressed as a lack of environmental
awareness and interaction, ineffective System Two, weak System
Three and non-existent Systems Four and Five.
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The expectations of the Head Office from the restructuring of the
higher levels of the organisation could not be fulfilled with the
organisation as it then stood. It was agreed that some radical
change was required. Figure 9.4 on the previous page shows the
original situation diagramatically.
The foregoing diagnosis was arrived at through a series of
meetings and discussions held under a variety of circumstances,
some of the most productive being "bull" sessions in pubs and
restaurants where the managers felt most able to relax and speak
out. The somewhat austere atmosphere of the offices tended to
inhibit free speech.
1111 of the management staff were involved in the process, each
making the contribution that he or she wished; inevitably, some
were more vocal than others. During the process, as is to be
expected in a large organisation the membership of the team
changed due to promotions, retirements, etc. Each new member
was introduced to the project and their views were always
sought.
9.2.5 Redesign
The redesign of the organisation took place in much the same
manner as the diagnosis. The faults with the system had been
generally agreed and the project then focused on deriving a new
organisation. The Management team was now beginning to
function as an "Operations Research" team, bringing together all
of their various skills to contribute to the project. Whilst they
each shared a background in the financial services industry, their
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educational background varied from first degrees in Russian and
other languages to Accountancy, Human Resource Management
and Retailing as well as professional qualifications. Each member
of the team brought some different and more or less explicit
"model" of the world to the project. The writer acted as
consultant, friend, cybernetician and guide to the process.
The first step was to question the basic assumptions about the
structure of the system. It had always been considered that the
"office" constituted the basic organisational unit and that the
Group and Region to which it belonged simply exercised a
hierarchical control function. It was agreed with the Management
that in order to design the organisation which was wanted, it
might be useful to do this using the Group as the basic unit, with
the Offices as constituent parts of a coherent whole. This formally
acknowledged the Group as an organisational entity for the first
time and moved the organisation away from the traditional
recognition of its existence through the office network to
recognising itself as a "distributed information system" in
dynamic interaction with its customers.
9.2.5.1 System One
In redesigning System One, the first step was to consider how the
Group could best use its resources to match the variety of its
customers and potential customers. Reference was made here to
prior market research. This had indicated, from a customer
perspective, the mismatch between the skills available at each
office and the needs of the customers. This led to a review of the
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way in which customer accounts were divided. It was decided
that there were four principal categories of customer:
mass market personal, (those with very
straightforward needs for safe custody of
money, money transmission, small personal
loans etc.),
specialist personal, (high income earners or high
net worth customers seeking a more specialised
and personal service),
small business, (sole traders and partnerships
with relatively straightforward requirements),
large corporate (bigger businesses with more
sophisticated and time consuming needs).
It was agreed that the System One implementation activity of the
group should be considered in these four categories. The
implications of this in organisational terms were great. The office
ceased to be viewed as anything except an outlet for the services
offered, it became an empty box through which could be provided
appropriate services to match local customer expectations. Rs
such each office no longer needed to be managed as an
autonomous organisational unit. The business of the office was no
longer treated as belonging to it but to the relevant market
segments which had been identified.
There were to be only four System One elements instead of the
previous thirteen. Each element would offer a specific range of
278
services to a particular group of customers. This proposal was
seen as enabling the organisation to more accurately match the
variety of the operational elements to that of the customers in
the newly discriminated environments. It enabled more effective
use to be made of the core financial services skills as most senior
staff were no longer required to "manage" an office but rather a
portfolio of customers. It did however generate new problems of
co-ordination and control.
Geographically, all offices continued to offer services to mass-
market personal customers and to local small businesses.
Specialist personal and medium or large corporate customers, or
those with particularly complex needs, would be invited to obtain
their services from a single office within the Group. These two
elements would then cater for the entire geographic area. The
emphasis was on inviting customers to take advantage of the new
arrangements (the invitation being treated as a business
development opportunity), rather than compulsion. Competitors
had been observed to lose good quality business through forcing
organisational changes on their customers.
It was recognised that an appropriate individual would need to be
appointed to manage each System One element and these were
selected mainly from the existing management team. These
individuals, if they were to fulfil their respective functions,
needed to be granted a level of discretion in all areas of activity
that enabled them to achieve the agreed objectives. This included
the right to select and appoint staff, lending authorities which
matched the needs of their existing and potential customers and
access to specialist support services when necessary. The battles
to achieve these freedoms were fought on their behalf by the
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writer at the Corporate level of recursion and are beyond the
scope of this work. It should suffice to say that the major battles
were, eventually, won.
During the pre-implementation phase these managers were
charged with creating business plans for their areas, starting
from a zero base wherever possible and examining what
resources were required to manage the pre-existing business and
what development targets were appropriate. For each element,
the business plan would include all relevant aspects, such as the
size and composition of the team, training requirements,
marketing plans, service quality standards to be achieved etc.
Technical help and general guidance was provided with these
areas by the writer. The development of these business plans was
perceived as being the first step in the creation of a metasystem
for each element at Recursion 2.
The basic shape of the new organisation having been decided it
was recognised that the rest of the organisation needed to be
designed to support the purposeful elements. It was agreed that
the four elements of System One represented the purpose of the
system and that everything else that the system did should be
aimed at supporting and enabling the fulfilment of that purpose.
This led to further radical changes in attitudes and expectations.
9.2.5.2 System Two
R major source of conflict had already been resolved with the
redesign of System One. Individual offices and officers were no
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longer competing with each other for the same business. There
still remained however a need for System Two.
Mechanisms were developed to help in the allocation of customer
accounts between the various segments and, whilst clear
guidelines were drawn up for this, it was recognised that there
would always be grey areas at the margins between segments. Fl
formal process was defined by which a customer falling within the
grey area would be approached and have the advantages and
disadvantages of each area explained to him so that he could
make an informed choice. R System Two monitoring function was
established to alert the relevant element to emergent customers
in the grey area so that action could be taken locally in the first
instance.
Staffing had previously been a matter for the Regional Office
(Recursion Zero) with people being appointed, from that level, to
work within a particular office. This process was changed so that
all the staff belonged to the Group. R mechanism was established
for monitoring staffing needs in each operational element of
System One through System Two as an attempt to maintain a
balance between workload and staffing. Matters such as
Corporate image and opening hours remained centrally decided
although discretion was obtained to enable flexibility in some
outlets.
It was agreed that monitoring of budgets would be undertaken
through System Two as far as possible such that excess
expenditure/income in one area could be balanced against
shortfalls in other areas. This enabled the budgets to be
continuously updated in line with business performance and
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changes in the demands or expectations of the elements. This was
particularly important as the business environment was moving
towards a period of recession when the achievement of centrally
driven growth targets would demand considerable flexibility to
take advantage of opportunities and counter threats.
9.2.5.3 System Three
The initial diagnosis indicated the absence of any adequate System
Three function, the Chief Manager switching into this role when
"necessary." The fundamental reorganisation of System One
relieved this individual of any involvement in managing an office
leaving him free to manage the Group. He retained a minimal role
in the Large Corporate element of System One as a matter of
political expediency with the customers. He took no
"management" role in this respect, simply dealing with customers
as part of System One operations. The deliberate granting of a
significant amount of autonomy to the System One elements was
intended to minimise the administrative cost of operating the
Group. The metasystem functions were those considered
necessary for cohesion and maintenance of the System.
System Three was comprised of four major elements, the Chief
Manager, the Managers of each of the System One elements, a
Lending Control Manager and a Resource Manager.
The Lending Control Manager and his team were made responsible
for the evaluation of large lending propositions within the Group
discretion, the quality control of major propositions being
submitted to the Regional Office (e.g. ensuring that financial
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analysis had been correctly undertaken and that proposals
conformed to expectations) and the audit of all lending within the
group. They had no decision authority in regard to lending, this
was all retained by the line managers. The function of Lending
Control was to alert the line managers to lending falling outside
the norms of the organisation. They also provided specialist advice
to these Managers when necessary, e.g for difficult lending
propositions and when recovery of funds was in doubt.
The Resource Manager was responsible with his support staff, for
the allocation of all Group resources. The major aspect of this was
staffing and he had a complete overview of the need for, and
availability of, staff throughout the Group. Whilst endeavouring to
fulfil the bulk of this personnel function through the System Two
channel, matters which could not be resolved this way were to be
brought to the System Three function for decision. The Resource
Manager dealt with all other matters of administration
throughout the Group which could only be resolved at this level
e.g. selection and allocation of new equipment, compilation of
Group returns and reports, monitoring of performance.
The Chief Manager, Lending Control Manager and Resource
Manager formed the continuing core of System Three with the
System One element Managers being involved in debate and
decision on all matters affecting the Group as a whole or their
particular element. The Lending Control Manager and Resource
Manager with their small support staffs were both allocated
relevant audit functions to conduct through each of the System
One elements. Lending Control focused on areas of commercial
risk, the Resource Manager and his team responsible for aspects
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of procedures and systems as well as the wider matter of the
organisation's fitness, e.g. training, recruitment.
Agreement on the composition and proposed style of operation for
System Three took a considerable time to achieve. The individual
managers concerned had been accustomed to working in a
hierarchy where seniority determined power. They were
developing a new organisation where the opinion of every, by
their definition, relevant, manager would be sought prior to a
major decision and the most knowledgeable individual would have
the biggest influence. This threatened the sense of security and
power felt by those who had been accustomed to the idea that "1
Am the Emperor - and I Want Dumplings." (80 ) It was eventually
accepted that predominantly, those with the necessary
information should make the decisions rather than those with the
most formal power.
This change moved the Group away from a situation where System
Three had been considered to be autocratic to one which might be
considered participative and consultative or consensus seeking.
Whilst in the limiting case, the Chief Manager would make a
decision, he considered it better that the team should reach
agreement as to what should be done. The perception of System
One managers, who were now part of System Three, was that the
operation of this aspect had changed for the better.
9.2.5.4 System Four
The Senior Management team agreed that the lack of a planning
function for the Group was likely to leave it vulnerable to future
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internal and external developments. The System Four model of the
enterprise was created by taking the management team together,
as in System Three, and recognising that they comprised a model
of the organisation, representing each element of System One plus
Systems Two, Three and Three* at Recursion One.
This was not a situation where a formal management centre or
operations room could be established, there was neither space nor
necessary resources to create such an entity. The Chief Manager's
office became this centre, changing from a room where Managers
went when invited, to a "drop-in" centre where the team would
regularly gather on a casual basis to discuss the changes and
developments of the Group. These discussions rarely operated to
an agenda, the concerns or ideas of the managers emerging from
the conversation on a continuing basis, with each taking
responsibility for following through any matters affecting his
particular area. The Chief Manager dealt with issues arising from
higher recursions and affecting the Group. This may be seen as a
practical example of Robb's "complex conversations at a number
of levels between just two or more individuals."(22)
The model of the environment was created by identifying those
aspects which were considered could influence the future of the
Group in the geographical area and starting to routinely monitor
them. This covered aspects such as the arrival of new competitors
in the area, demographic changes in the local community,
legislative changes and commercial developments of all types, i.e.
new businesses moving in, levels of unemployment etc.. In this
way the Senior Management team developed systematic
monitoring of the environment on an ongoing basis.
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The Lending Control Manager and Resource Manager were of
importance in this System, commencing routine scanning of their
areas of interest to find new ways of managing the business to
minimise the cost of their necessary functions. The team also
established a training programme for the entire staff of the
Group, around 300 people, in order to prepare them for the future.
The Senior Management team had, by this stage of the process,
changed from their previously acquiescent attitudes. They had
become a self critical, questioning and learning group, prepared to
examine any new idea and to experiment with it, a major change
in approach.
9.2.5.5 System Fiue
Systems Three and Four now being functioning parts of the
metasystem, the role of System Five was easier to elaborate and
the position was occupied by the Chief Manager. Since the
Three/Four conversations were invariably held in his office, he
was easily able to monitor the ongoing dialogue and influence the
direction of the conversation and decision. It was therefore rare
for any System Five decision to need to be made.
The Chief Manager's attitudes on most matters had become clear
over the period of the work undertaken and the constituent
members of the Senior Management team had learnt his likely
reactions, and, how to persuade him to shift his position. Debates
between the conflicting needs for stability and adaptation were
often extensive and the perceived advantages and drawbacks
would be fully explored. This normally led to an agreement being
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reached by the parties involved. When necessary the Chief
Manager, in his System Five role, would normally sanction some
form of controlled experiment to further determine the value of
an idea prior to a change.
9.2.5.6 Communication and Information Channels
The process of change using the Diable System Model had opened
up previously unused communication channels, in particular with
regard to the dialogue between System One and the Metasystem.
The team had developed such other channels as they required, and
perhaps more importantly, had the freedom to develop and adapt
these further after implementation.
Since the Group was a contained System of a much larger
organisation, many aspects of communication, and much of the
information in the system, was governed by the containing
system. Nonetheless, the management team learned to use that
information in different ways to more completely understand the
operation of the Group. Centrally generated reports were
understood to be performing a particular function within the
Group and were treated accordingly. The redesigned organisation
is shown as figure 9.5 on the following page.
287
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
MANAGER 1 / I
MANAGER 1/2
MANAGER 1/3
MANAGER 1/4
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
C.M.
MANAGER 1/1
MANAGER 1/2
MANAGER /3
MANAGER /4
1/1
Manager
1/2
Manager
1/3
Manager
1/4
Manager
Borderline
Customers
Staffing
Monitoring
Budget
Monitoring
4
LENDING
CONTROL
3
LENDING
CONTROL
Lending
Staff
Procedures
MASS
MARKET
CUSTOMERS
NON-CUSTOMER
	 Mass
COMPETITORS
	
Market
Personal
SPEC I RL IST
PERSONAL
CUSTOMERS
NON-CUSTOMER
COMPET ITORT
SMALL BUSINESS
CUSTOMERS
NON-CUSTOMERS
COMPETITORS
Small
Business
LARGE CORPORATE
CUSTOMERS
NON-CUSTOMERS
COMPETITORS
Large
Corporate
Finco: Reorganisation using the Viable System Model
Key • - Represents a homeostatic loop
Figure 9.5
288
9.2.5.7 Commentary
Whilst implementation of the major structural changes took place
on a particular day at the end of four months, the bulk of the
changes in operating style developed naturally over the period of
the project, about fifteen months. Both development and
implementation were ongoing processes during this period.
The process was not without its difficulties and moments of high
drama, including at various stages threatened resignations,
requests for early retirement and battles with Head Office
(Recursion -1). There were more battles with Head Office than
anything else. The changes that were being proposed, which in
detail went far beyond those reported here, had implications for
every part of the organisation, and particularly, represented
threats to those in the Corporate level metasystem whose roles
and functions were being questioned by the changes in the Group.
Perhaps the most important lesson for those in the Group was the
realisation that they had the power to change the organisation as
long as they had the courage to do so. Whether the structure and
processes designed to support the operation of the Group were
right is a matter for debate. Different observers will perceive
different successes and failures. What has proved right is that the
team no longer complain about aspects of the organisation which
malfunction, they sit down together and change it.
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9.2.6 Recursion Two
The changes involved at this level were, in many ways more
extensive than at Recursion One since the standard operating
procedures and the computer systems of FinCo were designed to
support the original style of organisation. Practical difficulties
were many, but, "We perforce rely on the human genius to know
how, precisely, to apply itself."(1 PG 518) The commitment and
ingenuity of the staff at all levels of the organisation were
brought in to play to effect the major changes and ensure that
the difficulties were overcome.
It is not the intention in this section to report all of the work
undertaken at Recursion Two. It must suffice to say that it was
undertaken in the same participative manner as at Recursion One,
the staff identifying the problems and developing solutions with
technical support from the writer. This section will focus
exclusively on the organisation of the Large Corporate element of
the business.
9.2.6.1	 Building a Process of Self-organisation
The restructuring decision at Recursion One led to the creation of a
Large Corporate element of System One. This was intended to deal
with customers throughout the Group having borrowing
requirements in excess of £100k or turnover exceeding Lim.
These figures were agreed by the management team as the levels
above which customers tended to have more specialised financial
needs. The figures were treated as guidelines and not absolute
limits. The element drew business from all the offices of the Group
290
although only customer relationships were moved, by agreement,
not the accounts themselves. This generated a number of
procedural difficulties which were eventually overcome.
The most difficult aspect of the change was how to organise the
unit itself. This unit had to deal both with existing customers and
to have capacity for business development within the given
constraints on the number of people that could be used. Rn early
decision was made to locate this unit at the largest office of the
Group which had sufficient space and was in the centre of the
major commercial district of the town at the core of the Group.
The project commenced with a review of the existing hierarchical
structure, the objective of the management being to discover
whether this could be adapted to accommodate the additional
business and staff. This initial structure was as shown in figure
9.6 on the following page.
The study of this structure was conducted through both statistical
analysis and personal interviews. It revealed that each of the
managers and supervisors was devoting around 50% of his or her
time to controlling and checking the activities of his subordinates.
There were five layers in this hierarchy and the dominant function
of the senior staff was checking that the lower staff had checked
their subordinates work - checking that the checkers had checked
the checkers checking. An absurd although not inevitable result of
the growth of hierarchy and bureaucracy.
The personal interviews revealed considerable dismay on the part
of these senior staff who, having spent a number of years
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developing professional expertise at the provision of financial
services, were spending most of their time on activities that they
considered as pointless and for which they were not trained. This
included their management function for which at the most they
had had 4 weeks training in an average twenty year career.
.../
The discussion of these problems led the team to discuss ways of.
releasing the professionalism of the team members to undertake
more productive, purposeful activity, whilst maintaining an
acceptable degree of control over the operations and lending
aspects. It was agreed that each member of staff, properly
trained, was a mature and capable individual and that a
significant element of trust could be brought in to play. It was
decided that most individuals could be relied upon to perform an
allotted task and that critical areas could be monitored through
reporting and control procedures. R sample check of the checking
showed that few errors were discovered, tasks generally being
carried out to the required standard.
The aim of the review now became to find a way of releasing the
skills of the staff to engage in professional activity while
minimising the control activity. There were three key skill areas
identified, Customer relationship management, financial analysis
and account operations.
R major difficulty of the original structure was that the four
operations units were too small to function properly, such that
when one member of the team was absent there were inadequate
resources to respond adequately to customer requirements, staff
either fulfilling minor functions for which they were overpaid or
attempting to fulfil more senior roles for which they had not been
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trained. It was considered that by merging these four units a
proper balance of staffing could be achieved to overcome these
problems. The impact on customers of this change was seen to be
minimal since most contacts took place with the Supervisory
staff. Customer Operations then became a System One element of
Large Corporate at Recursion Two, acting as a service to
customers and headed by its own manager.
This left the Customer Relationship and Financial Rnalysis
activities to be organised. Under the original organisation these
activities were intermingled such that any member of staff would
undertake both during the course of the day. It was considered
that these activities could be performed more effectively and
efficiently if staff were allowed to specialise in one or the other.
What developed was a form of self-organising matrix structure as
shown in Figure 9.7 on the next page. The customers were divided
for relationship purposes into different industry sectors such as,
medical and dental, engineering, construction, hotel and leisure,
and retail. Each Relationship Manager was selected to work on a
particular industry where he either had, or would develop,
specialist expertise. This was a means of enabling communication
with the customers, by speaking the same language, and
increasing the variety absorbing capabilities of the individual
managers whilst reducing the extent of the environment which
they needed to consider. The customer accounts were then
allocated to these Relationship Managers. This was again done by
introduction and persuasion rather than unilateral dictat and was
largely successful.
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For financial analysis it was recognised that the analyst needed a
skill level which matched the complexity of the accounts to be
analysed, rather than to manage the customer relationship.
Financial analysis was seen as supportive to Customer
Relationship management. Consequently the customer accounts
were re-analysed, by the Relationship Managers and lending
officers and fitted into four categories of complexity, very
complex, complex, moderate and simple. Numbers and grades of
Rnalysts were then selected to match these categories.
Each Rnalyst, like each Relationship Manager had a portfolio of
accounts with which he was involved, and the matrix, after some
experimentation, was drawn up so that each Relationship
Manager could be supported by up to four analysts and each
Rnalyst could undertake work for up to four managers. It was
discovered that if four were exceeded on either side the situation
became too complex for the individuals to manage.
Using this system of self-organisation there was no hierarchy in
this section, each individual being responsible for the fulfilment of
his or her duties and needing to work co-operatively with each of
his or her colleagues. R system of mentoring was established for
dealing with pastoral issues such as career development and
appraisal. The necessary administrative duties such as absence
records and stationery requisitions became a nuisance task,
allocated in turn to each of the analysts, regardless of grade, for
a period of three months. It was thus in nobody's interest for this
activity to become pathologically autopoietic as is so often the
case.
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R system of monitoring caseloads was established for all staff to
ensure that nobody became overloaded. The system allowed for
accounts to be reallocated between analysts if workloads grew
out of line with each other and for the analysts to continuously
take on more complex accounts as their skills developed. Similarly
with the Relationship Managers, they could develop their own
careers and rewards by seeking new business within their
industry and by moving towards more complex cases as their
expertise grew. The Senior Relationship Manager, operated both
within this matrix and as the System One Manager responsible to
the Metasystem of the next higher recursion.
This system of organisation, after some initial teething difficulties
while the staff adapted to the new way of working and the
operational difficulties were resolved, settled well and is reported
to be working in the same way some two years later. The impact
of the change was, as had been hoped, to release considerable
time from checking and monitoring to concentrate on purposeful
activity. The gain has been agreed with the team as being about
30% overall, such that with no increase in the number of staff in
the area, considerable additional time is dedicated to managing
and developing customer relationships. The original estimate of
time lost to checking was 50% and the remaining 20% of time not
clawed back is that which is either necessary because of legal and
accountability constraints or forced by the inadequacies of the
Information Systems in use by FinCo and controlled at the
corporate level.
Whilst in the initial period there was a slight increase in errors
made, this was soon resolved and is now perceived to be lower
than under the previous system. The staff are generally more
297
content and regard their jobs as more satisfying and fulfilling
than previously.
9.2.6.2 On Success
The implementation of the changes described, other than the
major structural change, took place largely as the outcome of the
process of review. Once the staff had agreed what needed to be
done, and formal sanction had been obtained where necessary,
they went back to their positions and carried it out. The writer
acted as co-ordinator for many aspects to ensure that all
happened in harmony, although much of this work was
progressively passed to the Group Resource Manager as part of
his ongoing duties. He is now responsible for ensuring that
environmental monitoring continues and that enquiries are
triggered into the need for further change.
Technically this was a successful project, the Viable System Model
was initially implicitly used to guide the process of developing
change. Most of the concepts were expressed in the language of
the system studied rather than that of cybernetics although more
explicit use was made as the project progressed. The process led
to a renovated organisation which can be seen to be capable of
learning and adaptation - the single largest legacy of the project.
There are, though, other ways of measuring success.
Financially, the project was again successful. The Group showed
the second fastest growth in profit during the subsequent
financial year of any Group of offices, around 30%. It was beaten
by one Group whose growth in profit had been driven by cost-
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cutting rather than business development. The increase was
achieved at a time when the UK economy had moved into
recession. What growth would have been achieved without the
changes it is impossible to say.
Further evidence of success is shown by the keen demand
throughout FinCo for those staff, particularly management who
were involved in the process. They are seen to be highly
motivated and change oriented staff with skills, abilities and
experience not found elsewhere in the organisation.
Finally, if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, a further six
Groups were remodelled on the same lines and modified forms of
the whole system are now being replicated throughout FinCo. The
organisational forms developed by the Group may not be perfect
but are considered a major improvement on the previous
situation.
9.2.6.3 Summary
This case has shown how the [liable System Model may be used in
a large organisation to provide not simply a tool for diagnosing
and redesigning an organisation but within a cybernetic process of
change. Whilst the case as presented is very brief, the whole
process over a lengthy period involved many experiments and
iterations to arrive at satisfactory outcomes.
Key tools were the concepts of purposeful and supportive
activity. These were used in the breakdown of the Group into
manageable elements that better matched the requirements of
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the customers. The concept of variety demonstrated a value in
helping to determine the skill levels necessary for the
satisfactory conduct of the business in each operational element.
Technology played only a minor role in this application, most of
the communication and information processing being by
individuals face to face and able in that way to transmit and
receive both the synactic and semantic meaning of the messages
conueyed.
This was a case of the use of "Science in the Service of Man '(69).
9.3 Cakes 
9.3.1	 Introduction
The study of Cakes was undertaken as remunerated consultancy.
The Viable System Model was used as both a diagnostic tool and as
a device for explaining the necessary changes. The intention was
to increase the effectiveness of Cakes and to focus the activities
of non-purposeful parts of the organisation.
9.3.2 Background
The study took place under the broad title of an Organisation and
Planning review and its explicit objectives were to:-
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Define and analyse the existing roles of staff at
First Hand level (the lowest level of Supervisor)
or above.
Assess the information requirements for each
role.
Redefine the structure and roles as necessary.
Prepare brief job outlines with specific
reference to decision, authority and
responsibilities.
Specify a production planning mechanism.
lt was anticipated that the outcomes would be, clearer job
definition, clear authority and responsibility and improved
purposeful communication. The project was conducted through a
series of interviews with all relevant staff, observation and
discussion and a process of negotiation and debate with the
Senior Management. Prior to the commencement of the review a
new General Manager had been appointed to the factory and was
responsible to the Managing Director for all aspects of the site
activity. R junior Manager had also been appointed, these two
staff being the first senior appointees from outside the factory
for around thirty years.
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9.3.3 System Identification
The factory, which became the System-in-focus was organised in
a series of functional areas on three floors. These dealt with, Raw
Material Stores, Mixing, Baking, Creaming, Packing and Despatch.
The Raw Material Store and Despatch were on the ground floor
along with one Baking, Creaming and Packing line, a second Baking
Creaming and Packing line was on the first floor, with Mixing on
the second floor supplying both Baking lines. Each of these areas
had its own Manager or Supervisor. In addition to these, Cakes
had units dealing with Product Development, Personnel, Hygiene,
Engineering, Quality Control and a Canteen. The original
organisation is shown in figure 9.8 on the following page. Initially,
the containing system was defined as Cakes Holdings, which
operated a second factory and dealt with Cake Sales, and the
contained systems as the functional areas, each of which was
potentially viable.
The initial review found that 93 staff out of a total of 300 were
receiving wages related to Supervisory or Management positions.
It was discovered that a number of these positions had arisen
over previous years as a means of maintaining industrial harmony
when the factory was in danger of being closed down. It was
found that a significant number of Supervisors had no staff under
their control. The process of review revealed a number of
significant faults within the organisation.
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9.3.4 System Diagnosis
The purpose of the organisation was debated with the General
Manager and representatives of Cakes Holdings (Recursion 0) and
agreed to be:-
"the production of cakes in accordance with
customer requirements."
There was a limited understanding of roles at all levels within the
organisation and no adequate articulation of the performance
expectations of Senior Management. There was no clear
delegation of authority. Managers and Foremen were unaware of
the limitations upon them, and their number served to increase
the uncertainty of expectations. Management throughout the
plant was thoughtless, that is that the traditional or prevailing
methods were used regardless of any apparent need for change.
Managers and staff throughout the Factory adhered to a "clock"
mentality.
The Factory was heavily unionised and it was considered by many
staff that the Union was a major influence in the running of the
operation. Wildcat strikes were frequent despite recent
legislation aimed at preventing them. The belief that the Union
was powerful had had two principal impacts, since it was
perceived to be powerful its actual power had increased, and, the
ability of Managers to Manage was inhibited by the perceived
erosion of their power.
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9.3.4.1 System One
There were many System One elements with Managers being
responsible for only small parts of processes. They had no
guidelines as to their roles and responsibilities and tended to pass
the blame for errors to other areas. Supervisory positions existed
where there were no staff to supervise. This lack of clarity tended
to generate interference in other areas, individuals exercising
authority without responsibility.
Some areas had more than one Manager, causing further confusion.
In one case the number of Supervisory staff exceeded the number
of operators. Rules and Procedures of all types were
comprehensively ignored and Management failed to correct the
abuses.
The Managers generally considered that the Supervisory staff were
of poor quality, citing the need to prompt and guide them
throughout each shift. This behaviour was observed during the
project and it was also found that some Foremen were unable to
speak in a language common to themselves, their subordinates or
Managers. This clearly contradicted the cybernetic requirement for
effective communication channels and transducers.
9.3.4.2 System Two
No System Two mechanisms could be discerned in this case. Work
and production scheduling was undertaken by each individual unit
without regard to the activities of other units. This led to severe
problems of peaks and troughs in the workloads of all areas.
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Particularly important in this regard was the failure to schedule
cake mixes which consequently often stood in the Mixing area for
some time as a result of which they would fail at the Baking stage.
This generated considerable waste.
There was no flexibility of staffing between the different units and
it was considered likely that as a result the Factory was generally
overstaffed. Staff in some areas were often to be seen idling while
waiting for the next task to arrive at their work station. fit the
same time other staff would be overstretched.
9.3.4.3 System Three
There were no effective control mechanisms nor performance
standards in place to enable monitoring of either Departmental,
process or personal performance. Such mechanisms as were in
place appeared counter-productive by focusing attention on one or
two aspects of performance, such as throughput or labour
utilisation, and ignoring the systemic consequences of maximising
these aspects. For example, over-production against customer
orders, whilst maximising throughput and labour utilisation
incurred additional costs for freezing, transport and stocking.
These costs were simply accepted as necessary to maintain
performance in one area. The managers responsible were not
concerned with this as it was "somebody else's problem."
The factory wage rates were the lowest in the area and the staff
systematically abused the shift Premium and Overtime systems to
compensate. This shows failure at both System One and Three.
Hygiene requirements (covered by legislation) were ignored, even
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by the Hygiene Manager directly responsible for their
implementation.
The Personnel function also formed part of System Three. Managers
complained that no support was forthcoming from this area to
cover absences, they were simply instructed to cope. The formal
procedure which should have guaranteed them replacements for
missing staff was ignored. Further investigation revealed that
neither the line Managers nor the Personnel staff had a mechanism
for determining the necessary staffing level. They adhered to the
numbers that they had always used regardless of changes in
product complexity etc.. The Personnel Officer for the Factory saw
her purpose as being to minimise costs by forcing Managers to
cope. The dysfunctional outcome of her approach had not been
recognised by her Seniors.
The Engineering Department, a further part of System Three, had
become pathologically autopoietic. The staff were pursuing their
own interests rather than supporting the needs of the production
areas which they had been employed to service. This led to
situations of dangerously defective equipment being used by
production staff and line stoppages through failures of machines
due to a lack of routine maintenance. System One Managers were
frustrated by this, often resorting to undertaking minor
adjustments and repairs to machines themselves.
9.3.4.4 System Three*
There was little evidence of audit activity other than quality
checks which had become routine rather than sporadic, quality
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being assessed through standard procedures at various points of
the production process.
Quality control was ineffective on the production line. Rn intended
100% final inspection rate being nearer to 5% in practice. The
throughput rate on the lines was too great for any adequate visual
inspection to be made. Despite an overall reject rate of 10%,
identified at the baking stage, or through damage during
packaging, the staff considered that quality was good.
9.3.4.5 System Four
There was some evidence of System Four activity. Product
Development was ongoing, both enhancing existing products and
developing new ones in conjunction with the customers.
Communication of the need for new products and their
implementation was poor, products being introduced to the
Production staff with no forewarning. Production staff regarded
new products as being a nuisance and as interfering with the, to
them, smooth operation of their areas. Since the implementation
process was poor there were major product quality problems when
new products were introduced.
11 training programme had been introduced at Cakes twelve months
before the review with the intention of increasing the skill levels
of all Managers and Supervisory staff. Despite the significant cost
of this programme no apparent benefit had been achieved. Staff
found that on their return from courses they were either
prevented from introducing changes, or, where they attempted to
do so and a dispute arose with the Union, the Senior Management
308
would not support them. The outcome of training was increased
frustration rather than improved performance. This was the sum
total of System Four activity, both aspects being ineffective.
9.3.4.6 System Five
It will be apparent that there was no effective System Five at this
level of organisation at the commencement of the review. There
was no "ethos," no clear sense of purpose or policy being
generated for the system. The General Manager saw this as his role
but recognised that he needed support to bring a functioning
organisation into operation.
9.3.4.7 Communication and Information Channels
Official communication throughout Cakes was generally poor, most
staff relying on the grapevine or the Union to discover what was
happening in the organisation. Particular examples of failure have
already been cited, (9.3.4.1, Page 305). Current customer orders
and instructions were often ignored, except at the Despatch unit,
with Managers producing according to the previous week's
customer orders. The Stores Manager was ordering from suppliers
to maintain a stable supply of all ingredients regardless of
whether or not they were needed for manufacturing. These
approaches led to a high level of waste of both raw and finished
materials.
309
9.3.4.8 Summary
The catalogue of symptoms indicated an organisation which was
out of control, characterised by poor communication, restrictive
working practices, abuse of systems and procedures, weak line
management and strong Union power. These perhaps reflected the
recent history of the factory which had been treated as a cash cow
by Cakes Holdings whilst operating under a continuing threat of
closure. R set of circumstances which are not designed to boost
the morale of either management or staff.
Structurally it was evident that a level of recursion had been
missed in the organisation which moved directly from the Factory
level to the detailed Operations level. It was considered that this
was responsible for a significant number of the problems.
9.3.5 Redesign
The foregoing diagnosis led to considerable discussion with the
General Manager the outcome of which was the following
normative statement of Management Philosophy:-
The purpose of the organisation as studied is the
production of a variety of cakes to fulfil
customer requirements. Any activity which does
not fulfil this purpose must be supportive to it.
If an activity is neither purposeful nor
supportive to the purpose its continued
operation must be questioned.
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The need of the organisation is for control to be
exercised as closely as possible to the source of
difficulty or disturbance.
This means that Managers must have maximum
autonomy in the conduct of their activities,
subject only to those constraints necessary to
ensure the cohesion of the organisation. That is,
Managers must be allowed to manage.
This approach shall be applied throughout the
organisation so that ultimately, operatives on
the production line must learn to manage
themselves, constrained only by the need for
cohesion.
Constraints necessary for cohesion include
sharing the objectives of the organisation.
The practical interpretation of this was that as far as possible, all
staff should have responsibility for controllable variables which
directly affect their performance. They must have decision
authority to carry out their delegated tasks and they must have
specific, relevant and measurable performance standards to work
towards.
It was further agreed that Managers must be supported by Senior
Management. They should also be responsible for training and
development of their subordinates and that performance
standards should be negotiated on a continuing basis to form an
agreed resource bargain. These must not be imposed from above.
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The next section reports work at Recursion One of the respecified
chain of systems. This introduced a new level of recursion so that
the chain became, Cakes Holdings containing the Cakes sub-
system. This contained four sub-systems (Stores, Line 1, Line 2
and Despatch). Lines 1 and 2 both contained three sub-systems,
Mix D Bake, Process, Despatch. This chain of systems is shown in
figure 9.9 on the following page.
9.3.5.1 System One
It was agreed that, if the purpose of the Factory was to
manufacture Cakes, then System One at the Factory level of
recursion (Recursion One) was comprised of the Manufacturing
activity. This was made up of four elements, Raw Materials, Line 1
and Line 2, attending to the whole manufacturing process from
mixing to packing, and Despatch.
These elements, each under the control of a Manager or
Superintendent, were to report to a newly appointed
Manufacturing Manager who represented the first System Three
function. The System One element managements would be
responsible for both manufacturing and for the routines of quality
control, hygiene, machine minding and health and safety
procedures within their area. Performance standards for each
element were to be agreed between its Manager and the
Manufacturing Manager.
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Cakes: Respecified Chain of Systems
Figure 9.9
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9.3.5.2 System Two
11 prime role of the Manufacturing Manager would be to co-
ordinate the activities of the different areas through production
planning and scheduling to ensure that all were working in
harmony. Procedures would also be installed for the reallocation
of staff between areas as necessary to smooth the production
flow.
9.3.5.3 System Three
The elements of the new System Three, in addition to the
Manufacturing Manager, included Engineering, Technical (Hygiene
D Quality) and what came to be called Services, dealing with
Personnel functions and the Staff canteen and shop.
Each of these areas was to be recognised as existing to enable
System One, (Manufacturing) to fulfil its purpose. As such,
performance standards were to be agreed between the Managers
of these units and the Manufacturing Manager. For example, in
the case of Engineering, maintenance schedules and elapsed times
between machine breakdown and attendance by an engineer were
agreed. This would not only enable the monitoring of performance
but also provide a rational basis for negotiating the budget of the
Engineering Department. The expectations from that Department
being known, it would be much simpler to determine the
appropriate numbers of staff and skill levels necessary for the
performance of their duties. For example, it would be possible to
measure the benefit of an improvement in response time to
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machine breakdowns (a reduction in lost production) against the
labour cost of an additional engineer.
Similar approaches were taken to the Technical and Services
areas, and communication between all parties was encouraged
through regular meetings and discussions, particularly informal
sessions in the Production Office and canteen.
9.3.5.4 System Three*
The routine aspects of Quality Control having been allocated to
System One, for implementation at Recursion Two the audit
function at Recursion One was redesigned. It was agreed that
Recursion One audits would be undertaken by all elements of
System Three in respect of their areas of interest. Reports would
be made available to all other parties in both written and verbal
form.
For example, the Technical unit would be required to ensure that
Quality Control procedures and records were being maintained and
corrective action taken where necessary, rather than undertaking
those functions themselves. The Services unit was encouraged, in
its Personnel guise, to visit the Production floor and engage in
conversation with the staff rather than hiding from them as had
previously been the case. This was seen as a way of enhancing
their understanding and knowledge of the operational activities
as well as enabling operations staff to voice their opinions and
concerns.
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9.3.5.5 System Four
The activities of Product Development and Training were
maintained at Recursion One and the proposed enhanced
functioning of System Three was to be used to enable more
effective implementation of both aspects. The functioning of
System Four was to be developed by involving each of the other
elements of System Three in this unit. It was specified that they
should undertake systematic research activity in their areas of
expertise to enable ongoing adaptation and development of the
Factory.
Engineering would commence seeking new and more cost
effective equipment. The Manufacturing Manager would examine
different production processes. The Technical staff would research
the changes demanded by new legislation on Food Safety and
Hazardous substances. These activities had historically either
been ignored, or pursued after threats and warnings from
external agencies or higher recursions.
9.3.5.6 System Flue
System Five was represented by the General Manager. He carried
complete responsibility for the operations of the Factory, but with
the revised structure in place would be able to act in a co-
ordinating role between Systems Three and Four in which he would
take no direct part.
His role was defined as being to act as an arbitrator between
these two systems, using his knowledge of the System at
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Recursion Zero and his resource bargain with that system where
he acted as a System One Manager, to balance the conflicting
demands for stability and adaptation. His belief was that having
appointed Managers to undertake tasks on behalf of the Factory
he should only become involved with them in the event of a crisis
or when his help was sought.
This approach by the General Manager was expected to lead to a
greater sense of autonomy throughout the System, although the
freedoms of the Managers had now been designed. The
reorganisation of the system at Recursion One is shown as figure
9.10 on the next page.
9.3.5.7 Recursion Two - Production Lines One C, Two
Production Lines One and Two are treated together as their
organisation was identical. Changes in Stores management and
Despatch will not be included in this work.
9.3.5.8 System One
Each production line was to be broken down into three System One
elements, Mixing C, Baking, Processing, and Packing. Each of these
elements was to have its own Superintendent responsible for
performance of the element and reporting to the Process Manager
who represented the metasystem.
The Superintendents were to be given complete operational
responsibility for their areas, including the freedom to negotiate
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resources and performance standards with the Process Manager.
Staff were the principal variable resource, other items such as
ovens being relatively fixed. The responsibilities would include
routine checks on product quality, maintenance of hygiene
standards and daily cleaning routines. The Superintendents were
to have the freedom to deploy their staff in pursuit of these
duties as they saw fit.
9.3.5.9 System Two
Production scheduling and planning mechanisms were introduced
along with a Batch Control system. This was to enable production
to be tracked throughout the Factory and enable System Three to
be alerted to emergent problems, the Process Manager would
devote most of his time to this co-ordination role. Thus once
performance standards had been agreed, and the daily or weekly
production schedules issued, the role of the Process Manager
would moue from System Three to System Two, aiming to balance
and co-ordinate the production process to achieve a free-flowing
line. This was intended to avoid the previous problems of
unfinished products deteriorating through delays between
processes.
9.3.5.18 System Three
It was considered that the Process Manager would fulfil the
System Three function. This involved taking responsibility for the
whole production process on a particular line, agreeing resource
bargains (performance standards, staffing levels) with his
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subordinates and developing production schedules. He would also
be responsible for all other matters affecting the line, e.g. Staff
management and discipline, job rotation, etc..
9.3.5.11
	 System Four
The scope of the development function at this level of recursion
was very limited. The prime concerns were with anticipating and
avoiding emergent production problems, e.g. shortage of staff,
peak workloads.
Direct development activity was to be concerned with considering
ways of reducing the levels of resources required to operate the
production line and the handling of new product introductions.
Training of Superintendents and operators would become a major
part of this function, both in the formal sense of identifying the
need for training courses and the informal "on the job" training
which was an ongoing commitment.
9.3.5.12 System Flue
The Process Manager was seen to create the "ethos" of the
production line by extension of his own personality, the mood and
style of the Manager seeming to determine the mood and style of
the line. The individuals appointed were expected to ensure the
ongoing development and adaptation of the Line within the
constraints imposed by their membership of the next higher level
of recursion. Rs System One Managers of Recursion One, these
Managers represented the identity of the System in both
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Recursions, displaying Recursion Two to Recursion One and vice
versa. They were the key linking element in the multi-level
system.
9.3.6 On Success
The major changes in organisation outlined above were
implemented by the managers in conjunction with a number of
changes in procedures and operating practices. In terms of
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of Cakes in pursuing
its purpose the project was undoubtedly successful. Numbers of
Supervisory staff were reduced by 39, the bulk of these staff
being redeployed within the organisation although there were
some job losses. Production levels were maintained, after a short
term fall, and have subsequently reached higher volumes and
quality and hygiene standards have been raised. Further help was
given to Cakes in the drafting of job specifications which enabled
the negotiation of performance standards and clarified limits of
authority.
Cakes is now a more viable organisation, under control at all
levels with a more contented workforce. The role of the Union has
diminished as purposeful communication between Managers and
staff has increased following the changes. These have served to
give individuals a greater control of their own future through
direct involvement in designing their own freedom. The
reorganisation at Recursion Two is shown in figure 9.11 on the
following page.
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9.3.7 Summary
The Diable System Model played a major role in the understanding
of the organisation of Cakes and in the derivation of solutions to
the perceived problems. The diagnosis and redesign was
accomplished by the writer in conjunction with the staff in a
period of only four weeks. Implementation by the Staff
themselves was accomplished later.
This application did not make great use of contemporary
technology. The skills, language and attributes of the staff at the
time of the intervention would have made this a waste of
resources at the time. Fill new procedures and reports were
developed, within the holistic modelling, to be generated by
people. Nonetheless it was evident that there was a role for
technology in the production planning and control systems and
System Four at Recursion One is now examining how this need can
best be fulfilled. The first step has been taken and that is the
introduction of training for all relevant staff in the use of
Personal Computers. These are envisaged as providing the
technological platform for a distributed information network
when connected through a Local Firea Network with Electronic
Mail or message transmission facilities.
Whilst the Diable System Model made a major contribution to this
project, the importance of the people involved in the process
must not be underestimated. The Viable System Model provided a
diagnostic and design tool, the people of Cakes provided the
information and, perhaps more importantly, made the changes
successful. Thus whilst the diagnostic power and the speed of use
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of the Diable System Model are shown, the importance of the
purposeful behaviour of individuals is emphasised.
9.4 Teaching Uiabilitg - the Diable Classroom 
9.4.1	 Introduction
My experience of the Diable System Model is that reading about it
and talking about it do not adequately demonstrate its power and
utility, nor do these processes fully develop understanding. It was
only when I began to undertake projects using the model that it
became a meaningful approach.
When asked to teach Organisational Design and Behaviour to an
MBR class in Singapore, a course which is concerned with
organisational cybernetics, I considered that there were two
teaching methods available to me. The first was the traditional,
and somewhat sterile, approach of standing in front of a class
lecturing. The second was to engage in an action learning process
with the students using a predominantly case study approach.
The cultural norms of the students suggested the first approach
but, the second seemed more interesting, and on the basis of my
experience of learning about the model, a more effective way to
understand the ideas and concepts of cybernetics. I decided to
use the Diable System Model to structure the organisation of the
class which was to be taught about that same model. Prior to the
commencement of the classroom sessions the students had been
asked to read a course manual, prepared by Jackson(' 5 ) and
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"Diagnosing the System for Organisations," Beer.( 3 ) They were
also invited to introduce examples from their own workplaces. The
class had recently completed a course in Human Resource
Management which had introduced them to the dominant
organisational models, e.g. Machine, Human Relations and
Systems.
The planned classroom sessions extended over twenty hours and
consisted of two major parts. First a worked example was used to
explore the concepts and ideas in a practical way, theory
emerging from the practice as each new area was covered in
much the same style as "Diagnosing the System." The second part
of the course was a case study based on the "Cakes" project
already reported in this chapter. The aim was to introduce the
students to the theory and practice of Organisational Cybernetics,
demonstrating the relevance to them of the approach.
9.4.2 Classroom Organisation
The purpose of the system was:-
"for students to learn about organisational
cybernetics as demonstrated in the Diable
System Model."
The relevant system for pursuing this purpose was considered to
be the "class" which included the students, myself, the teaching
materials and supporting texts and the classroom itself.
325
Traditional classroom organisation would treat the students
collectively as a single System One element, or alternatively as
around 40 individual System One elements. Either of these
approaches leaves the Lecturer facing an uncontrollable mass of
variety which he or she attempts to equal by speaking loudly
enough to be heard throughout the room and making assumptions
about what needs to be taught, i.e. the teacher teaches every
student the same things, regardless of their individual needs.
Illternatiuely, every student is set the same work, and the
lecturer allocates an identical amount of time to each one. Roth of
these approaches are unsatisfactory, the first because it teaches
the student only what the lecturer considers relevant, the second
because the same difficulties are covered several times and some
difficulties are not covered at all.
The "system-in-focus" being the class, its containing system was
decided to be the course programme of thirteen modules, since
this specified what was to be learned during the classroom
sessions and thereby acted as a metasystem to the class. The
contained system initially seemed to be the individual students.
Since the class was divided for private study into study groups I
decided to use these as the viable parts of the viable system,
introducing another level of recursion into the class. This meant
only attempting to contain the variety generated by five groups,
the students working together being able to resolve many
problems with the ideas and concepts autonomously within the
Group, thus distributing the sources of command and control
throughout the classroom.
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9.4.2.1 System One
The System One elements were now the five groups of
approximately eight students. Each of these needed to have its
own local management. It was suggested to the groups that they
should each appoint a chairman to act as group controller and
ensure that time constraints for undertaking each part of the
practical work were met, (the System Three role at that level of
recursion). Similarly, at the outset of each exercise they were to
discuss how to handle the work, ( a System Four, Planning,
function), the Chairman was then to monitor progress against the
plan, alerting the group to any problems and reconvening System
Four as necessary. System Five was represented by group decision
making, essentially a democratic process. The operational
elements were the students themselves and other than the
suggestions made about the metasystemic roles the groups were
left to be self-organising.
9.4.2.2 System Three
The Lecturer adopted the metasystemic role for the viable
classroom. The System Three function consisted of specifying the
tasks to be undertaken and agreeing the time constraints with the
students as well as delivering necessary information for them to
undertake the task. This function also controlled classroom
administration such as the breaks for coffee and meals, and
adherance to start and finish times of the class, constraints
imposed by a higher recursion.
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9.4.2.3 System Two
System Two activity consisted of moving between the groups
providing technical assistance where necessary to help a group
over a particular point, or asking deeper questions when a group
was making good progress. Reminders about time constraints
were also given to help keep the group on course to finish its task
simultaneously with the others.
System Two activity was used deliberately to identify common
problems for which explanations were then given, in the System
Three role, to the entire class. Local problems were handled within
each group.
9.4.2.4 System Three*
The audit activity consisted of visiting each of the groups on a
random basis, listening to the ongoing debates and asking
questions designed to explore the students understanding.
9.4.2.5 System Four
System Four activity involved monitoring the overall classroom
environment and the local press, seeking examples to help
elaborate particular points and bringing in experiences to the
teaching process from beyond the environments of the students,
e.g. other work and writings concerning the Viable System Model,
explanations from wider reading, e.g. other organisational models
etc.
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9.4.2.6 System flue
System Five was represented by the students with the lecturer.
fill policy decisions at this level of recursion were taken on a
consultative basis, the aim being to allow the students to set the
ethos for the classroom, albeit within the constraints imposed
from the next higher level of recursion, e.g. overall time
constraints, course content. Despite these constraints the
students, as fee-paying and voluntary members of the system,
had ultimate control since they could choose not to turn up for the
class, and, without the students there is no need for a lecturer.
The students were also able to determine the final course content
taught at classroom level since their enquiries prompted
explanations.
9.4.2.7 Communication Channels and Control Loops
There were no formal or physical communication channels or
control loops established in this system. The entire set up was
based on human interaction and depended on the ability of myself
as lecturer to observe and hear what was happening and the
ability of the students to establish contact as necessary. Channels
sprang into operation naturally both between the metasystem
Lecturer and System One and between System One elements.
Group members visited other groups and freely exchanged ideas
and information.
The Rlgedonic channel was represented by the level and type of
noise generated in the classroom. Silence was taken to signify
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that there were problems, whilst a high level of hap p y noise
meant everything was OK and a high level of unhaPPy noise
required metasystemic intervention. This approach was found to
be very reliable as an indicator of progress and general
satisfaction. "Happy" noise was indicated by laughter and good
natured debate, whilst "unhappy" noise was indicated by
agressiue tones and outright argument. The operation of this
mechanism depended upon correct discrimination by the receiving
system of the signals. (System Three* audits were used to amplify
variety when signals were confused or unclear).
The Classroom design is shown as figure 9.12 on the next page.
9.4.3 Practical Work
The worked example undertaken was a conceptual modelling of
the organisation of the University of Hull, moving through the
complete methodology for using the Diable System Model as
crystallised by Flood D dackson (5) . Since the students had little
knowledge of the detail of its organisation this exercised their
creativity and prompted considerable questioning which allowed
explanation of the problem areas. They ended by designing an
"idealised University system" according to the various purposes
that they imputed to it as observers. These ranged from "a system
for providing education" to "a system for employing otherwise
unemployable academics" and "a system of education for profit."
The purposes chosen reflected the attitudes and expectations of
the individual groups and were justified in terms of their
perception of the outputs of the System. The second half of the
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course called for them to diagnose and redesign "Cakes". The task
and situation description form Rppendix iii to this thesis.
The results of their diagnosis and redesign were presented in the
form of combative presentation in that one group presented its
findings whilst the other groups and myself used our own findings
as a base for questioning their interpretation. This enabled the
further exploration and elaboration of the areas of difficulty.
To elaborate the different findings in full within this thesis would
be inappropriate. It must suffice to say that each group proposed
redesigns of Cakes which were generally cybernetically sound
according to the purposes they had imputed. The diagrams were
drawn on flip charts and covered the entire walls of the lecture
room. One of these in particular was more than two metres high
and around five metres long. The presentations were recorded on
video and have been preserved.
9.4.4	 Difficult Points
Two major areas of difficulty were experienced by the student
with the Viable System Model which are worth exploring here.
9.4.4.1	 Role articulation
This problem concerns the understanding of roles within an
organisation. The traditional approach to describing organisation
is through an organisation chart. This will show each individual
occupying a single box and conducting the functions allocated. The
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Wable System Model represents an account of how the
organisation actually works, and as such individuals may fulfil a
number of roles within it. This distinction proved to be a great
difficulty for the students until explained to them by undertaking
a modelling of "myself" as a Diable system. This, which is
reminiscent of Pask's "P" and "M" indiuiduals,( 82 ) is shown
diagramatically in figure 9.13.
The explanation is this.
Bt Recursion One, there is only one "me", I am capable of learning,
adaptation and survival within a specified environment, I am
"viable." However, at Recursion Two, I fulfil a number of roles,
which, taken together, comprise the "me" which is seen.
There is as a System One element, a physiological "me" which has
as its operations all normal human activities, eating, breathing,
sleeping etc.. I also have other selves, arbitrarily, the lecturer,
the consultant, the researcher, the husband and the father. I
never cease being any of these things although at any one time I
will be more in one role than any of the others. I co-ordinate
these different aspects of "me" through a system of diaries,
schedules and budgets both of finance and time; this is my System
Two.
My System Three, knows what I am, and controls the allocation of
resources to each element of my System One. I sporadically audit
my activities in each role, System Three*,to ensure that I know
myself and that I am behaving according to my System Three
expectations e.g. I weigh myself and know when I am allocating
too much of "me" to eating, (or too little to exercise!).
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System Four systematically scans my environment, constantly
looking for other things that I could be, searching for
opportunities for me to become nearer to what System Five, i.e.
my soul or my spirit, would like me to be.
I am therefore one person occupying multiple roles within my
"self" as a viable system. I need to know when I am occupying
each role in order that my behaviour can be appropriate to that
role. In the same way each individual within an organisation may
occupy more than one role, it is important that they should
recognise this and behave accordingly. R member of System Three,
behaving as a member of System One, as is so often the case, may
threaten the viability of the whole system.
9.4.4.2	 Diagrammatic representation
Despite Beer's protestations that the Diable System Model is not
an alternative hierarchy, the diagrams used show the metasystem
in a position which appears superior to System One, System Five is
at the top of the page, System One at the bottom. This convention
did lead students to think about the various systems in this way.
It is after all the same presentation as a conventional hierarchy,
i.e. he who sits at the top of the chart has the biggest office and
makes what are considered to be the broader and more far
reaching decisions while he has least knowledge of perceived
reality in the sub-systems.
It was proposed to the students that in order to counter this and
to more accurately depict the role of the metasystem, the
diagram should be turned through 90 0 . This change of
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presentation depicts System One as being at the same level of
importance as the metasystem. System Two continues to be
presented as an anti-oscillation device but acting horizontally
rather than vertically. fl complete inversion of the diagram was
considered to depict the metasystem more accurately in its role
of supporting and enabling the activities of System One. However,
this then presents System One as more important than the
metasystem, whereas the cybernetic and systems argument is
that they are fully interdependent none being more important
than the others, each fulfilling a distinct and necessary function in
achieving viability of the system studied.
It was agreed that the horizontal representation of a single level
of recursion alters the perception of the relative importance of
the five sub-systems which comprise the Viable System Model.
When it is necessary to present more than one level of the model,
System Five will always, at some point, be at the top of a
recursion.
9.4.5 Summary
It is difficult to comment adequately on the success or otherwise
of the approach taken to designing the viable classroom but,
standard evaluation forms completed by the students at the end
of the course showed a favourable response. FM of the Students in
the class passed the subsequent examination, (an unusual
phenomenon), and a large number are now using the Viable
System Model for their MIDI projects. Several are known to have
returned to their own organisations and developed and
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implemented changes using the Diable System Model as their
guide and inspiration, including an application in the armed forces.
The same approach has been taken to subsequent lecture sessions
but the same results have not always been achieved. It is
uncertain to what extent this success is influenced by the
approach and to what extent by the students, each class being
different.
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported three major uses of the Diable System
Model in different circumstances. The first, FinCo, changed the
orientation and organisation of a very traditional and hierarchical
organisation with apparent success on a number of counts,
particularly the use of the Senior Management as an Operations
Research team. The second, Cakes, was a more explicit use as a
diagnostic tool to dissolve organisational problems in a cake
factory. The third, an experiment in classroom organisation for
teaching the Diable System Model, while apparently successful on
the first occasion has since met with varying degrees of success.
The next chapter will draw lessons learnt from the process of
applying the Diable System Model to these various situations and
to the Carco project described in Chapter Eight.
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Chanter Ten 
Theorti in Practice 
This chapter concludes the second part of this thesis which has
reported four experiences of using the Diable System Model. It
consolidates the work that has been done, reviews the
established theory and past practice, and critically reflects on
the case studies to draw out theoretical and practical lessons for
further consideration.
10.1 Introduction 
The first part of this thesis examined the need for a more
adequate model of organisation for contemporary managers. It
suggested that Beer's Viable System Model might offer this and
also traced the development of cybernetics and that model. This
second part has reported a series of applications of the model
and is aimed at understanding how it can be used and may be
made more accessible. This chapter consolidates the work so far
undertaken and critically reflects on the experience of using the
Viable System Model to briefly draw out the theoretical and
practical lessons.
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10.2 Theoru Revisited
The Viable System Model is considered to be an observer
dependent, general model of organisation, applicable to all sizes
and types of organisation and useful in complex-unitary
situations. That is, where there is general agreement about the
purposes to be pursued, or where such agreement is achievable,
and where many elements exist in close interrelationship,
exhibiting purposeful and probabilistic behaviour. The
organisation is considered to be in dynamic interaction with its
enuironment.
The Viable System Model has previously been seen as being
superior to the dominant models through its recognition of the
environment, its concern with adaptation and learning and
because it attempts to provide an account of how the
organisation works (or should work) rather than providing a
device for apportioning blame. It has also been shown that the
Diable System Model provides direct assistance in the diagnosis
of organisational faults and in subsequent redesign. The principal
arguments against the model concern the difficulty of practical
application and its simplistic view from an interpretive
perspective.
Chapter Five comprehensively reviewed the past reported
applications of the model, and demonstrated its use in a variety
of situations, highlighting its perceived limitations. The case
studies reported in this part of the thesis were aimed at
examining the utility, methodology, topography and accessibility
of the Viable System Model as a way of thinking about
organisations. The following sections of this chapter will briefly
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examine the studies reported in Chapters 6 - 9, to highlight the
apparent strengths and weaknesses of the approach and the
consequences for the model.
18.3 Carta 
The application of the Diable System Model to Carco was difficult,
inhibited by two major factors. Firstly the lack of adequate
management knowledge by the participants in the process.
Secondly, the need to translate the cybernetic principles and
ideas into language accessible to them. ficcordingly, a non-
technological, people-oriented approach was deliberately taken
to the application. This seemed the most appropriate format in a
small family business and provided the opportunity to examine
the theoretical criticism that the DSM underplays the purposeful
role of individuals in an organisation. In this case the impact of
purposeful behaviour, or lack of it, is considered to be a key
issue in the outcome of the process.
10.3.1	 Strengths
The application undoubtedly had benefits for Carco in a number
of areas. Firstly, it enabled a composite view to be taken of the
potential consequences of each decision for the whole business,
a view not previously available. Secondly, it highlighted
inefficient or loss-sustaining areas of the business, bringing
these sharply into focus and enabling them to be addressed
within the framework of the needs of the organisation as a
whole. Thirdly, the importance of effective generation and
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distribution of meaningful information was recognised and
procedures were installed to achieve this. Each of the Managers
benefited, being able to make better informed decisions than
previously. Fourthly, the impacts of the behaviour of the
Franchisor, Hireco and Oi!co were recognised for the first time
and while Hireco was subsequently excluded by the closure of
the Car Hire operation, the representatives of the Franchisor and
OiIco were brought into the metasystem of Carco. This inhibited
their previous corruption of the system since their expectations
became filtered by the metasystem and were modified to meet
the expectations and capabilities of Carco as a whole before
being transmitted to the relevant System One element. These
representatives were treated, as far as possible, as being a part
of Carco, rather than as separate from it. Fifthly, the application
led to more open communication between the Senior
Management of Carco and the Managers of the System One
elements, not only through formal reports but through direct
discussion that enabled both semantic and syntactic meanings to
be conveyed. Sixthly, the importance of understanding and
discriminating roles within the organisation was emphasised,
such that the participants came to realise, in particular, the need
to separate their System One selves from their metasystem
selves and behave accordingly. Finally, the application of the
Uiable System Model emphasised the importance of the policy
making function. It showed clearly how the lack of purposeful
behaviour by the Chairman/MD, who personified System Hue
throughout the study, inhibited the changes necessary for the
survival of Carco.
The increase in communication enabled the development of a
stronger sense of common purpose and shared goals throughout
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Carco. The clarification of roles, the definition of limits of
authority for each of the Managers, and the development of
clearer guidelines and policies for the operation of the business,
far from inhibiting the freedom of the Managers was actually
considered, by most, to have increased it. Prior to the
intervention the lack of rules and policies had constrained the
behaviour of most Managers who had felt obliged to refer even
minor operating decisions. Other Managers had chosen to subvert
the purposes of Carco to their own ends. These were excluded
from the revised organisation, their behaviour being
unacceptable within the agreed common purpose. The remaining
Managers were able to absorb more variety at the lower
organisational leuel as they were now aware of the expectations
and limitations of the wider system to which they belonged. The
provision of policies and rules, created with their assistance, is
considered to have extended the boundaries of their perceived
freedom.
10.3.2 Weaknesses
although the established methodology for using the Diable
System Model is precise in advising the user what should be
clone, it says nothing about how it should be done. This should
probably be seen as a weakness of the methodology rather than
of the model itself.
No help was provided by the model in achieving the recognition
of the purpose of the organisation, nor in communicating that to
the participants in the system. This was undertaken by a process
of discussion and debate with the participants, the writer acting
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as a guide to this part of the process. The chosen purpose was
theirs, not mine, although my involvement inevitably affected
the outcome of the discussions. The identification of purpose is
perhaps a function which is beyond the capabilities of the Viable
System Model itself and of the established methodology,
requiring the adoption of some other approach. It can, however,
prove useful in the event of a disagreement about purpose, to
undertake a number of modellings for different assumed
purposes and allow the participants to assess their implications.
The Viable System Model has a limitation in use at the fine detail
level of examination. It does not help with the specification of
individual tasks and jobs, a facility that can be obtained within
the "machine" model of organisation, particularly in the use of
work measurement techniques. Rt that level of analysis the
approaches should perhaps be considered as complementary and
not alternative.
While, in the case of Carco, the intervention was consciously
structured to take account of, and maximise, the purposeful role
of the people in the organisation, this is not a requirement of the
methodology, nor is it explicit in the model itself. The lack of
purposeful behaviour by the Chairman/MD was a major factor in
the outcome of the intervention and the model provided no
significant help in countering this. It was useful in explaining to
him the need for action and the justification for proposals made.
It could not however make any decision for him.
The language of cybernetics, and that of the [liable System
Model, can be considered as reducing its accessibility to
managers. The model, its concepts and principles are expressed
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in the language of management scientists, and, while this
language has a precision of meaning and descriptive power for
us, it merely serves to obscure the meaning for those unfamiliar
with it. It was therefore necessary to undertake much of the
work in the language of the system studied and not that of the
model. It is inevitable that there was a compromise in this case
between a clean, technical application of the model and the
practical nature of the work in that environment. Whilst there
may be some loss of potential utility through this approach,
there still remain the strengths outlined above.
18.3.3 Consequences for the Model
18.3.3.1	 Utility
The application has shown that the Viable System Model can be
used in a non-technological manner, taking account of the
purposeful behaviour of individuals, and where there is a narrow
base of management knowledge. The difficulty of application,
often considered to arise from resistance to change provoked
within the organisation, was overcome in three ways. Firstly, by
expressing the model in the language of the system studied,
secondly by close involvement of the people affected by the
application in both the identification and resolution of
difficulties, thirdly by helping them to explore and comprehend
the benefits of this approach. It is undoubtedly the case that the
application was helped by the clear desire of the majority of
participants to improve a situation which threatened their
livelihood and security at a time of rising unemployment and of
high inflation in the wider environment. The difficulty of
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application can, perhaps, be overcome by this people-oriented
approach.
18.3.3.2	 Ideology
The principal ideological concern with the Diable System Model is
the perceived danger of autocratic abuse and control over
individual freedom. Section 10.3.1 showed how freedom was
perceived to have increased at Carco as a result of the creation
of rules and policies in conjunction with the people affected.
These attempted to limit behaviour to actions supportive of the
systems purpose. Whilst this shows that the Diable System Model
need not be used in an autocratic way it does not mean that the
cybernetic tools cannot be used that way.
The Diable System Model, though, is considered to be useful
where there is, or is achievable, a general agreement amongst
the stakeholders about the purpose of the system. If this is not
present, then the model cannot be useful since modelling
subsequent to the definition of purpose depends upon that
agreement. fin organisation designed in accordance with the
principles of the Diable System Model, cannot itself be
autocratic. If the requirement for the minimum degree of control
over individual freedom necessary to maintain systemic cohesion
is not met, then the system is not designed to meet the criteria
of viability. Maintenance of cohesion in these circumstances can
only be achieved by "policing" the system and punishing
transgressions. This could be expected to lead to subversion of
the system by stakeholders perceiving different purposes, thus
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reducing efficiency and effectiveness in direct contradiction of
the aims of the model.
18.3.3.3 Theory
While the Diable System Model can be held to give only a partial
view of an organisation, the Carco study showed how the
attributes of the participants in the study were taken into
account and how they contributed to the development of the
interventions. Fl pure application of the model could, in theory,
ignore these aspects but this is not possible at the practical
level; they must be acknowledged and worked with. Rn example
has already been given in the behaviour of the Chairman/MD. The
model provided no help in resolving the difficulty which was,
eventually, overcome by the intervention of external agencies
and decisions being forced upon him.
10.3.3.4 Methodology
The work so far undertaken suggests a need for further
refinement of the methodology of using the Viable System Model
to more accurately reflect its principles. Firstly, using the model
perhaps needs to be considered as an interactive process of
learning to manage differently, through learning and
experimentation rather than historical precedent. Secondly, the
importance of the stakeholders within the system needs to be
emphasised, both in terms of their purposeful behaviour, and, in
their contribution to the definition of the purpose of the system.
Finally, to increase effective communication, perhaps the model
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should be expressed in the language of the subject system
rather than in its own terms.
10.4 Finco
The application of the Diable System Model at Finco was implicit
rather than explicit, the principles and concepts were used and
discussed, but the model was never fully elaborated to the
participants. This approach was taken to avoid alienating the
participants and enabled the model to be used as a way of
"thinking about organisation." This way of thinking was applied
both to the management of the project and to the redesign of
the organisation itself. Rs suggested in section 10.3.3.4, this was
a process of learning to manage differently. Established
boundaries and norms of behaviour were modified in heuristic
progress towards the goal of becoming a financial institution
meeting the needs of all of its stakeholders, who were
considered to be the customers, staff and owners of the
organisation. Os with Carco, the organisation and the project
were regarded by me as belonging to the participants. It was
their organisation, and, for any long term benefit to be felt, they
had to own the reorganisation as well. This emphasises again the
impact of the purposeful behaviour of people, both in
determining how the system functions and in redesigning it to
function differently.
The language used was predominantly that of Finco. Cybernetic
language was translated into those terms as far as possible.
Technological development was inhibited by the constraints of
belonging to Finco as a whole which centrally determined the
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availability and content of many reports, and prevented the
development of some local initiatives. The way in which reports
were used and interpreted was not constrained in this way and
advantage was taken of this aspect.
111.4.1	 Strengths
Key changes were seen in the understanding of the organisation,
not as a network of offices with undifferentiated customers
which was the traditional view, but as an organisation
structured to match the needs of its customers which used those
offices as its physical manifestation. This led to the
redevelopment of the organisation into the four operating
elements defined at Recursion One.
Major benefits were obtained in challenging the bureaucracy of
the organisation from the ideas of purposeful and supportive
activity. Purposeful behaviour was seen as that which fulfilled
the given purposes of the organisation, supportive being that
which enabled the purposeful activity to be carried out. These
very different attributes had previously been closely intertwined
throughout the organisation, with supposedly supportive activity
becoming dominant at the higher organisational levels.
Questioning function, nature and necessity of much of the control
activity played a major part in freeing people to engage in
productive behaviour which appears to have been responsible to
some degree for the increase in profit revealed at the end of the
period after the changes. El number of activities ceased and
others were allocated lower priority than had been the case. This
experience also counters the criticism that use of the Viable
348
System Model leads to autocratic, rigid, institutionalised change
after application.
The use of the Senior Management team as an "operations
research" group was of particular benefit. Firstly, their
knowledge of the organisation, its people, systems and
procedures significantly enriched the development process,
increasing the capacity to absorb variety by amplifying the
variety of the project model. Secondly, since they were fully
involved in the derivation of the outcomes, they were fully
committed to their successful implementation. Thirdly, their
direct involvement enhanced their understanding of the need for
an effective metasystem and the different roles which they each
needed to fulfil.
At Recursion Two, where the self-organising matrix was
developed, control activity was almost abolished. The autonomy
granted to each individual to be responsible for the conduct of
his or her duties was supported by audit activity and the
creation of the mentoring system that enabled emergent
problems to be addressed. Each of these staff seemed to gain
greater satisfaction from this maximisation of autonomy, being
trusted rather than closely controlled. The satisfactory operation
of the system was allowed to depend on their co-operation and
interaction rather than on formal procedures.
This approach highlighted a number of inadequacies in the
original organisation design; a mismatch between the skills and
operational capabilities of the Managers and the needs of the
customers; a lack of any effective metasystem; poor
communication; the internal focus, and, a level of oscillation
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arising from competition for customers occurring between
offices. Once identified these areas were not difficult to address
and resolve.
18.4.2 Weaknesses
The implicit rather than explicit use of the Viable System Model
inevitably reduced the level of understanding which the
participants in the project obtained. Nonetheless the underlying
logic of the model was used and conclusions derived from it were
generally accepted.
Resistance was met from certain individuals who saw that their
perceived status within the organisation would fall as a result of
the reorganisation, either through a reduction in direct power or
through changes in the relative importance of roles. The model
provided no assistance in overcoming these difficulties which
were addressed on an individual basis by the writer with varying
degrees of success. The political nature of these difficulties and
the nature of the organisation as a whole meant that some
compromises were necessary. These were fortunately few, and,
if a proposed compromise threatened the success of the project,
negotiations continued until it could be brought within the
desired framework. No decisions or changes were imposed,
albeit some of the agreements were achieved only reluctantly.
R particular example of this is the Manager, Large Corporate. The
original organisation chart showed this individual as
hierarchically superior to all but the Chief Manager. He saw
himself as the "number two" for the Group, a position which he
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had occupied for some years. The reorganisation, derived from
modelling according to the Viable System Model, revised this
individual's role such that he became "number one" for the large
corporate element. While in the absence of the Chief Manager he
would, as the next most senior officer, be expected to deputise,
his prime role was the management of his own unit. The
managers of the other System One elements were expected to
manage without his help. On the revised organisation chart, all
System One Managers were shown as being at the same
hierarchical level. This reflected the way the group was now
organised rather than the grades and seniority of individuals
within it. This difficulty of perceived status was eventually
overcome through both re-examining with him the benefits of
the changes in helping him to achieve his objectives and
reassurance of the acknowledgement of his seniority.
This is again an aspect of organisation which the Uiable System
Model and established methodology do not address, the logic and
rationality of the model cannot overcome illogical forms of
behaviour based on human desires and expectations.
10.4.3 Consequences for the model
10.4.3.1 Utility
This application has again shown how successful use of the
Viable System Model does not depend upon the application of
technology. The project emphasised the purposeful behaviour of
the individuals, explicitly recognised that it was their system and
used the cybernetic concepts to inform their decision making,
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This approach is considered to have substantially helped to
overcome the difficulties of using the model.
The application demonstrates the use of the model as a guide to
managing the process of change, interlocking the "project
system," which needed to be viable itself, with the "subject
system" which was seeking viability. The "subject system" was
the Group, the "project system" the activities aimed at
reorganising the group, these systems had some separate
members and some common members. The participants learned
that they could utilise their skills to reorganise Finco, and, by
structured reflection on the outcomes of their decisions, learned
different forms of behaviour; making different decisions, and
making decisions differently.
10.4.3.2	 Ideology
The concern with potential autocratic abuse arising through
application of the tHable System Model has already been raised.
This people-oriented application has again shown how freedom
can also be created. Prior to the project the Staff at Finco were
constrained in their behaviour by the established norms, values
and expectations of the organisation. They had been taught that
they had no power to change the way the organisation worked
and that Head Office had all the solutions. This did not stop them
believing that there were faults. The project provided the
opportunity for them to address their concerns while having the
support of an expert who was able both to guide them through
the process, and, to some degree, protect them from external
interference, this created the freedom for them to learn.
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The greatest legacy of the project is perhaps not the
organisational changes which were made as they will become
less relevant through the passage of time and as the
environment of Finco itself changes. The real legacy is that those
individuals have learnt that they can, to some degree, change
the organisation, that they have the skill and can grasp the
opportunity.
1B.4.3.3 Theory
The application of the Viable System Model highlights the impact
of the behaviour of individuals on the process of intervention.
The project worked in the way that it did because of the
personal approach of the Regional Manager, his willingness to
change and his desire to involve the staff in the process. Rs with
Carco, the influence of this key individual on the process cannot
be overstated, although the attributes of the individuals could
not have been less alike. Had he been instructed to change,
rather than being a keen volunteer, the process and the outcome
would surely have been different.
1L4.3.4 Methodology
This study again emphasises the need for the methodology to be
further developed. Firstly, the participants in the system need to
be explicitly incorporated in the process. Secondly, although the
purpose of the system was given in this case, a mechanism
needs to be established whereby it can be effectively shared and
agreed. Finally, the project shows that the use of the model for
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problem solving intervention is perhaps not sufficient since that
only enables an immediate change. The model and methodology
need to become an embedded way of thinking about the
organisation so that the process of learning and adaptation
becomes an integral part of the process of management.
10.5 Cakes 
The explicit use of the Viable System Model at Cakes was
intended to increase the viability of the organisation both
financially and organisationally after a considerable period of
neglect by its owners. The purpose of Cakes was given in this
case by its owners and this purpose was accepted by those
participating in the project. The project was undertaken through
a series of purposeful conversations with the participants,
singly, in groups and in both formal and informal settings. The
aim of the conversations was to draw out from the participants
their descriptions of the then prevailing situation. These
descriptions, which conveyed differing perceptions of the
organisation's reality, were compared with the ideal organisation
proposed by the Viable System Model, the redesign being the
product of the conversation. This may be seen as a means of
enabling the participant, whose view must be subjective, to be
an observer of his or her own situation.
The process was inhibited to some degree by the language of the
model, which had to be explained in that of Cake's staff. fl
further limitation of the study was the short time scale available
for achievement of an outcome which would be seen as
productive by the Company. The model was helpful in this regard,
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its speed and economy of use being suited to a situation calling
for a fast response. R final difficulty was the inevitability of
some job losses at Cakes as one outcome of the process, a factor
of which all parties were aware at the outset. This did cause
some difficulties with communication and participation although
these were largely overcome.
10.5.1	 Strengths
The application showed considerable benefit for Cakes. The
efficiency and effectiveness of the factory were improved,
purposeful communication increased, and subsequently the
industrial relations climate has been calmer overall. The
organisation changes and job losses caused some initial
disharmony but the Management made clear its intention to
maintain and develop the Factory and to preserve employment
for the majority in the longer term. This intention had been in
doubt for some time prior to the intervention and the
uncertainty had been a factor in the previously militant attitude
of the Union whose members were involved in the process.
The holistic modelling of Cakes provided, possibly for the first
time, an understanding of the interrelationship of its various
units. This systemic view enabled production to be seen, not as a
series of discrete and separate activities to be managed
separately, but, as a continuous process which needed to be
managed as a whole. Further benefit was gained from the
development in understanding of the roles both of individuals
within the organisation and of the supporting departments.
People were enabled to understand the contribution which they
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made to the organisation and to its success or failure, something
which had not previously been possible. The understanding of the
roles of the supporting departments, outlined in the normative
statement of Management Philosophy, had considerable benefits.
Firstly, it served to focus the attention of the staff in these
areas on their purpose in the organisation, raising awareness
that, while all units were interdependent, if the purpose of the
system could not be fulfilled, then it would not survive, and it
was their task to enable purposeful activity. Secondly, it enabled
meaningful discussion of the costs of those departments in
terms of the service standards that needed to be provided to the
operational elements and other sub-systems. Finally, it should
enable the development of a measurement procedure for
monitoring their performance in terms of the services provided.
This suggests that a meaningful bargain may be achieved for the
resources absorbed by these areas.
The normative statement of Management Philosophy was
beneficial in helping to establish a new ethos for Cakes. The
management publicly described for the first time their view of
how they intended to manage the factory, not exposing
themselves to a democratic process, but certainly opening
themselves to accusations of bad faith, and probably Union
pressure if they failed to work according to their declaration.
Finally, the speed of application of the model is stressed. The
project was undertaken, from initial visit to reported proposals
in four weeks, and the only external agent involved was the
writer. fill 93 staff receiving Supervisory or Management pay
scales were involved in the intervention to varying degrees.
Some were not interested, others became very actively involved,
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but all views were sought and taken into account although not
all suggestions could be included in the redesign.
10.5.2 Weaknesses
The principal weakness revealed in the Viable System Model
through this intervention was its inability to provide help with
the human aspects.
The Cakes intervention required that commercial interest in
reduced costs outweighed human interest in preserving
employment. Although after the intervention the selection of
certain staff for redundancy was undertaken in a humane way,
seeking for volunteers and those who had expressed a desire to
leave, this did not help during the process to reduce uncertainty
and concern that a number of staff felt about their future
livelihood. The Viable System Model, and its methodology, provide
no help with this very personal aspect of intervention.
Similarly, the attitudes of certain individuals whose comfortable
niches within the organisation were threatened by the
intervention, could not be changed through the model. No change
was achieved with some staff, while others, after considerable
debate, became actively involved in the process.
This intervention shows again the need for the behaviour of
individuals to be taken into explicit account in the methodology
for using the Viable System Model. A need for the development of
shared purpose is also suggested by this study. Although some
people were not contributing to the stated purpose of the
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organisation, they were, apparently, personally fulfilled by the
pursuit of a different purpose within the system being studied.
Its redesign led either to their future unemployment, or to
imposed change of their purpose to fit within that of Cakes as a
whole, causing discomfort and dismay. This was not a democratic
context, the individuals concerned could not change the purpose
of the system, they either had to conform or leave. This imposed
choice, while perhaps justifiable from a meta-level that can
observe and adhere to the overall needs of the system, cannot
be adequately justified at the level concerned. Fin explanation to
one individual that the continuation of his behaviour threatens
the cohesion or possibly survival of the system as a whole may
not be accepted unless it can be demonstrated from his or her
perspective on the organisation.
16.5.3 Consequences for the Model
18.5.3.1	 Utility
This application has demonstrated the speed of application of the
Diable System Model in diagnosing and redesigning an
organisation. This was achieved through the inherent economy of
a design that is identical for every recursion, and, since it
attempts to provide an account of how the organisation works,
quickly reveals flaws in the present situation. The changes then
necessary are largely self-evident.
The difficulty of application, highlighted as a weakness of the
model, while largely overcome in this case, was highlighted by
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the attitudes of some of those affected. This perhaps shows that
what may be seen by one person as logical and commercial
necessity, may easily be perceived by another as autocratic
abuse.
10.5.3.2 Ideology
This point has been introduced in the last part of 10.5.3.1 above.
If the stated purpose of a system does not have the agreement
of all parties affected by changes to the system then, what one
observer defines as necessary for survival or cohesion, another
may perceive as autocratic abuse.
10.5.3.3 Theory
This intervention shows again how the purposeful behaviour of
individuals must be taken into account in an intervention, and
the necessity for purpose to be agreed by all participants. While
this may be achievable in a fully democratic context, I suggest it
will always remain an unachievable ideal in a commercial
organisation where different purposes are imputed by different
observers. In this context the purpose of the organisation may
be an end in itself for some, while it is a means to an end for
others.
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18.5.3.4 Methodology
This application again shows the need for further development of
the methodology. It suggests that a more detailed and explicit
examination of the supportive activity of metasystem
constituents should be undertaken. This should not focus simply
on how System One is controlled and monitored and the nature of
the relationship between System Three and System One. It should
also consider how well System Three fulfils its supportive role to
System One's purposeful activity, and how responsibility and
accountability are exercised for the resources which System
Three absorbs at that level of recursion. This may have two
principal benefits.
Firstly, this process of self-examination can serve to increase
variety absorption at the lower level of recursion, relieving the
metasystem of further work. Secondly, since the intervention
should preferably be carried out at the highest practical level of
recursion - the Corporate level in a commercial situation - this
may be the sole opportunity for such an examination.
If the five sub-systems in a Viable System are considered to be
mutually interdependent, none being "more equal than the
others," and System One is to be held accountable to the
metasystem for the resources that it employs, then the
metasystem should be able to demonstrate to System One that it
only utilises such resources as are necessary to ensure
continuation of the System whose identity System Five
represents to the wider system. 11 requirement such as this
would also help to safeguard the system against the dangers of
autocratic abuse and pathologically autopoietic behaviour.
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The inclusion of these steps in the intervention process would
call for a more detailed elaboration of the resource and
accountability channels at the metaleuel than is in general
currently reported.
18.6 Teaching Wahllitu 
This explicit use of the Diable System Model to enable learning
about it may be considered as similar to the approach adopted at
Finco, where the process of using the model to redesign the
organisation incorporated cybernetic processes aimed at
reflecting on the results achieved and so enabling further
learning and adaptation to take place. This was considered to
have embedded the model in the organisation. The classroom
situation had no other purpose than to teach the students about
the model with the intention of changing their way of thinking
about organisation.
18.6.1	 Strengths
The study shows firstly, how the understanding of organisational
cybernetics can be consciously used to structure a situation such
that students may learn for themselves and from each other, a
process of self-learning and enquiry within a systematic process
of teaching and guided by the established methodology for using
the Diable System Model. Secondly, the variety reduction
inherent in a team or group situation can be demonstrated,
provided the group is prepared to organise itself to achieve its
given objective. Thirdly, the study shows how the model may be
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used in a conceptual, as opposed to a formal, organisation,
without technology and relying solely on human interaction and
communication. Finally, the study shows how, through the
process of debate and discussion, a fuller meaning and
understanding can be gained by all involved, conditional upon a
willingness to listen and learn on the part of the students.
10.6.2 Weaknesses
The study highlighted weaknesses, not perhaps of the Viable
System Model itself but in its methodology and presentation.
Firstly, unlike the machine model of organisation, the Diable
System Model recognises that individuals may fulfil more than
one role, and in more than one function within an organisation.
This is not explicitly considered in the methodology. Secondly, the
diagrammatic representation with System Five shown at the top
of the chart conveys an impression to the student that is
difficult to correct through a written description. This may be
responsible, in part, for the accusation that the Diable System
Model is an alternative hierarchy. Rlthough it may be interpreted
in this way, such an interpretation inevitably loses some of the
apparent intentions of Stafford Beer.
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10.6.3 Consequences for the Model
10.6.3.1
	 Utility
This case showed how the [liable System Model could be
deliberately used in practice to create freedom for the students.
They shared the purpose of the system, and perhaps since the
only apparent loser of power was the writer, no resistance was
met in the particular case to that approach to classroom
organisation.
10.6.3.2	 Ideology
It can be considered that the style of classroom organisation
freed the students from potential autocratic abuse. Rather than
being compelled by the custom of the classroom to sit and listen
collectively to lectures they were largely freed to interact and
learn individually, from and through each other, as well as from
me.
10.6.3.3 Theory
This application emphasised the purposeful behaviour of the
participants, whilst installing and maintaining a viable
organisation structure. The system was dependent on the human
qualities of the students, in particular their ability to interact
harmoniously with each other.
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18.6.3.4 Methodology
This study has demonstrated the need for change and further
development of the methodology for using the model. Firstly, the
examination of the roles of individuals needs to be made explicit,
both as a means of accounting for their purposeful behaviour,
and, to ensure that the roles are fully articulated in any redesign
of tasks and in the individuals understanding of them. Some of
the benefit of the approach will be lost if participants in a study
remain convinced that they can not fulfil more than one role in
any organisation. Secondly the diagrammatic representation of
the model should be changed so that the system-in-focus is
drawn horizontally rather than uertically. This is seen as
necessary to change the perception of the observer.
10.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the principal lessons learned from the
four case studies and identified a number of common themes for
further consideration. These will be further developed and
elaborated in the next Chapter which will also reconsider the
cases for and against the Viable System Model.
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Chapter Eleuen 
Critical Reflections 
This chapter uses a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats) approach to provide a critical framework to review
the various organisational models. The Diable System Model is
compared with the mainstream models and its greater utility
demonstrated. The second part of the chapter reflects on the
lessons learned, emphasising the contribution to knowledge. The
section will consider the theory, utility, ideology and
methodology of the model, proposing additions and adaptations
to the methodology and ways in which the model can be made
more accessible.
"One can take a perfect photograph of anything
from a dustbin to a daisy, but the subject is
infinitely more important than the photographic
technique. "(83)
11.1 Introduction 
The initial argument of this thesis is that the increasing
complexity and rate of change of the world demand a richer,
more adequate organisational model than those which are
currently dominant. It is proposed that the Diable System view is
more adequate than the machine and organic views represented
respectively by the Traditional or Rational Model, the Human
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Relations Model and the Systems Model. The next section will
compare the three models.
1E2 Comparison of the Models 
11.2.1	 Strengths
The machine view of organisation has strength in the systematic
analysis of tasks. Practical application of the approach has over
a significant period yielded benefit in the efficiency and
effectiveness of many types of organisation. The view also
assists in the activity of organisation, creating structures for
their control and management. It is of particular benefit when an `7
organisation needs to be precise or exact in operation, i.e. those
where the absence of precise rules may generate failure or
danger to mankind.
The simplicity of the model makes it easily accessible as a tool
for all managers who, unfortunately but necessarily, work with
an abstraction from the full richness of the originator's
understanding. One example of this is the way that Fayol's
./
principle of centralisation, which he saw as being a question of
continuously varying proportion - an appropriate balance, has
frequently been understood as a call for full centralisation.
The view of the organisation as organic is represented by the
Human Relations and Systems view. The first of these has as its
greatest strength the recognition of the importance of the
human element in organisations. It recognises that people are
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individuals with different needs and aspirations, although it is
often forgotten that these may be met by activity outside the
workplace.
The Systems view acknowledges that organisations are
composed of a number of interrelated parts, and interact with
the environment in which they are contained. The holistic
approach requires that all aspects of the system of interest be
taken into account by management, a major advance over the
models already mentioned.
The Diable System Model, represents the neurocybernetic or
brain view of organisation. It shares with the systems view the
holistic approach to organisation and its recognition of
interaction with the environment. Similarly, the model shares
with the machine view the ability to systematically derive order
from chaos, although its systemic nature ensures that, unlike the
machine model, the whole organisation is kept in view. The Viable
System Model, with the Human Relations model, also enables the
purposeful behaviour of individuals to be taken into
consideration. The model encourages dynamic behaviour by the
system studied, enabling processes to be developed for learning
and adaptation. Rs a diagnostic tool, the Viable System Model
offers precise help with the diagnosis and rectification of
organisational faults whilst assisting with the design of
organisation structure and enabling measurement of the success
of changes made.
The general applicability of the Diable System Model has been
demonstrated through the literature review in Chapter Five and
emphasised by the organisation case studies reported in
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Chapters Eight and Nine. Following these studies a number of
points can be added to the strengths of the model. These will be
further elaborated in the second part of this chapter.
Firstly, the concepts of purposeful and enabling activity, coupled
to performance measurement and resource accountability for
enabling functions may serve to break down bureaucracy in an
organisation. Rctiuity which is becoming pathologically
autopoietic can be recognised and supporting departments can
be refocused on the role which the survival of the system
demands of them.
Secondly, the model can provide a guide to the development of
self regulating organisations in which hierarchical control may be
replaced by self control. This has been seen to have both human
and financial benefits.
Thirdly, the Viable System Model enables the explanation and
articulation of the number of roles played within an organisation
by a single individual. This may be compared with the machine
view which places each individual within a single box on an
organisation chart and treats that position as describing his
function and role in the organisation.
Fourthly, the model can be used in conjunction with other
frameworks of thought. Flood D Jackson( 5 ) have provided a
meta-methodology, Total Systems Intervention which enables
different views of the characteristics of an organisation to be
taken in a complementary manner, fit a subordinate level, once
an organisation has been diagnosed through the Diable System
Model, there remains a role for activities such as work
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measurement, procedure review, ergonomics and other areas of
management science. Used within the context of a holistic
approach to problem solving, with an agreed organisational
purpose, the value of these approaches may be enhanced. The
enhancement arises since the detailed redesign using, say
procedure review, can be undertaken in a manner which fits
within the overall design of the organisation rather than in an
isolated way. This should serve to avoid the ever more efficient
pursuit of ends which are either not purposeful or are misguided.
Finally, the utility of the model as a guide for the process of
managing, rather than simply as an abstract tool has been
shown.
11.2.2 Weaknesses 
The weaknesses of the machine view stem, in part, from the
assumptions underpinning it outlined in section 2.3.5 (Page 26).
The machine view may be characterised as leading to the
development of organisations which are, static, bureaucratic,
reductionist, isolationist, hierarchical and dehumanising. These
attributes may be regarded as unlikely to be of assistance to
contemporary managers faced with increasing organisational
complexity and environmental turbulence. Finally as a model for
Managers, while the machine view may enable the identification
of problems it offers little specific help with their resolution.
The weaknesses of the Human Relations view are, the common
assumption that people's needs must be met at work, that it
does not allow for the supremacy of the needs of the
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organisation over those of its people, and it provides no help
with the design and structure of organisations and their
environmental interactions.
The Systems view accepts survival as the primary goal of the
organisation, effectively ignoring the goal oriented activity of
the human actors. It also does not recognise the contribution of
these people to the adaptations and changes of the system.
Finally, no measurement for cohesion or achievement of goals
exists and solutions to problems are vague and untested.
The weaknesses of the neurocybernetic or brain view of
organisation were elaborated in Chapter Five as being its
simplistic view from an interpretive perspective, the
consideration that it underplays the purposeful role of
individuals, the danger of autocratic abuse and the difficulty of
practical application. These weaknesses will now be reviewed.
Firstly, it can be seen from the Carco, Finco and Cakes
applications that the model is easier to apply in practice when
the intervention is conducted, as far as possible, in the language
of the system studied, and, when the stakeholders in the
enterprise are directly involved in the development of solutions
to the perceived problems. This development of their
understanding reduces resistance to the changes derived and
seems to promote a sense of ownership of the changes amongst
those stakeholders. This in turn facilitates implementation of
those changes.
Secondly, since this view must be considered as only one possible
way of looking at organisations then it will inevitably be either
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simplistic or complexifying from other perspectives, e.g. the
machine view would see the Viable System Model as too
complex. It can be argued, though, that the richness of the model
is dependent upon the extent of its elaboration in any particular
case. It has already been suggested that a number of different
modellings of any system may be undertaken in order to derive a
most useful chain of systems with which to work. Similarly, a
number of modellings of the system-in--focus may be
undertaken, each from a different perspective on the purpose of
the system and to model different aspects of it. For example,
any one manufacturing organisation could be modelled as a
production system, a quality system, or an employment system,
or indeed as all three. The choice is a function of the observer,
the observed, and, the purpose of study.
Thirdly, the purposeful behaviour of individuals was deliberately -/
taken into account in the studies undertaken. The contribution
which this made to developing and implementing change in the
organisations cannot be overstated but the problem of underplay
lies not with the model, which provides an account of how the
organisation works, but with the methodology for its use. The
second part of this chapter will propose a revision to the
established methodology to try to take account of this aspect.
Finally, the perceived danger of autocratic abuse can now be
denied. It is undoubtedly true that the cybernetic insight to
communication and control in organisations, taken together with
the cybernetic tools, may be applied in an autocratic manner,
and, this was acknowledged by Wiener( 16 Pb 38 ) at the birth of
the science. However, this is untrue in a rigorous application of
the Viable System Model. Such an application requires adherence
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to both its practice and its principles. Rn autocratic use would
not be an application of the model but of a corruption of it. It
would not adhere to the principles since it would require greater
constraint on the operational elements than necessary to
maintain cohesion and System Five would not share its identity
with System One, a fundamental requirement. The adaptations to
the methodology proposed later in the chapter aim to minimise
this risk of corruption.
11.2.3 Opportunities and Threats 
The machine view of organisation maintains its position of
enabling improvements in the performance of parts of
organisations. However, the reductionist view which it takes, in
conjunction with the flaws in its underlying assumptions limits
its utility. While it can continue to contribute to the economic
efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of many
organisations it will equally serve to ensure that the extensive
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures necessary to maintain
such organisations are continued. These structures may be
considered to absorb resources of all kinds which could be put to
more effective use in the service of mankind.
Rdherence to the machine view inhibits the ability to consider,
from a societary perspective, the roles and functioning of both
private and public institutions. Their apparent purpose having
been given at the outset, they will continue to fail in their
objectives since they have no mechanism for recognising failure
and no means of adaptation. Rn example of this could be the
Social Security system in the UK. The Government, through the
372
Department of Social Security, seems to be pursuing more
efficient means of delivering funds to those in need of support,
rather than trying to find ways of reducing the number of those
in such need. This approach ensures that fundamental problems
will never be addressed. The reductionist approach ensures that
the purpose of the whole system can not be questioned or
explored.
The organic view of organisation, represented by the Human
Relations and Systems models, can enable the interaction of
parts, and of the organisation with the environment to be
considered. However, neither provides any substantial guidance
on developing solutions, and the predominant concern in the
Human Relations model with the needs and desires of individuals
ignores the needs and desires of organisations, or society as a
whole. The development of this model has undoubtedly been an
emancipatory phenomenon, encouraging the recognition of
individual capabilities and expectations. However, the respect
that the model suggests we should have for any individuals
rights must be accompanied by his or her responsibility to accept
ours, and to act accordingly. There are no rights without
responsibility, either for ourselves or for others.
The models provide no help with the redesign of organisations,
and so offer nothing specific towards the problem of
organisation outlined in Chapter One. That is not to say that the
models are useless. They offer specific guidance on the
treatment of humans and their contribution to the organisation.
This contribution needs to be incorporated as part of the
methodology for any model which is to serve human and
technical interests.
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The neurocybernetic, or brain view of organisation appears to
offer a major opportunity through the Viable System Model.
Since the model has been developed and applied in numerous
organisations over twenty five years, it offers not simply a
framework for criticising existing organisation but a tested
alternative. Its limitations in use are known, and the benefits of
its application can be reviewed. The model can be used with
considerable confidence. It provides the opportunity to re-
examine the functioning of organisations with a view to
minimising the use of resources in pursuit of their objectives.
Successful application of the model need not simply lead to more
efficient organisations but to a new framework of thought for
managers. fl framework which accepts uncertainty and plans for
change, rather than one which emphasises management of
yesterday's problems.
Perhaps the biggest opportunity for the model rests in the
political and economic changes which are occurring throughout
the world. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the progressive opening of China, and the increasing
industrialisation throughout Asia demand that changes are made
in the way Western organisations are managed, if only in order
to ensure their economic survival in the face of new competition.
Fit the same time, the emergent nations and economies will look
to the Western model for guidance on how to manage their
organisations. If we do not want them to make the same
mistakes as us, we should ensure that they are offered the most
adequate model at our disposal, the Lliable System Model. The
danger is that if we do not reform our organisations, they, and
consequently our societies, will not survive - they have been
breaking down for some years already. If the emergent nations
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model their organisations on ours which are failing, they will
ensure not long term survival, but will institutionalise failure
since it will be built in to the system.
Finally, the contemporary world of management has become
obsessed with Management Information Systems, the underlying
assumption being that Managers need more information than
they currently receive. Beer has written about the expense of
these systems criticising their failure, and much has been
written by others about what has become known as "information
overload." Many expensively designed and implemented
information systems fail since little or no account is taken of the
users. Large sums are expended on hardware and software to
generate outputs with little regard given to what is generated,
who receives it, how it is used (if at all), and what information is
conveyed. The computer systems at Carco, Chapter Eight, were a
good example.
The Viable System Model gives the opportunity to address the
real need. This seems not to be for Management Information
Systems, but, for systems of information management. Use of
	 \
the Diable System Model enables an examination of the
information needs of an organisation and, by design rather than	 1
accident helps to develop a system where:-
- the right information.
- is in the right place.
- at the right time.
- for the right purpose.
- in the right language and context.
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Effective use of the model will help to ensure that superfluous
data (noise) is minimised - only relevant information being
transmitted within the system and in its exchanges with the
environment. Environmental scanning can be carried out such that
irrelevant material can be excluded. This will help to reduce
information overload and on these grounds if no other the [liable
System Model must add value to the practice of management.
11.2.4 Summar
This section has compared the (liable System Model with the
dominant models of organisation and its superiority has been
demonstrated. lipplication of the Viable System Model will more
adequately enable managers to deal with the increasing
complexity of contemporary organisations in their environments.
11.3 Reflections on the Model 
The cybernetic approach exhibited by the model has been
demonstrated as more adequate than the currently dominant
models, and it has been suggested that the value of these latter
approaches, and their tools, can be enhanced by their use in a
way complementary to the holistic view. This section of the
chapter will reflect on four principal aspects of the [liable
System Model; its theory, ideology, utility and methodology.
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11.3.1 Theor
The principal theoretical criticism of the Viable System Model is
that in emphasising communication and control processes it
neglects social processes and underplays purposeful behaviour
by individuals. Social processes and purposeful behaviour may be
seen as aspects of communication and control, particularly in
smaller or less formal organisations such as Carco and in the
classroom. None of the mechanisms of control or sub-systems
required by the model need to exist in a hard physical sense,
they may simply be ways of thinking about organisation, and as
in the classroom case study may be made implicit in behaviour.
These soft aspects may still be modelled through the Viable
System Model as demonstrated in Chapters Eight and Nine.
The second aspect of this is the purposeful behaviour of
individuals. Whilst the original model does not specifically take
account of this it may be because its logic is bounded by the
neurophysiological analogy used to describe it in "Brain of the
Firm." The model requires that System Five supplies logical
closure to the system, acting to absorb all residual variety in
terms of achievement of the systems purpose. It is therefore
complete; every question can be answered.
In a social system, which depends for its cohesion on the
willingness of its constituents to belong, whether in a nation or a
firm, this is not enough. In this case, maintenance of cohesion
depends both, on the ability of System One to meet the
expectations of the metasystem, and, that of the metasystem to
meet the expectations of the people who constitute System One.
Only if this is done will the system be truly viable, minimising use
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of resources and maximising autonomy. This requires that the
metasystem be able to demonstrate to System One that its use
of resources is commensurate with the needs of the System to
maintain cohesion. This means the development of feedback
processes which enable the metasystem to be accountable to
System One and mechanisms which enable System One to debate
both purposes and commitment of resources.
11.3.2 !deo loom 
The proposal in Section 11.3.1 suggests a way to counter the
danger of autocratic abuse of the model by including
accountability loops which require the metasystem to be
responsible to System One for its activities and use of resources.
These also formalise the involvement of System One in the
determination of the purposes of the System. The danger of
internal autocracy is then minimised, although one dominant
person can still emerge as a leader and persuade others to
follow his purposes.
There is however a second danger of autocratic abuse in the
application of the model and that arises with the intervention in
a system by the observer or consultant. Each of the
organisational models and the metaphors which are used to
describe them belong principally to management scientists. As
such, whether through the numerous metaphors proposed by
Morgan(67 8 68 ) or the five selected by Flood 8, Jackson(5 ), they
represent our ways of thinking about organisation. Used in an
intervention they constrain the participants to think in our terms
and not theirs. This, far from being emancipatory and
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participative, may be seen as confining others to think as we do,
an autocratic abuse of expert power.
It is proposed that the stakeholders in a system must define the
system and its boundaries for themselves, in doing so they
determine their own constraints within their existing model of
reality. The role of the intervenor then comes to be, as in the
classroom study (Chapter Nine), to use his or her expert
knowledge and models to help the stakeholders to explore and
develop their models. This does not mean that the descriptive
metaphors cannot be used, but that they should be used in
intervention as a means of enriching the stakeholders
understanding of their system, rather than for the intervenor to
impose his or her views. This means that the stakeholder's model
must be elaborated before the consultants model is revealed, i.e.
the stakeholders must be allowed to articulate their
understanding before it is influenced by other models. The
consultant then acts not in a way which is constraining but
emancipatory or liberating.
If stakeholders are encouraged to take possession of the
situation in this way there are two benefits. Firstly, their
thinking is constrained only by themselves, and out of their
increased understanding arises the freedom for them to change
the system. They can change its boundaries and redefine it at
will. Freedom is guaranteed in their recognition of the
boundaries they have chosen, with the knowledge that there are
other ways of defining the systems and, in the knowledge of
their freedom to change or cross over those definitions and
boundaries. Secondly, since it is their understanding which has
been extended the outcome of the process belongs to them, not
379
us. They then have ownership of the changes and control of
implementation.
The proposals made under this and the previous section should
help to address the problem, highlighted by Flood a, Jackson( 5 PG
113) that "the model depends for its proper use and functioning
on social conditions which it does not itself sufficiently seek to
engineer - a democratic milieu." It should however be
remembered that models may be descriptive, prescriptive or
diagnostic, but they are all abstractions from reality, intellectual
constructs, and as such can engineer nothing. It is people who
engineer organisations.
11.3.3	 Utilit
The proposal in 11.3.2 above has implications for the utility of
the Diable System Model which has been criticised for being
difficult to apply in practice. The deliberate inclusion of the
stakeholders in an intervention has been shown in Chapters Eight
and Nine to help overcome the resistance to change which is
often provoked.
If the Diable System Model is used to help stakeholders to
understand and develop their knowledge, and the concepts and
ideas which it embodies become accepted within their system
then it can become a process of management rather than an
abstract tool for problem solving. The key ideas which need to
become embedded are those of change and development to
maintain the organisation in dynamic equilibrium with its
turbulent environment. Organisational stability may be compared
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to that of a yacht, which, when stationary, will be tossed around
at the whim of its enuiroment, the wind and the sea. In motion it
becomes relatively stable in relation to its environment, and, is
able to take advantage of environmental influences and natural
forces to progress along a chosen course. The limiting case is
that the strength of the environmental forces must be within the
design limitations of the yacht. In the case of organisational
stability, the design limitations are the creative and innovative
abilities of the human stakeholders. These, in practical terms,
appear to be unlimited.
The objective of intervention should perhaps then not be
considered as an attempt to perform a one off diagnosis and
resolution of an organisation's problems, the method of
traditional consultancy which ensures future problems to solve.
It should become a process of intervention aimed at changing
the process of management within the organisation such that
heuristic goal-seeking behaviour becomes embedded. The Viable
System Model then becomes an interactive tool for the ongoing
process of mess management, the stakeholders in the system
being able to understand how the organisation works and change
it. The model describes the underlying structure of the activity, it
does not specify ends.
R second thought can be drawn from the yacht analogy. Yachts
are systems designed to take advantage of natural forces to
ensure their stability and progress. Under sail, they do this with
a maximum economy of effort, the wind which fills the sails,
while disturbed, is not destroyed by its interaction with the
yacht. Its energy is largely maintained. The yacht minimises its
absorption of resources by harmonious interaction with its
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environment. Systems which are designed to act in contravention
of natural forces, such as aircraft, require massive amounts of
energy to be pumped into them to achieve success. The energy
which they use, whilst perhaps not destroyed is certainly
changed by this process, and arguably damage is caused to the
energy and the environment, e.g. the damage to the atmosphere
arising from combustion of fossil fuels. The lesson suggested by
this is that systems which are designed to harmonise with their
environments, and this includes social systems, will be less
expensive to operate than those which act in defiance of them.
The proposals outlined above will require "large scale changes in
organisational structure"( 5 P6 113 ), but the opportunity exists
through the Diable System Model to breakdown the hierarchical
and bureaucratic structures which have developed in many
organisations. Hierarchical structures create situations where
career progress means a movement from purposeful activity, the
pursuit of a trade or profession, to control activity. This is
particularly evident in Government Departments, Banks and
Insurance Companies where the most senior posts tend to be
controlling rather than purposeful. These structures ensure that
those who are best at doing the job end up controlling others,
yet, their fitness for the one activity neither proves nor
disproves their fitness for the other. The situation can develop to
one of dissatisfaction, both on the part of the organisation and
that of the individual. This is a costly use of resources.
The Finco case study showed how the Viable System Model could
be used to break down such a problem situation and improve
both organisational performance and individual satisfaction.
There are other implications to this such as the need to create
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different forms of career structure, different reward systems, to
specify jobs differently and to increase trust and autonomy at
the operational level. Each of these things can be achieved once
the established model of the organisation, contained inside the
heads of the stakeholders, is challenged and developed.
11.3.4 Methodology 
The dependence of the Viable System Model on the
neurophysiological analogy has been argued against by Beer and
others. Section 11.3.1 argued that there is a need to moue
beyond the boundaries of thinking through the brain metaphor
and the constraint of the brain model in order to enable the
incorporation of capacity for self control in social systems, i.e.
feedback from the metasystem to System One.
The established methodology, drawn from Flood and Jackson( 5 PP
93-96) has been fully elaborated in Chapter Four. This section will
use their framework as its base, interpreting and adding to the
process as required, leading to a revised methodology. It is not
within the scope of this thesis to critically reflect on these
proposed changes. They represent a formalisation of the
processes reported in Chapters Eight and Nine and a cue for
further work in this area.
11.3.4.1 System Identification
The methodology requires first that the purpose of the system be
determined. Reer( 3 ) suggests that the purpose of a system is
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determined by what it does, its outputs. However, this leaves no
scope for critical appraisal of purpose, either by an external
observer, or a stakeholder. If the purpose of a system, fulfilled
by System One, is defined by its outputs, which is what can be
observed, then present outputs define present purposes.
However, there is a problem, what the system does is not
necessarily what the stakeholders think it does, or indeed, want
it to do. For example Beer's( 1
 PG 12) interpretation of the
purpose of British Rail as a system for stopping him smoking and
working would be most unlikely to be in accord with the view of
the Board of British Rail.
The methodology needs a step introduced which enables critical
appraisal of the purpose of the system, asking not what it does,
but what its stakeholders intend it to do. Taking Beer's example,
to model British Rail as an anti-smoking system would generate
an entirely different outcome to a modelling which perceived a
purpose as a transport system. Although each would be valid for
its imputed purpose only the second would contribute to a more
effective and efficient railway, something which might be the
purpose of British Rail from a management perspective. Effective
and efficient pursuit of an inadequately defined purpose is of
little benefit.
I suggest that in using the Viable Systems Model in a social
system this step should be undertaken using a more or less
formal participative approach, extracted for example from
Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology or Rckoff's Interactive
Planning. In organisations where it is difficult or impossible to
bring together the relevant stakeholders, a variation on the
Delphi technique or the Japanese ringgi system may be
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appropriate. In this way a view of the purpose of the system,
defined by one stakeholder, may be circulated to each of the
others who is free to amend it. This process may continue until a
common view is achieved. Participants should focus on four key
questions to aid this process:
What constitutes the system?
What are its outputs?
Do the outputs meet expectations?
What other or different outputs are sought?
Rsking these questions should enable critical appraisal of the
system and its purposes. These can then, if necessary, be
redefined at the outset.
Criticism can be levied here that a consensual view of the
purpose of the system may not be achievable. Similarly that, in
practice, it may not be possible to debate purpose in any
meaningful way, for example, if the purpose is given by a higher
level system as in the case of Finco. In the first case, if the
purpose cannot be agreed then the application of the Viable
System Model is rendered inappropriate and some other model
must first of all be employed to handle that issue. In the second
case, the intervenor must determine whether he or she is
content to work with the given purpose and that will depend on
personal beliefs and values. It must be remembered that
achievement of a truly consensual view of a situation may
simply not be achievable since each participant may be seeking
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satisfaction of his or her individual objectives and may not be
willing to sacrifice these for the good of the system as perceived
by others.
The statement of purpose represents the collective perceptions
of the stakeholders. Very importantly, it is not defined by a
consultant or management scientist, who often either stands
outside the system or is a supportive part of it, but by those
within it and responsible directly for the fulfilment of its
purpose. Rn exercise defining purpose would need to be
undertaken at every level of recursion to be studied, and
consistency across the levels ensured.
The purpose having been agreed, the second step is to determine
the relevant system for achieving that purpose, together with its
contained and containing systems. The relevant system must
again be identified by, or at least in conjunction with, the
participants. Identification of formal systems, such as a
corporation or partnership will be relatively straightforward. Rn
informal or conceptual system, such as the Trade Training
Network in New Zealand examined by Britton D NicCallion,(40)
Commercial Broadcasting in the United States by Leonard, (41)
 or
the "Class" considered in Chapter Nine will need to be defined
and its boundaries determined by those who claim its existence.
Identification of the contained systems calls for a division of the
activities within the system-in-focus into two categories,
purposeful and enabling. Purposeful activities are those which
fulfil the purpose of the system, they are the System One
elements, the viable parts, of the system-in-focus. Fill activities
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which are not identified as purposeful should at this stage be
treated as potentially being enabling.
The containing system, that of which the system-in-focus is part,
may be more difficult to adequately define. I suggest that the
most appropriate approach here is to select a containing system
which is most useful for the purpose of the enquiry. This will be
one that exercises a management or controlling influence on the
system studied, e.g. the Franchisor in the case of Carco.
The identity of the chosen chain of viable systems, its purpose
and existence, must remain open to question throughout any
intervention and the subject reuisit,f1 whenever considered
appropriate by the participants in the study.
11.3.4.2 Sustem Diagnosis 
Further changes are proposed to this part of the methodology.
Firstly, rather than the intervenor acting in a prime role of
driving the study, the participants should do so. The intervenor
acts in the role of Devil's Rduocate, consistently questioning and
challenging the findings of the participants in the process. This is
considered to help the participants to explore and develop their
understanding of the situation. This in turn assists them to push
back the limitations on their actions, to learn to question their
assumptions about the organisation's reality, and, to own the
changes which result from the process. In this way the process
becomes embedded in their way of thinking and they have
ownership of resulting changes. This will help to overcome the
difficulty of application of the model. It must be accepted that in
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following this approach the redesigned organisation may not
fully reflect the ideal encapsulated in the model.
Secondly, rather than naming the sub-systems through the
numbers 1-5, they should be named according to their function
e.g. Implementation, Co-ordination, Control, Audit, Development
and Policy. The use of names rather than numbers serves two
purposes. First, the names are descriptive of the activity
undertaken, this eases understanding for those unfamiliar with
the model. Second, the names are less directly hierarchical in
their implications than the numbers.
Finally I propose that Systems 2-5 collectively should be known
as enabling functions. Implementation, System One, fulfils the
purpose of the organisation, and, while mutually interdependent,
the other Systems exist only to enable System One to carry out
its purpose. Without purposeful parts there is no need for their
existence; they are necessary parasites. I consider that this
conception of their organisational role helps to clarify the reason
for their existence and to focus their activity, reducing the risk
of pathologically autopoietic behaviour.
Each of the systems will now be briefly reviewed in turn to
highlight difficult or confusing aspects. Further refinements will
be added to the methodology.
Implementation: System One
If the purpose of the system has been adequately defined then
each of the operational elements of its System One, which must
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be potentially viable systems themselves, should emerge readily
from its examination. R frequent difficulty arises when studying
a traditionally tiered and hierarchical organisation. The
organisational levels displayed in the hierarchy rarely represent
recursive levels of organisation. Departments or units shown will
often not denote either purposeful parts or whole operations.
likewise, as in the Finco case study, a basic assumption about
the organisation may need to be questioned. For Finco this
assumption was concerned with its physical network which had
traditionally been seen as its basic building block. This view was
replaced with a set of divisions of the customer base. It will
often be the case that a number of separate activities will have
to be brought together to constitute a recognisable, viable,
operational element. It is vital for effective use of the model
that this aspect of study is undertaken with care and that, if
necessary, several modellings are undertaken to determine
which is the most useful in the context of the purpose to be
served.
It is essential to determine, in addition to the established
requirements, whether System One Managers consider that they
have sufficient authority and capability to enable the fulfilment
of purpose. This aspect will be revisited in section 11.3.6
Rutonomy, Development and Efficiency.
Co-Ordination: System Two
System Two is one of the most difficult systems to isolate within
an organisation, often appearing to be passive rather than
active. Beer suggests as one example the school timetable,
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another might be the allocation of Service Bays at Carco, or
telling positions within a bank. Each of these serves to dampen
potential oscillation between System One operations and reduces
the need for routine decision making at System Three. System
Two provides a service to System One and in doing so reduces the
variety that System Three has to absorb.
System Two channels can also handle the soft issues of an
organisation. For example aspects of organisational culture such
as ethical standards can be communicated through this route as
was shown at Carco (Chapter Eight). If such aspects are not to be
seen as commands then they must be handled in this way. Poor
handling of these matters of systemic cohesion or organisational
glue have been seen in the development and subsequent
breakdown of eastern European nations this century. These seem
to have been bound together through command rather than
common interest, cohesion being ensured by apparently
oppressive regimes. Once the pressure was released the nations
have attempted to revert to their previously independent status.
Fill organisations have to deal with similar problems of creating
and reinforcing a sense of identity and belonging, some do so
well, others badly. While it is commonly held that five years will
be taken for a sense of identity to be generated in a corporation
after a takeover or merger, I have worked with some where this
has not been achieved after twenty years, individuals clinging to
the values and norms of their original company. Other
organisations such as Hewlett Packard have a very strong sense
of identity and employees who do not share in it will apparently
rapidly leave the organisation. The recruitment process reduces
the risk of this by involving future colleagues of a job candidate
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in the recruitment process, those who are not seen as a potential
"good fit" are not employed. The "HP way" can be seen as a
massive variety attenuator, affecting the behaviour of the entire
workforce. To those on the inside it is not seen as following
commands but as taking positive steps towards generating a
sense of belonging.
fin example of a seemingly totalitarian corporation is the Disney
organisation. Disney considers itself to be in the entertainment
business, and as such treats its staff, and expects them to
behave, as cast members. The staff accordingly play a role when
"on stage," having been instructed on their behaviour and
provided with a script to follow. This seems reasonable given the
nature of their product. However, recent instructions to staff at
Eurodisney outside Paris to wear deodorant and "proper
undergarments" at all times seems excessive since these
aspects are not generally visible. They do not affect the quality
of "performance." The organisation seems to be going beyond
the needs of anti-oscillatory, or even control, requirements and
imposing a set of expectations values and beliefs which reduce
individual autonomy to zero.
It remains to be seen whether such a massive attenuation of
personal variety will enable the organisation to be succesful in
Europe as it has been in the rest of the world. Disney appear to
have created production line entertainment, with tasks specified
using the machine view of organisation, much as in a car factory;
how long will it be before similar industrial relations problems
appear? Standards of education are, in general, increasing
throughout the world, and increased attention is being paid to
the needs and rights of individuals. Given these changes, it is
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difficult to accept that cohesion through corporate dictat, rather
than individual commitment, can be sustained for much longer.
Control: System Three
System Three is responsible for the control of the already
defined and ongoing activities of the system, and informs System
Four of situations which cannot be handled under existing rules.
The established methodology requires that the components of
System Three be listed. I consider that this is a particularly
difficult area. It is necessary not simply to list Departments but
to discriminate activities within those departments, since
System Three and Four functions are often intertwined, e.g. a
Personnel Department may be responsible for both day to day
staff management functions such as payroll or pensions and for
future management such as training and development of staff.
II division of this sort also emphasises the moue away from the
traditional functional departments and towards Beer's ideal of an
Operations Directorate. Frequently in small organisations one
individual may be fulfilling more than one, or even all, of the
System Three functions. It is vital to the success of the
organisation that he or she understands all of the roles played.
This theme will be returned to in section 11.3.5 Role Rrticulation.
Further additional questions to ask are:
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How are the parts of Control made accountable,
at this level of recursion, for the resources
which they consume?
How is their performance in enabling the
fulfilment of purpose measured?
It will frequently be found that the answer to the questions is
that there is no accountability; there is no measure of their
performance. Control functions are recognised as necessary to the
functioning of the organisation, and the cost and bureaucracy
which arises is simply accepted as part of the expense of running
the organisation.
R further step which can be added to the methodology at this
stage is a critical examination of all the activities of System
Three, asking how they contribute to the fulfilment of purpose, or,
are necessary for the maintenance of the enabling function. This
approach will help in the identification and resolution of problems
of pathological autopoiesis, inhibiting the development of their
own purposes.
The additional questions highlighted under this section, and for
System One will help in the determination of the appropriate level
of autonomy in the system studied, whilst ensuring cohesion.
The approach taken at Carco and Finco of incorporating System
One Managers in System Three provides two benefits. First, they
can monitor resource use by other System Three components.
Second, they are provided with a view not just of their own
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element of the System but of the whole which helps to broaden
their understanding of different needs.
II further difficulty experienced is in the understanding of the
nature of System Three*, the audit. Many organisations carry out
what they consider to be audits, but as Beer( 3 PG 83 ) shows, these
are frequently ineffective. Effective audit of System One activity
is essential to amplify its variety to System Three. The enquiries
into System Three* activity must examine and question whether
audit enquiries are effective in fulfilling their purpose, or
whether, as is so often the case, they have lost their power
through becoming routine.
System Three* audits will also act as a variety attenuator at
System One. The awareness that certain activities are
unacceptable or proscribed and will bring retribution may inhibit
the desire to engage in them. This serves to reduce the potential
for friction with System Three. That System should also be
conscious of its responsibility to reward System One for good
performance, as well as punishing transgressions.
Development: System Four
System Four is responsible for the future development of the
organisation. It is the key to adaptation and any organisation
without this facility will experience great difficulty in coping with
environmental change.
I consider that System Four is the root of any viable system, any
new organisation emerging from an existing one to which it may
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or may not be similar. fin idea or possible future arising in one
system, if not accepted by that system, and carrying the
commitment of its originators may lead to the emergence of a
new and separate system. That new system will have as its initial
purpose "planning of the new venture," and once the preparation
has reached critical proportions it may break away from its host
and seek to implememt its own future.
It seems though that most organisations having defined
themselves and their future consider that the problem is solved.
They cease to actively seek alternative futures or selves,
emphasising internal stability and jeopardising viability. They
view planning and management as actions, not processes. The
essence of viability seems to rest in the ability to constantly
redefine the organisation, its structure and purposes, in the light
of evironmental disturbances while maintaining cohesion.
System Four activity, as highlighted by Beer, and by Flood D
Jackson, is very often a poorly articulated, unwelcome and
unaccountable presence in organisations. The development of a
highly change oriented mechanism is inhibited in an organisation
that resists change. The result of this weakness is evidenced by
the obsession with short term results and the "fire-fighting"
attitudes of many managers. Espejo D Schwaninger (eds.)(52)
have proposed a new approach to considering organisational
fitness which provides a framework for the discussion of
development problems which should help to alleviate these
difficulties.
I propose that changes be included in the established
methodology to encourage focused, accountable System Four
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activity. The established questions in the methodology already
adopt a critical stance for this System, aiming to discover whether
the activity undertaken guarantees adaptation. Rs with System
Three, measurements of performance and resource use need to be
installed to inhibit the growth of autopoietic behaviour. Similarly,
System One Managers need to be included in this development
function since they can contribute to the essential model of the
enterprise, they have after all greater knowledge of the system
than any consultant or "staff" expert. The technological model of
the enterprise, represented by Beer's Opsroom, outlined in Chapter
Five, will be enriched by the inclusion of these staff who will bring
to the ongoing debate the human values which must influence
decision making. Since these Managers are making decisions
which affect themselves they cannot behave autocratically. They
are defining their own freedom.
It must be remembered that the purpose of System Four is to
guarantee adaptation of the system-in-focus to environmental
change. This is normally taken to consist of activity such as
Market Research, Research and Development, etc. but must also
include internal development of the organisation's facilities, e.g.
how to take advantage of new technology, etc.. Unfortunately,
experts in these areas often fail to focus on the needs of the
organisation, focusing instead on the pursuit of the latest
developments in their field of expertise. The rapid development of
computer technology is a good recent example, with central
computer departments often pursuing the latest technology,
because that is professionally exciting, regardless of its
usefulness for the enterprise. While System Four must explore
developments which hold opportunities or threats for the future
of the organisation, there must be means of evaluation and
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internal control which recognise and prevent useless pursuit of
irrelevant developments.
System Four is, perhaps, the sub-system where the recursiuity of
the model needs to be clearly understood to enable the
recognition of what constitutes a relevant development at any
particular level of recursion. I suggest that this may be
determined by two factors; time, and scope.
Scope will be determined by the membership of a higher level
system which imposes constraints on the policy making freedom
of System Five, a topic which will be explored further in the next
section. Rny research activity leading to developments which
would require System Five to make policy decisions outside those
boundaries must be seen as irrelevant at that level. That is not to
say that the metasystem, in its System One management
embodiment at the next higher level, cannot alert its metasystem
to developments falling beyond the scope of its enquiries, but it
should not utilise its own resources in this way.
The other factor is time. fit any given level of recursion, the
organisation will work within a relevant timescale. For example,
in the production process at Cakes, the relevant timescale for a
Process Manager at Recursion Two was "the shift," a period of
around eight hours in which a particular volume of output was
required. The planning and development timescale for the
manager was limited by the start and finish times of the shift. Rt
Recursion One, the Manufacturing Manager had a broader
timescale of the "Production Week." His planning activity at that
level of Recursion was limited by that. In his embodiment at
Recursion Zero (the Factory), development activity for
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Scope
Manufacturing had a wider timeframe, perhaps expanding to a
year, while the scope of planning activity would similarly widen.
Figure 11.1 represents this diagramatically.
A
Dec 2 Dec 1 Dec 0
7
Boundaries of
System Five
Freedom
Time
Determining relevance for System Four
Figure 11.1
Fin important feature of System Four is the ability to learn from
past behaviour and avoid repetition of errors. This requires a
facility for drawing out from past experience, not necessarily fine
detail, but the principles which have underpinned success or
failure. R second requirement is to be able to acknowledge errors.
Many organisations seem to work on an assumption that decisions
are made with perfect information and are correct for all time.
The rapid change and increasing complexity of the environment
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make it increasingly likely that changed circumstances will lead to
a need for new and different decisions. Any decision can only be
seen as relevant or correct on the basis of the information that
was available when it was made. An alteration of that decision on
the basis of new information should not be seen as an admission
of human error but a modification to take account of the latest
circumstances, a part of the process of learning.
The Finco case study provided an opportunity to work with this
approach. Whilst considerable research enabled the determination
of new objectives for the organisation and the broad shape of the
structure was agreed at the highest level, the detailed planning
and implementation was an iterative learning process. The bulk of
the work took place on a live and real time basis, working with
the people whose system was under development. As such, the
plans were developed and implemented on an interactive basis.
The process was time consuming but considerable learning was
achieved. The final task was to write a report which reviewed the
whole process, eventually undertaken in seven locations, a report
which included the apparent errors in development, and forms a
record of the achievements rather than a detailed proposal. It is
hoped that the report forms part of the memory of that
organisation.
Policy: System Flue
System Five is reponsible for the creation of identity of the
system, that is its system of values, beliefs and expectations. Its
role is to listen to the debate between Systems Three and Four
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and arbitrate between their conflicting demands. This could be
viewed as a metasystemic System Two role, ensuring that present
and future operations of the organisation are co-ordinated. The
diagrammatic convention adopted by Scwaninger( 51 ) can be seen
as representing this, with Systems Three and Four represented at
the same level.
Since at any given recursive level System Five can only receive
information from Systems Three and Four, it can only make
decisions based on that information. Its function must be to
minimise oscillation between the two. This will, as required by the
logic of the model, absorb all remaining variety.
There are two flaws with this expectation. First, in a social system
System Five will be comprised of a person or people. Rs
demonstrated by the Carco study, no matter what the logic of the
proposal or the need for decisions to be taken, an individual may
be in this role who is apparently incapable of fulfilling it.
Second, there is a flawed assumption. That is that System Hue,
given the necessary information from Systems Three and Four has
complete freedom to act in the best interests of the system.
However, any one System is always part of a chain of systems,
and System Five, as part of a System One element management
unit of the next higher level of recursion in the chosen chain, is
constrained in its freedom by its membership of that chain. In
other words, if System Five acted only in the interests of its own
level of recursion, there would be no guarantee of cohesion with
its own metaleuel.
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It must be recognised then, that the behaviour of the
metasystem, in particular System Five, is modified by its
existence as a System One element management unit of the next
higher level. Autonomy is inhibited by membership of the chain of
systems.
This must be accounted for in the methodology for using the
model. Any intervention recognises three levels of recursion, the
system-in-focus, its contained and containing systems. R practical
study must always be bounded by limitations of time, finance or
the interest of the organisation studied, there will always then be
a highest recursive level studied. The practitioner, whether
internal or external to the particular organisation, must always
establish what limits on behaviour impact on the freedom to
redesign the system by virtue of its membership of a wider
system not under study.
These limitations were recognised in the Finco, Cakes and Carco
case studies. In the first, the purpose of the system was given by
the higher recursion. In the second, the purpose was constrained
to "making cakes," since this was the purpose allowed by its
belonging to Cakes Holdings. In the third, Carco's autonomy was
limited by its choice of belonging to the Franchisor's chain of
dealerships and constraints were accepted accordingly. Perhaps,
if Beer and Allende had recognised that the autonomy of Chile was
constrained by its belonging to a higher level of recursion, the
"World of Nations," which had expectations of it, and addressed
that aspect, the outcome of their work may have been different.
401
11.3.5	 Role Articulation
Unlike the machine view of organisation, represented in the
traditional organigram, the Viable System Model demands that
roles and functions within the organisation be understood, not
simply levels of authority. The organisation chart limits
understanding to the allocation of blame and allows any individual
to occupy only one box which is then considered to describe his
role. The Teaching Viability case study showed how an individual
may occupy a multiplicity of roles within an organisation.
Observation, and discussion with individuals occupying multiple
roles suggest that they are often unaware of the differences,
adopting a single organisational stance at all times, e.g. working
supervisors who either always, or never, work on the production
line as in Flood's( 56 ) Tarty Bakeries study. It is essential when
using the model to explicitly recognise the different roles played
by the people and thus to get beyond the limitations of the
traditional hierarchy. These roles need to be incorporated in any
job descriptions or outlines which are prepared in order to
formalise such recognition.
The most important change however is to ensure that the roles
are recognised by the participants. Individuals are normally
comfortable in a particular role, especially when adoption of a
different role has discomfiting implications for their other selves.
11 System One manager who also fulfils System Three and Four
roles for a given level of recursion may find it difficult to make
decisions in those roles which adversely affect his System One
element, e.g. the decision to close, or reduce in size an
unprofitable part of the organisation. This is not a reason for
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excluding them from such involvement, but for developing their
understanding of the needs of the whole organisation so that they
can make a decision in that interest.
11.3.6 Autonomy, Development and Efficiency
Organisations, in general, seem to regard staff training and
development as a necessary cost of being in business, and as such
seek to minimise such expense in the short term. Thinking about
organisations in terms of the Viable System Model, and taking
account of a desire to enhance freedom brings a new perspective
on this. That is, that training may be regarded as an investment in
the future of the organisation, and, arguably could be treated in
this way for accounting purposes, some payback being sought
through reductions in the cost of control systems.
The essential argument is this. Training and education of staff
should increase their capacity to absorb variety. If further variety
is absorbed at System One, then there is less to absorb in the
metasystem. This suggests that the size, and therefore cost, of
the metasystem functions can be reduced. There is less need to
exercise control and development over those who are self-
controlled.
Increasing the capacity of individuals to absorb variety is then
both emancipatory and cost effective. They do not need to be
regulated, their behaviour does not need to be policed, and they
do not need expensive bureaucracy to supervise them. The greater
knowledge they have to understand their own interests and
limitations, and the needs and limitations of the system to which
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they belong, the more likely they are to act in accordance with
the cohesion of the system. Rlternatiuely, and this may be
considered as the risk, if they do not like or wish to share in the
purposes of the system they may choose to try and change it, or
leave it. In either case, they are, in principle, freer to act in their
own interest, as determined by themselves. I acknowledge the
possible argument that economic reality may inhibit the freedom
of the individual in this respect in a particular situation but will
not pursue it here.
R system relies upon cohesion, and this can be imposed on its
human participants through rules and regulations, or, developed
through personal commitment. Imposition of rules absorbs
resources and needs an autocratic approach for its success.
Personal commitment takes time to develop but is cheaper to
control, and, since those who do not share in the values of the
system may exercise their right to leave it, or engage in debate
about it, the system identity can develop in accord with their
collective wishes. If it becomes too oppressive for some
individuals then they must have the right to leave. If at every
recursive level in the chain of systems, the System One managers
are incorporated in the metasystem, then the collective views of
the human stakeholders will always be heard. If they understand
the needs of the system, and share its values, i.e. identity is
shared between Systems One and Five, then cohesion will be
achieved at minimum cost.
The problem arising is how we should measure the variety
absorption capacity of an indiuidual. It is normal to do this
through Professional examinations, Rpprenticeships and ficademic
awards. Likewise, many large organisations have training
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departments engaged in the development of staff. R lot of these
training courses do not incorporate measurement of the student's
achievement, therefore, the benefit, if any, is unknown.
I suggest that an effective organisation will take two approaches
to dealing with this situation. Firstly, the knowledge gained, and
in particular, the ability to apply it in a practical context should
always be evaluated, not necessarily by examination in the formal
sense, but by ongoing monitoring of the individual's performance
in using the newly acquired knowledge or skills. Further training
input should be provided to correct errors arising.
Secondly, organisations should use the insights provided by the
Uiable System Model to understand the variety absorption
capacity necessary for the completion of any particular role and
seek to match that with the perceived variety of the person
appointed. This approach should help to avoid the mismatches so
often seen, such as the appointment of a bio-chemist as a Factory
Manager in one organisation. There is no doubt that the individual
concerned had adequate skills as a bio-chemist, however he had
virtually none for the task to which he was appointed. Needless
too say, problems soon appeared in the management of that
factory.
Once variety absorption is understood, and its relationship to
individuals articulated then, like other management tools, it can
be manipulated. This I call flexing freedom. For example, a Sales
Manager may grant a degree of discretion to a newly appointed
salesman in the negotiation of discounts, say up to 10% without
referral. At this level the Salesman can absorb a particular amount
of variety from the environment in which he operates and enjoy a
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fixed level of autonomy. The Sales Manager can monitor the
performance of this individual, and in the light of that monitoring
either reduce the Salesman's autonomy, or, increase it, simply by
changing the level of discount which he may negotiate. Similarly,
freedom can be flexed under different external or internal
conditions, e.g. a boom in the market, a fall in demand, oversupply
at the factory. The Sales Manager can flex the freedom of all of
his subordinates over time, within the limits of his own autonomy.
Flexing freedom can be, and often is done, by other parties. For
example the Credit Controller (a part of System Three) may, in his
perception of the interests of the system reduce, or extend, the
credit arrangements available to certain customers. This can
cause problems, particularly of internal conflict. Both Salesman
and Credit Controller consider that they are acting in the best
interest of the system, but they are pursuing different purposes,
the one seeking to maximise sales, the other to minimise risk.
Resolution of this type of conflict can only occur when there is
effective communication between the parties in a common
language. This reinforces the argument for the Managers of
System One elements to be recognised and treated as part of the
metasystem.
The approach has two probable and direct benefits. Firstly, the
individual will be better satisfied since he will be competent for
the appointed task. Secondly, since he or she can absorb more
variety, then less variety will be needed from Senior Management
to guide him.
This approach to the treatment of individuals at all levels of
organisation will help to avoid the dangers of anti-organisational
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behaviour arising in organisations adopting the machine model
where the creative capacities of individuals, not being required
for the fulfilment of the given task, will be directed elsewhere.
This must eventually lead to industrial anarchy. It is vital from
both the cybernetic and human perspectives to enhance the role
of the individual in the organisation through participation and
training to ensure maximum variety absorption at each level, and
the harmonisation, wherever possible, of individual and
organisational objectives. The pool of promotable people in an
organisation defines the gap between actuality and capability in
terms of effective use of human resources. It is in the interest of
every party to minimise the gap.
The practical, organisational and philosophical developments
associated with the need to promote greater autonomy will
require further research and education to surmount. There are a
great many people whose power and status are guaranteed by the
current system, they are threatened by the proposed changes and
must be convinced of the long term benefits.
R particular interest here is to elaborate and understand a
difference between training and education. Training I interpret as
being the teaching of a particular set of skills, or body of
information, such that the trainee becomes able to replicate the
actions of the instructor. Education I consider to be the teaching
of a set of skills or body of information, together with the
philosophy which underpins it. In this way the pupil becomes
aware of the assumptions and limitations of his knowledge and is
able to re-interpret that knowledge in the light of changing
circumstances. fin example of this might be the teaching of young
drivers. Training in the mechanical movements necessary to
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control a car is relatively simple, with practice almost anyone can
acquire that skill. Educating a young driver to understand the
performance limitations of the vehicle, and, how his behaviour
must harmonise with that of other road users, such that he or she
drives in a responsible manner, is much more complex, requiring
the sharing of a system of beliefs and values which cannot be
imparted easily in a short time. Currently these are normally
acquired through experience. In the process of acquiring the
experience, which enhances the training, the young driver is a risk
both to him or herself and to other road users. Nonetheless, the
driver can pass a driving test in the mechanical skills and need
never acquire the subsequent learning, having been told that he or
she can drive, what else is there to learn?
11.3.7 Summary
This section has reviewed the theory, utility, ideology and
methodology of the model. Changes were introduced to thinking
and methodology which aim to increase understanding and
accessibility of the model. The methodological changes add to the
established methodology suggestions that cater not simply for
"What to do" as established by Beer and Flood D Jackson, but
"How to do it." It is appropriate to acknowledge again that these
suugestions are a formalisation of my practice of using the Viable
System Model, and, that others such as Checkland and Rckoff have
deuoted considerable parts of their work to the development of
participative methodologies. My suggestions are a beginning, not
an end. The changes incorporate both critical reflection on the
purpose and construction of the system being studied, and, a
potentially participative approach. This is intended to enable
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stakeholders in a system to define and resolve their own
situation, using the Viable System Model to develop and enhance
their own models. This is seen as contributing to their freedom.
The revised methodology forms appendix iv to this thesis.
11.4  Conclusion 
This chapter commenced with a SWOT analysis through which the
superiority of the Diable System Model was demonstrated when
compared to the dominant models of organisation. The second part
of the chapter reviewed the model, explaining additions to
understanding and changes to the methodology. Chapter Twelve
will summarise these findings and incorporate proposals for
further research.
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Chapter Twelue 
Conclusions arid Future Research 
This final chapter consists first of a summary of the principal
findings of the work undertaken. The second part of the chapter
outlines proposals for further research.
12.1 Introduction 
This brief chapter consists of two parts. The first summarises the
findings of the theoretical and practical research, the
contribution to knowledge of this thesis. The second outlines
proposals for further research.
12.2 Summaru of Conclusions 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge about
the Viable System Model. These are summarised as follows.
12.2.1
The basic proposition of this thesis, that the Viable System Model
is a more adequate model of organisation for contemporary
managers than the dominant models, has been demonstrated
through their elaboration and comparison. It has also been
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proposed that the use of the Diable System Model can enhance
the value of other, reductionist, tools of organisation design by
placing their contribution within the context of a purposeful
system.
12.2.2
Chapter Five consists of the most comprehensive review to date
of the prior published work concerning the Diable System Model.
The chapter traces the major applications, commencing with and
building from Stafford Beer's own work in Chile. It addresses
developments in understanding and utilising the model. It
summarises the principal criticisms of the model, and,
incorporates a personal intrepretation of Beer's philosophy in
relation to management and the Viable System Model.
12.2.3
The ideological concern, expressed by Ulrich( 31 ) and others, that
the use of the model carries with it the possibility of autocratic
abuse has been suggested to be unfounded. The cybernetic tools
may certainly be used in this way, but that denies the principles
which underpin the model. fin autocratic use corrupts the model,
threatening viability.
Practically, the danger of such autocratic abuse has been
minimised by the development of the participative methodology.
Built upon the earlier crystallisation by Flood C, Jackson( 5 ) the
methodology was described in Chapter Eleven and is summarised
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in Rppendix iv. The revised methodology emphasises the role and
purposeful activity of the stakeholders in the system and
recognises that communication and control within organisations
may be represented by the social process of human interaction.
This participative approach also helps to overcome the difficulty
of application of the model by involving those affected in the
process of diagnosis and redesign.
The revised methodology also incorporates critical review of the
purposes of the system studied by those involved. This is seen as
demanding consideration by the stakeholders, not simply of what
is achieved, but what is intended. The aim is to ensure that
agreement about the purpose of the system is shared by the
stakeholders, and to allow any divergence of opinion to be
resolved at an early stage.
12.2.4
The role of the model and the cybernetician or management
scientist in an intervention has been examined. It has been
demonstrated that the Viable System Model can be used to
develop the understanding of the stakeholders in the system.
This is proposed as an emancipatory approach, enabling them to
explore the definition and boundaries of the system and define
their own freedom. The aim of the intervention then becomes not
to "solve the problem" but to change the process of management
such that the stakeholders can command their own future.
Thinking about the organisation in terms of the concepts of
viability creates a new and different understanding.
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12.2.5
The logic of the Diable System Model has been taken beyond the
neurophysiological metaphor used to describe it. In so doing it
has been possible to suggest the inclusion of mechanisms which
enable accountability to be achieved, at the metasystem level,
for resources used. This is considered as inhibiting the growth of
pathologically autopoietic behaviour.
12.2.6
Rccessibility of the model has been enhanced. Firstly, by
explicitly making its use participative. Secondly, by describing
the model in the language of the system studied, and particularly
by the use of names rather than numbers to describe the five
sub-systems. Thirdly, by the proposal that all activities should be
regarded as either purposeful or enabling which allows a new
focus to be obtained on the activities of some parts of
organisation hierarchies.
One of the intentions of this thesis was that it should be written
in a way which allowed non-management scientists to
appreciate and understand the value of the approach. This
accessibility has been tested by two such candidates and the
text modified where necessary to enable their understanding.
They now appear to have a sound understanding of the principles
and benefit of the model.
The use of the Diable System Model in understanding
organisational roles, in enhancing organisational efficiency and
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as a device for conscious flexing of individual freedom all
contribute to this accessibility. Role articulation being made
explicit, the need to incorporate System One managers in the
metasystem has also been emphasised. This helps to ensure
common understanding, and sharing of values and expectations
within the system.
12.2.7
The value of training and development to an organisation, and its
treatment as an investment rather than a cost, has been
proposed. This is considered to have benefits for both
organisations and individuals, since it can reduce overall cost for
the organisation by the creation of organisations which are self-
controlled, such as the Large Corporate element at Finco.
12.2.8
Finally, there is the recognition that freedom for a system is
always to some extent curtailed by its membership of a chain of
systems and that this must be accounted for. In practice it
cannot be ignored. Rrising from this it has been suggested how
System Five is constrained and how this in turn contributes to
the definition of relevance for the development activity
occurring in System Four.
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12.3 Further Research 
There are a number of areas requiring further work to be
undertaken.
12.3.1
The findings rest on the work undertaken in the four case
studies. This is a small base on which to propose the changes. The
revised methodology requires further rigorous testing and
development in a wider variety of organisations.
12.3.2
The impact of training and development on the capacity of staff
to absorb variety needs to be rigorously assessed. The suggested
measurement for this is the ability to decrease the amount of
higher level control activity.
12.3.3
Studies need to be undertaken which deal specifically with the
development of resource utilisation measurement within the
tnetasystem. The benefit of such work in breaking down
breaucracy needs to be established.
415
12.3.4
Further studies need to be undertaken with the development of
self regulating, self organising work groups.
12.5 Conclusion 
This final chapter has summarised the principal findings of this
thesis and outlined a programme of further research.
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Rppendix i
CARCO 
Weekly Business Return 
Week ending .../.../...
Vehicle Sales Department 
£	 £	 £	 £
Number Cost Rue.Ual. Total G.P. Rue/ueh
Sales	 New
Used
Trade
Prospect Rec'd
Calls	 Made
Demo's
Advert	 NWN
Response TUT
Other	 MI
Income
	 Careplan
Cordiale
To
Target: Average GP Per vehicle: £350 New (YTD: £265)
£500 Used (YTD: £435)
£+ue Trade (YTD: £(24))
Prospect Calls made : 50 p.m. SR/RJ, 25p.w.MT
Service/Recovery Department 
Average No. of Productiues
(inc. Recovery Driver O, App)
Hours available (a)
Hours sold (b)
Bonus hours earned
Average Productivity (b/a * 100/1)
Hire Car Income
Other Income
Target: Average Productivity 90% (YTD: 84%)
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Appendix i (cont.)
Service Prospect Calls
Breakdown Opportunities
Breakdowns Attended
Value of "Add on" service business
Number of MOT's
MOT "Add on" business
Bodyshop 
Average No. of Productives
Flours Available (a)
Hours Sold (b)
Average Productivity (b/a * 100/1)
Value of "Add on" repairs
Other Income
Target: Average Productivity 90% (YTD: 67%)
Parts Department 
£	 £	 £	 £
Trade	 Retail	 Internal Van
Sales (Income)
£	 £
Franchisor
	 Factor
Purchases: Stock
VOR/Urgent
Target: Sales p.w.: £15500 (YTD: £15130)
Forecourt 
Fuel Sales (Gallons)
Shops Sales (£) (Accessories)
Shop Sales (£) (Other)
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Cann: Summary of Financial Information
Profit/Loss Account
1991
£
1992
£
Turnover 4813120 5093754
Gross Profit 588263 618210
Operating Profit (89764) 22572
Net Interest Payable 241260 210673
Profit/Koss) (331024) (188101)
Balance Sheet
1991
£
1992
£
Fixed Assets (a) 2222276 1864678
Current Assets (b) 1068729 709107
Creditors (< 1 year) 2112162 1931984
Net Current liabilities 1043433 1222877
Total Assets less Current
liabilities
1178843 641801
Creditors (> 1 year) 72161 51307
Provisions 278000 155200
Net Balance Sheet Value 828682 435294
Notes
a) Revaluation of land and buildings.
b) Partial liquidation of vehicle and parts stock.
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Flppendix iii
SB Foods: 
Case Studu using the Diable Sustem Model 
Background
SB Foods is a company within the Sundries Division of Victuals, a
major supplier of manufactured and processed food to multiple
retailers. SB Foods itself has two factories, as well as a "Head
Office" function which deals with the Sales, Central Buying and
Distribution aspects of the business. It is this Head Office
function that deals primarily with the Sundries Division
management of Victuals.
SB Foods has recently completed a major extension and
refurbishment of Factory R which was intended to enable the
factory to absorb all of the production obtained from Factory B.
This plan has proved to be impossible as output volume has
increased at Factory 11 utilising the space which was to be made
available for Factory B production.
Factory B, which has a poor industrial relations record, was for a
period of two years (while the Factory 11 extension was being
built), operating under the threat of closure, a threat which was
well known to both management and staff. The inability of
Factory 0 to absorb production from B has led to a reversal of
the closure decision and the Senior Management of SB Foods now
wish both to retain the factory and develop its volume to ensure
long term viability.
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Appendix iii (cont.)
Task
SB Foods has recently appointed General Managers, with profit
responsibility, to both factories. The General Manager of Factory
B has asked for your assistance. He recognises that change is
needed at the Factory but needs your help to determine the
current state of the operation, what changes should be made,
and, how the organisation will benefit.
Use Diable System Diagnosis to model the current organisation of
the Factory, determine where the problems lie and offer
preliminary suggestions for redesign.
Requirements 
1) 11 20 minute presentation by each group of their initial model,
diagnosis and recommendations. This should involve the use of
diagrams where appropriate and a brief section covering
implementation of the changes.
2) R written report, in note form, covering the content of the
presentation and highlighting areas where ()SD was not
considered helpful.
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Rppendix iii (cont.)
Procedure 
The diagnostic process should follow the methodology provided
in Chapter Five of Creative Problem Solving (Flood Di Jackson,
Wiley 1991).
Further Information 
This information has been gathered through a series of
interviews with all levels of staff in the factory and through
observation.
1) Factory B is on three floors:
the top floor is a preparation and mixing area
the middle floor cooks and packs three product
ranges, Unit, Corn and Bar, representing 40% of
product output (split 301515)
the ground floor cooks and packs a single range
of products, Slab, representing the balance of
output, as well as housing the Stores and
Despatch departments
an additional product range, Hmas, is produced
on the middle floor during the second six months
of the calendar year
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Appendix iii (cont.)
other Departments include, Emgineering,
Technical, Quality Control, Hygiene,
Administration, Personnel, and, Finance. (The last
two of these do not report to the General
Manager).
the Factory has a Canteen and Staff shop (which
sells reject output), both of which report to the
Health, Safety and Hygiene Manager.
2) The manufacturing process for all output is the same:-
Mix, Deposit, Bake, De-tin, Cut, Process and Pack.
3) When the decision was made to close this factory a caretaker
manager was appointed with a brief to maintain production at all
costs in the short term. To achieve this a number of events have
occurred:-
staff have been granted higher status positions,
e,g, Foreman, Leading Hand, Supervisor, in order
to "buy off" problems with the Union. This has
been done regardless of the need for a higher
grade in the functions to be fulfilled, e.g.
Supervisors with no subordinates.
procedures and working practices have been
allowed to deteriorate, e.g. morning and
afternoon tea breaks are stretched from fifteen
minutes to thirty minutes, lunch break is
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Appendix iii (cont.)
stretched from thirty to forty-five minutes, an
end of shift shower break is taken by staff in
the mixing department, toilet breaks are treated
as routine rather than exceptional and minimal
interruptions to work.
absenteeism runs at around 15%, commonly
staff will take "sick leave" up to the limit betond
which sick pay ceases.
standards of hygiene are inadequate and
maintenance of plant and equipment is only
undertaken in the event of a breakdown.
4) Managers and others in Supervisory positions have limited
understanding of their roles and no adequate articulation of the
performance expectations of the Senior Management.
5) There is a lack of clear delegation of authority, Managers and
Foremen are apparently unaware of the level of decisions they
can take. This has meant that they have taken decisions in the
past which subsequently have been overridden by Senior
Management.
6) There appear to be too many Managers and Foremen.
7) Managers are only responsible for part of a process, in the
event of a failure blame is passed up and down the chain of
events.
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8) Management at all levels fail to support and implement
established Rules and Procedures.
9) The Union is relied upon as an information source to a far
greater degree than the Management.
10) Management is thoughtless, that is to say, the prevailing
method of decision making is to do that which has always been
done.
11) There appear to be no adequate mechanisms for monitoring
either, Departmental, Process or Personal performance. The only
performance measurement is of labour utilisation for the
Production Managers on the First and Ground floors. This operates
in such a way that the Managers are working to maintain
production regardless of the level of customer orders. This
approach is fundamentally flawed in that whilst Managers are
maximising labour utilisation they are ignoring the other costs of
overproduction, e.g. the costs of transport, freezing and stocking
of excess output.
12) Overtime and Shift payment systems, intended to reward staff
adequately for long or unsocial working patterns are
systematically abused by both Managers and Staff. This is
tolerated as a way of "keeping the peace."
13) The level of basic pay at all grades is such that the Factory has
one of the lowest paid workforces in the local community.
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14) The capability and professionalism of many of the Managers
and Foremen is doubted by their peers, superiors and
subordinates. The majority of them have risen to their posts from
the shop floor with little or no training, it has simply been "their
turn."
15) Communication is poor throughout the organisation. lit a
personal level, some of the Foremen do not have the ability to
speak, write or understand the English language.
16) Managers consider that Foremen need constant guidance and
instruction throughout a shift, including control and setting of
equipment, e.g. relighting burners on ovens.
17) While a number of basic management courses have been run in
the short period since the appointment of the new General
Manager, a large number of candidates have not attended as
either they consider it a waste of time, or, their Managers have
refused to make them available. One Manager, who has completed
the course, was unable to implement changes on his return due to
lack of support from the Senior Management.
18) The workforce and management consider that they produce a
consistently high quality output notwithstanding an ongoing
reject rate of around 10%.
19) The line Quality Inspectors are expected to undertake 100%
inspection of output. When running, each production line has an
output rate of around 90 units per minute, Inspectors are required
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to check presentation, size, appearance and labelling for each
item. There are six Quality Inspectors to deal with the two
production lines as well as all other quality control aspects of the
Factory.
20) Communication between Production staff and Product
Development staff is minimal. Product Development reports to the
Commercial Director of SB Foods, not the General Manager of the
Factory. Product Development staff are not involved in pre-
production trials of new products on the plant, nor do they advise
Production staff of forthcoming changes until the last moment.
This is largely a function of the relationship between SB Foods and
its customers. Once a product specification has been agreed with
a customer it will normally be launched within a few days.
21) The "grapevine" is, after the Union, seen as the most reliable
information source. Communication is such that one Senior
Manager only found out about a major factory visit by the most
important customer through a Ground Floor cleaner.
22) Replacement staff are not available to cover absences through
sickness and annual leave. The Personnel Officer will not obtain
relief for these absences, instructing Managers to "cope." This is
normally achieved by substantial overtime working often until 9
p.m. at which time a shift premium of 17.5% is payable for the
whole shift.
23) There is no workload or staffing monitoring system in use,
Managers operating on the numbers they have always used. There
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is no explicit requirement for them to attempt to reduce numbers
through revised working practices or increased automation.
24) There is no flexibility of labour between the processes or the
product lines, yet the workload in one area will frequently peak
while there is a trough elsewhere in the process.
25) Provisional customer orders are recieued on a weekly basis
with daily confirmation of final outloading requirements. The
Production Managers ignore these provisional orders which are
notoriously inaccurate. They prefer to produce according to the
previous week's final orders with an adjustment for "instinct and
experience." Daily production is always within 10% of final orders,
usually by way of an excess. The factory has never cut a customer
delivery for lack of output.
Final orders are used only by the Despatch Foreman for loading
vehicles.
The Stores Foreman ignores both provisional and final orders, he
orders stores to maintain a stable supply of all items. The factory
rarely runs out of any item but frequently has cause to throw
away perishable items which have been overstocked.
26) There are no routine, planned management meetings.
27) The General Manager has a very open style and wishes to have
working for him Managers who will manage.
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28) Health and Safety requirements are frequently not achieved,
machines often being in a hazardous condition. The Engineering
Manager has advised Production Managers that "no funds are
available for that repair."
29) The whole Personnel function is carried out by the Personnel
Officer. Problems, complaints and grievances are all directed to
her by the line Managers. She has no executive authority in any of
these matters.
30) There is no process control system in place such that batches
can be tracked in their progress through the factory. This will
become a mandatory requirement in the near future to comply
with proposed Food Safety legislation.
31) Key Personnel and Reporting Lines
SB Foods Head Office:
Managing Director - reports to Sundries Division management.
Commercial Director - reports to the Managing Director and acts
as Salesman to the principal customers. He is supported by a
General Trades salesman and two Product Development teams, one
at each factory.
Finance Director - reports to the Managing Director, supported by
a Plant liccountant at each factory and a team of accounts staff
at Head Office.
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Operations Controller - reports to the Managing Director. Through
his subordinate team, all at Head Office, acts as buyer of raw
materials and packaging and handles product distribution.
Personnel Controller - reports to the Managing Director and takes
direct responsibility for the entire Personnel function with
particular responsibility for Management Development. He is
supported by a Personnel Officer at each factory.
SB Foods - Factory R:
General Manager - reports to the Managing Director and takes
responsibility for the entire operation of Factory R.
SB Foods - Factory B:
General Manager - reports to the Managing Director and is fully
responsible for the operation of Factory B.
Manufacturing Manager - reports to the General Manager and is
responsible for all aspects of production from goods in to
despatch.
Engineering Manager - reports to the General Manager and is
responsible for all aspects of site, plant and equipment
maintenance. He is supported by an Assistant Manager and a
Foreman Fitter. The workforce consists of a team of fitters and a
team of electricians together with a painter and storeman.
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Technical Manager - reports to the General Manager and is
responsible for all technical aspects of the Factory including
adherance to food safety standards, customer product
specifications, Health, Safety and Hygiene. He is supported by a
Health, Safety and Hygiene co-ordinator ( who also has
responsibilities at Factory fl), the Quality Control Manager who is
supported by three quality assurance staff in the laboratory and
six line inspectors, and the Specification Manager who together
with the Food Chemist prepares and maintains product
specifications for both factories. The Health, Safety and Hygiene
co-ordinator takes responsibility for the running of the canteen
which has two Foremen and four staff, and the Staff shop which
has one Foreman and one member of staff. Also reporting to him is
the Assistant Hygiene Manager who, through his two Supervisors,
is responsible for the cleanliness and hygiene of the Factory and
equipment.
Stores Manager - reports to the Manufacturing Manager and is
responsible for the ordering receipt and storage of raw materials
and packaging. He is supported by a Foreman, a Leading Hand, one
operator and a clerk.
Mixing Bay Manager - reports to the Manufacturing Manager and
is responsible for the preparation of cake mixes and delivery of
these to the production areas. He is supported by a junior
Manager, three Foremen and two Supervisors.
Production Manager, First Floor - reports to the Manufacturing
Manager and is responsible for all output from this floor. He is
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supported by one junior Manager, a Hmas Foreman (working as an
ordinary hand for six months of the year), a Bar Foreman
(responsible for "minding" a fully automated machine), a
Processing Foreman, a Bar packing Foreman and a Corn Foreman.
Production Manager, Ground Floor - reports to the Manufacturing
Manager and is responsible for Slab output. This Manager is
supported by two junior Managers, a Depositing Foreman
supported by a Leading Hand, two Shift Oven Foremen each
supported by a Leading Hand, a Cream Room Foreman supported
by one operator and servicing both production floors, and a
Packing Foreman.
Despatch Manager - reports to the Manufacturing Manager and is
responsible for the safe custody and outloading of completed
product to customer vehicles. He is supported by one Leading
Hand, one clerk and two operators.
32) There are no job descriptions in force for the Managers and
Supervisory grades.
33) Morale is poor in the factory and this has not been helped by
the recent replacement of the Manufacturing Manager and the
junior Manager in the mixing bay by two staff from Factory R
where the General Manager was also previously based. Foremen
throughout the Factory consider that their future careers are
threatened by these moves as vacancies at this level have, for
thirty years, been filled internally.
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34) Line Managers have no responsibility for setting or managing
the budgets of their departments.
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Revised Methodolouu for the Diable Sustem Model 
This methodology uses that of Flood D Jackson( 5 PP 93 - 95 ) as
its base. New material is in bold print, where substituted, Flood D
Jackson's words are in brackets and italics.
System Identification:
Rs with any "unitary" methodology it is necessary initially to
identify or determine the purpose(s) to be pursued.
Ask what constitutes the system.
Define the outputs of the system.
Ask if those	 outputs	 meet	 the	 stakeholders
expectations?
What other, or different, outputs are sought by the
stakeholders?
Establish from this whether there is an agreed view of
the purpose of the system. (In the event of no
agreement being achieved or achievable, pursue the
enquiry through all or part of a different methodology).
Taking the purpose as defined (given), determine the relevant
system for achieving the purpose. This is called the "system in
focus."
Remember that the purpose of a system is what it does and what
the viable system does is done by Implementation (System 1)
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it is Implementation (System 1) that produces the "system in
focus").
Specify the viable parts of the Implementation activities
(the System 1) of the system in focus.
Identify the apparently enabling activities carried out
within the system in focus.
Specify the viable system of which the system in focus is part
(wider systems, environment, etc.). This should be that
system which is considered the most useful for the
purpose of the enquiry and will normally exercise a
management or controlling influence.
System Diagnosis
In general, ask the participants to draw upon the cybernetic
principles to carry out the following:
study the Implementation functions (System 1) of the system
in focus and:
- for each Implementation element (part of System I)
detail its environment, operations and localised
management;
- study what constraints are imposed upon each
Implementation element (part of System 1) by higher
management;
- ask how accountability is exercised for each part, and
what indicators of performance are taken;
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- determine whether Implementation Managers
have adequate authority and capability to enable
the fulfilment of purpose.
- model the Implementation elements (System 1)
according to the USM diagram.
Study the Co-ordination functions (System 2) of the system in
focus:
- list possible sources of oscillation or conflict between the
various Implementation elements (parts of System 1)
and their environments and identify the elements of the
system (the various Co-ordinating (System 2) elements)
that have a harmonising or damping effect;
- determine whether "soft issues" such as ethics,
morals and culture are addressed through this
function.
- ask how Co-ordinating activity (System 2) is perceived
in the organisation (as threatening or as facilitating).
Study the Control functions (System 3) of the system in focus:
- list the Controlling (System Three) components of the
system in focus;
- ask how Control is exercised (System 3 exercises
authority);
- ask how resource bargaining with the Implementation
elements (parts of System 1) is carried out;
- determine who is responsible for the performance of the
Implementation elements (parts of System 1);
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- establish whether Control and Development
actiuities are adequately discriminated from each
other.
- clarify what "audit" enquiries into aspects of
Implementation (System 1), Control (System 3)
conducts;
- are audit activities sporadic or routine?
- understand the relationship between Control (System 3)
and Implementation (the System 1) elements (is it
perceived to be aurocratic or democratic?) and find out
how much freedom the Implementation (System 1)
elements possess.
- how are the parts of Control made accountable, at
this level of recursion, for the resources which
they consume? how is their peformance in
enabling the fulfilment of purpose measured?
- are all Control activities necessary to the
maintenance of the system?
Study the Development function (System 4) of the system in
focus:
- list all the Development (System 4) activities of the
system in focus;
- ask how far ahead these activities consider;
- question whether these activities guarantee adaptation
to the future;
- determine if the Development function (System 4) is
monitoring what is happening to the environment and
assessing trends;
437
- assess in what ways, if any, the Development function
(System 4) is open to novelty;
- find out whether Development (System 4) provides a
management centre/operations room, bringing together
external and internal information and providing an
"environment for decision;"
- question if Development (System 4) has facilities for
alerting the Policy function (System 5) to urgent
developments.
- how are the parts of Development made
accountable, at this level of recursion, for the
resources which they consume? how is their
peformance in enabling the development of the
system measured?
- how is the relevance of development activity
determined?
- how does the Development function learn from the
experience of the whole system?
Study the Policy Function (System 5) of the System in Focus:
- ask who is on "the board" and how it acts;
- determine what constraints are imposed on Policy
making by the next higher level of recursion; how
do these limit freedom to adapt?
- assess whether the Policy function (System 5) provides
a suitable identity for the system in focus;
- ask how the "ethos" set by the Policy function (System
5) affects the "perception" of Development (System 4);
- determine how the Policy "ethos" (set by System 5)
affects the Control - Development (System 3-System
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4) homeostat (is Control or Development (System 3 or
System 4) taken more seriously?);
- investigate whether the Policy Function (System 5)
shares an identity with implementation (System 1) or
claims to be something different.
Check that all information channels, transducers and control
loops are properly designed.
fit each stage of the process critically review each
response with the participants to help them explore and
develop their understanding. Rmend results as
necessary.
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